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INTRODUCTION 
international standards and norms on banking regulations have, once 
again, leaped to the forefront of the policy discussion in developed 
nations due to the recent crisis in the world’s financial markets. This 
discussion is far from new, nor does it apply exclusively to the world’s 
most advanced economies. A sound and well-enforced regulatory regime 
can help developing nations to channel financial resources more efficiently 
into investments. For open economies, it can also act as a buffer, an 
important stability factor in today’s shaky market situation.  
Against this backdrop, this study examines the impact of banking 
sector regulations on bank efficienc y  a n d  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  i n  f o u r  
Southern Mediterranean countries (referred to collectively as “South-
MED”) – Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia – while exploring the level 
of convergence of regulatory practices and efficiency to EU Mediterranean1 
standards.  
In particular, the study first compares the banking sector and its 
regulations in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, to international 
standards using measures on the adequacy of regulatory and supervisory 
practices. Second, banking efficiency and the level of convergence to best 
practices are examined using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
complemented by Meta Frontier Analysis and the β-convergence and σ-
convergence methodologies. Third, the impact of the regulatory 
environment on the efficiency of banks is investigated using the developed 
measures of regulatory and supervisory practices. In addition to the 
regulatory details, the performance analysis also considers the legal and 
institutional characteristics of the South-MED countries. Fourth, the study 
                                                      
1 The European Mediterranean countries considered in the study are Cyprus, 
Spain, Greece, Italy, Malta and Portugal (referred to as “EU-MED”).  
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explores how compliance with these standards and norms may influence 
the growth potential of each country.  
Chapter 1 provides a descriptive analysis of the banking sectors of the 
South-MED countries covered in the study. Chapter 2 then develops 
measures of regulatory adequacy in a number of areas and provides 
comparisons with the EU-MED. Chapter 3 summarises the analysis of 
efficiency and convergence between the South-MED and EU-MED. Chapter 
4 analyses empirically the determinants of the efficiency scores, paying 
special attention to the regulatory adequacy measures developed. Chapter 
5 provides a similar analysis for economic growth. The final chapter 
concludes and puts forth the main policy recommendations.  
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1.  OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL 
BANKING SECTORS IN NORTH AFRICA 
1.1  Introduction 
A well-functioning financial system is instrumental in attaining balanced 
and sustainable development. Such a system increases the availability of 
funding by mobilising idle savings, facilitating transactions and attracting 
foreign investments. It can also improve the allocation of financial 
resources by enhancing risk management, transparency and corporate 
governance practices, reinforcing property and creditor rights. Developed 
financial systems are crucial in providing funding to more opaque 
borrowers, such as the first-time and low-income borrowers or small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which represent a significant proportion 
of economic activity but often lack the internal sources to grow.2 In short, 
financial development can serve to ameliorate the distribution of 
opportunities and improve income equality.3 
The emerging consensus in the academic literature is that financial 
development is possible as long as certain conditions are present to ensure 
that financial intermediaries serve the financial needs of the citizens and 
the private sector. These conditions include an adequate and operational 
regulatory structure, a well-defined supervisory authority, legal systems 
that reinforce property and creditor rights, restrained control of 
government over the financial system and macroeconomic stability.  
                                                      
2 See Levine (1997 and 2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine (2008) for a review of 
the literature on financial development and growth. 
3 Although alternative theories exist, financial development is often thought to 
improve income equality by enabling a more just capital accumulation or skills 
development (Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993). See Liang (2006) for 
empirical support and a recent review of the relevant literature.  4 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
Although the four countries covered in this study have embarked 
upon wide-ranging financial reforms, financial development has remained 
relatively limited. With mainly bank-driven financial systems, the surveyed 
countries are ‘under-banked’, i.e. the availability of credit to households 
and businesses is limited. In Algeria and Egypt, these shortcomings are 
quite severe, with bank loans to private enterprises representing less than 
one-half of the country’s  GDP (see Figure 1.1).  
Figure 1.1 Private credit in the Mediterranean and Middle East (% of GDP, 2008) 
 
Source: Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). 
 
This section provides a descriptive analysis of the financial systems of 
the four South-MED countries. The role of the public sector and the 
changing regulatory and legal framework are assessed qualitatively to 
highlight the main shortcomings of the banking system. Apart from legal 
sources and international assessments, the discussion relies on quantitative 
measures of the banking sector in each country, ranging from structure of 
banking, details on aggregate balance sheets and indicators of financial 
soundness.  
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1.2  Algeria 
Algeria’s banking system is characterised by an exceptionally strong and 
persistent presence of the public sector. The public banks direct the 
country’s vast domestic savings to the state-owned enterprises operating in 
the country’s hydrocarbon sector, which produces the country’s chief 
exports. The Algerian government has expressed interest in liberalising the 
sector, although these promises are not backed by realistic policies to 
attract foreign investment. Moreover, although the banks appear to be well-
capitalised, the loan quality is very low, especially in the portfolios of 
public banks, requiring constant restructuring. Access to banking services 
is limited, with over 25,000 inhabitants per branch, or more than twice the 
regional average (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 Structure of the Algerian economy and banking system 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GDP per capita ($)  3,137  3,470  3,904  4,940  4,027 
GDP per capita growth (%)  3.37  -0.70  1.20  2.22  0.52 
Inflation  (%)  1.64 2.33 3.56 4.86 5.74 
Deposit  rate  1.94 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 
Lending  rate  8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
Commercial bank assets  
(% of GDP) 
56 61 69 66 72 
Top-3 banks (% share)  48  54  56  57  57 
Number of commercial banks  19  18  19  21  21 
… of which: public  6 6 6 6 6 
Number of branches  1,183 1,227 1,278 1,287 1,301 
… of which: public  1,063 1,097 1,126 1,093 1,057 
Inhabitants per branch  27,772  27,181  26,489  26,699  26,772 
Sources: IMF and Bank of Algeria. 
Prior to the 1990s, as in most centrally planned countries, Algeria had 
a financial system that could only be described as “financially repressed”. 
A set of regulations, laws and other non-market restrictions prevented the 
intermediaries from functioning at their full capacities. The government 
had full administrative control over the banking sector as a whole, setting 
credit and deposit interest rates, directing the allocation of credit and 
having ownership stakes in practically all credit institutions. The banking 
system had the single aim of providing liquidity for the execution of the 
objectives of the plan. The directed allocation of credit and high liquidity 
levels led to an unrestrained monetary expansion.  6 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
The sector was partially liberalised in 1990 with the entry into force of 
the Monetary and Credit Law (Law No. 90-10). The law was designed as a 
first step to replace the state’s direct control over the banking sector, 
facilitating entry and liberalising interest rates, first the deposit rate and 
then the credit rate in 1994. Between the years 1995-2007, several private 
banks were formed, almost all foreign-owned subsidiaries of prominent 
international banks.4 Although the government has repeatedly renewed its 
commitment to liberalising the sector, the private banks’ role remains 
limited in terms of the mobilisation and allocation of resources, except for 
loans to the private sector where public banks’ predominance is lower 
(Table 1.2).  
Several reasons may explain the deficient growth of the privately 
owned banks in Algeria. First and foremost, the public authorities have 
been historically hesitant to open the banking sector to competition, since 
this may divert financing from public entities. As an example, Algeria’s 
ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has been severely 
hampered by the recent Supplementary Budget Law of 2009 (Ordinance 
No. 09-01, Art. 58). This law requires—among other things—that the 
majority stake must belong to a domestic partner for all new incoming FDI 
flows.5 This new requirement will continue to hamper the privatisation of 
public banks, which puts in question the government’s willingness to 
liberalise the market.  
Second, Algeria has traditionally been seen as a risky country, mainly 
due to political risks.6 The recent financial crisis appears to have reduced 
the investors’ risk appetite, which is often cited as the main reason behind 
                                                      
4 The most notable private banks include Calyon‐Algeria (France), Société Générale 
(France), BNP Paribas El Djazair (France), Natixis (France), Gulf Bank Algeria 
(Kuwait), Arab Banking Corporation (Bahrain), Citibank (US), HSBC (UK), Al 
Baraka Bank (Bahrain) and Fransabank El Djazair (Lebanon).  
5 Other elements of Ordinance No. 09-01, Art. 58 that relate to the FDI inflows 
include i) a requirement to obtain approval from the National Investment 
Development Agency (ANDI) for all new investments, and ii) the rights granted to 
the state and public enterprises to have a “pre-emptive purchase right for all sales 
by or to foreign investors” (see IMF, 2010a).  
6 According to Euromoney magazine’s recent bi-annual survey, Algeria ranked in 
101st place worldwide among 185 countries in September 2010, the lowest among 
the four Southern Mediterranean countries.  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 7 
 
the cancellation of privatisation of Crédit Populaire d’Algérie (CPA), one of 
the largest public banks in Algeria.  
Table 1.2 Market shares of Algerian public banks 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total assets  91.4%  91.7%  92.2%  90.8%  .. 
Private sector loans  85.4%  83.3%  79.4%  77.0%  76.7% 
Public sector loans  99.9%  99.9%  99.8%  99.8%  99.9% 
Total deposits  93.3%  92.9%  93.1%  92.2%  .. 
Branches 89.4%  88.1%  84.9%  81.2%  .. 
Source: Bank of Algeria. 
Table 1.3 Assets and liabilities of Algerian banks (billions of Algerian Dinars) 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 2010* 
Assets  3,893  4,210  5,229  6,511  7,287  7,327 7,510 
Reserves 281  198  274  445  370  340 617 
Balances with foreign 
institutions 
77  91  84  108  142  58 55 
Balances with state  803  876  1,015  941  678  810 805 
…of which: Treasury 
deposits  15  14  84  46  52  83 64 
… of which: Deposits at 
CCP  11  4  12  7  5  15 10 
… of which: Treasury 
bills  669  644  818  793  491  541 552 
of which: Other  109  215  102  95  130  171 180 
Loans 1,534  1,779  1,904  2,204  2,614  3,085 3,185 
… of which: Public 
enterprises  858  882  847  989  1,202  1,485 1,570 
… of which: Public 
authorities  0  0  1  0  0  1 1 
…of which: Private 
enterprises  675  896  1,056  1,213  1,411  1,598 1,613 
… of which: Private 
banks  2  1  0  2  1  1 1 
Other assets  1,198  1,265  1,953  2,813  3,482  3,034 2,891 
  8 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
Liabilities  3,893  4,210  5,229  6,511  7,287  7,327 7,510 
Capital 142  152  161  171  184  302 300 
Reserves 25  20  24  28  169  170 173 
Liabilities to non-
residents 
116  84  115  90  134  46 54 
Deposits 2,705  2,961  3,517  4,322  4,938  4,732 4,880 
… of which: Sight: 
Public enterprises  697  774  1,164  1,832  2,056  1,427 1,511 
… of which: Sight: 
Private enterprises  274  321  442  563  721  904 910 
… of which: Sight: Other 
banks  157  129  144  166  170  173 165 
… of which: Term: 
Public enterprises  254  366  365  351  394  499 509 
… of which: Term: 
Private enterprises  1,189  1,233  1,271  1,396  1,573  1,723 1,779 
… of which: Term: Other 
banks  134  138  130  14  24  7 8 
… of which: Central 
government  67  99  144  218  400  445 444 
Funds by state  49  55  34  29  16  15 14 
Other liabilities  790  840  1,236  1,654  1,446  1,618 1,645 
* March 2010 figures. 
Source: Bank of Algeria. 
 
The predominance of state-owned banks leads to a number of 
problems. First, by providing funding primarily to the public sector, the 
present structure severely restricts the diversification opportunities for the 
Algerian economy. According to recent figures, the share of loans to the 
private sector represent only one-fifth of total banking assets (Table 1.3). A 
large proportion of the total assets are held in loans to public enterprises, 
mostly in the hydro-carbons sector, and balances with the state. Although a 
more effective financial intermediation and diversification of the economy 
are the key aims of the authorities, progress has been limited in channelling 
the domestic savings into the real economy, especially to non-hydrocarbon 
businesses and private enterprises (IMF, 2010a). 
A second problem arises from the allocation of credit to inefficiently 
run public undertakings: in particular, the state-dominated banking sector 
has been characterised by exorbitant levels of non-performing loans 
(NPLs), especially for loans to public enterprises (Table 1.4). Owing to their CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 9 
 
limited role, the public banks lack the institutional framework and 
experience to promote efficient intermediation. Over the past years, this 
fundamental weakness has repeatedly threatened the viability of the 
quality of public banks portfolios, calling for a frequent clean-up of the 
balance sheets via government loan purchases. The government 
implemented such a buy-back program in 2008, when the NPL rate in 
public banks had dropped from 24% of total loans in 2007 to 20%. Despite 
these policies, the NPL rates continue to remain high for the publicly-
owned banks, not only for their loans to state-owned enterprises but also 
for the credit they extended to private-sector businesses. In turn, foreign-
owned private banks, which have almost no exposures to the public sector 
businesses, have relatively low NPL rates, except in recent years due to the 
financial crisis.  
Table 1.4 The Algerian banking system: Key financial soundness indicators 
  2005  2006  2007 2008 
Regulatory capital (as % of RWA)  12%  15%  13% 17% 
…of which: public banks  12%  14%  12% 16% 
…of which: private banks  19%  22%  18% 20% 
NPLs* ( as % of total loans)  19%  18%  22% 18% 
…of which: public banks; all loans  20%  19%  24% 20% 
…of which: public banks; 
private loans  10%  12%  19% 16% 
…of which: private banks; all loans  3%  3%  9% 7% 
Return on equity  8%  19%  25% 25% 
…of which: public banks  6%  17%  24% 25% 
…of which: private banks  5%  23%  28% 26% 
* Non-performing loans (NPLs) include loans in arrears with 100% provisioning 
requirement. The figures include all public and private bank, including the branches of 
foreign institutions. 
Source: IMF (2010a). 
 
In recent years, Algerian authorities have launched a number of 
additional initiatives aimed at increasing the banking system’s lending 
capacity, increasing the minimum capital requirements for banks, and 
reducing the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) through financial 
restructuring of public enterprises. The 1990 Monetary and Credit Law 10 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
foresaw the gradual implementation of the capital requirements set by the 
1988 Basel Capital Accord. After several revisions, the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio of 8% was established in 1999 and has been maintained ever 
since. Reserve requirements were first implemented in 1994 (Instruction 
No. 73-94), gradually raised from a minimum of 2.5% of deposits to 8% by 
2008.  
A deposit insurance scheme was introduced in 1997 (Law no. 97-04), 
providing a guarantee of up to 600,000 Algerian dinars (approximately 
€6,200 at end-2010 conversion rates) per depositor with no co-insurance or 
legally set delays for making payments. The scheme became operational 
with the creation of Société de Garantie des Dépôts Bancaires (SGDB) in 
2003. Under the current regulations, the scheme is funded by an annual 
premium charged on each bank, which is set at 1% of deposits.7 The scheme 
was put to use for the first time in 2004, to reimburse depositors of the 
now-defunct El-Khalifa Bank, which was a private bank that was founded 
in 1998. As noted in the World Bank (2004) assessment, there has been 
some concern that the scheme lacked functional and financial 
independence, which could result in discretionary decisions on its use.  
Turning to legal and informational infrastructure for getting credit, 
the World Bank’s Doing Business (2010) ranking clearly shows that Algeria 
lags behind others, putting it in 135th position out of a total of 183 countries. 
The finding is not surprising. Algeria is behind many countries in terms of 
creditors’ rights and information-sharing capacity. In particular, there are 
no private credit bureaus and the public credit registry’s coverage is largely 
insufficient. Secured creditors’ ability to make claims on collateral is ill-
defined, severely undermining their rights and more generally the legal 
framework for credit. 
To conclude, Algeria’s banking system is dominated by six public 
banks, which continue to collect over 90% of the domestic deposits and 
divert a significant proportion to the mostly inefficient public enterprises 
concentrated in the hydrocarbon sector. Under current conditions, the 
Algerian financial sector is not providing the necessary funding for its 
private sector to successfully diversify its economy in the near- to mid-
                                                      
7 Order No. 03-10 for Money and Credit.  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 11 
 
term, in line with the aims set in its 2009 Action Plan8 and the EU-Algeria 
National Indicative Plan (NIP) for 2011-2013.9 In addition to hampering 
growth opportunities, directed credit undermines credit quality and real 
intermediation. Algeria has ample fiscal space due to its immense 
hydrocarbon receipts and can continue to engage in risky loans and their 
restructuration at regular intervals. However, these strategies should be 
used to resuscitate private sector growth and not to support the ailing 
public enterprises. In conjunction with steps to liberalise the economy, the 
government should improve the pre-conditions for easing the flow of credit 
information and improve creditors’ rights. Doing otherwise may hamper 
credit growth for the traditionally opaque firms, such as small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and may prolong the realisation of the 
benefits from a well-developed financial sector. The use of an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme when a substantial proportion of the banking 
sector is publicly-owned should also be assessed.  
1.3  Egypt 
Egypt’s banking regulations have undergone significant reforms in recent 
years. A new banking law (Law no. 88) enacted in 2003 unified all Egyptian 
banking regulations, reinforcing the independence and regulatory role of 
the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), aligning the prudential standards with 
the Basel II Accord as well as strengthening loan classification rules, 
remedial powers of regulator, risk-based focus on supervision and capital 
requirements. More recent reforms have sought to address reducing the 
state-owned stakes in joint-venture and public banks, enhancing credit 
conditions and increasing access to banking. 
The pervasiveness of state ownership is one of the key challenges of 
the Egyptian banking system. The government-controlled banks account 
for nearly two-thirds of the banking activity. This has undermined 
competition by obstructing entry and contributes to inefficiencies, as is 
evident from the country’s high non-performing-loans. By 2006, the 
reported stock of NPLs amounted to nearly a quarter of gross loans, mainly 
                                                      
8 The 2009 Action Plan is available in French at http://www.premier-
ministre.gov.dz/images/stories/dossier/Plan_action_2009_fr.pdf.  
9 The 2011-2013 EU-Algeria National Indicative Plan (NIP) is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_algeria_en.pdf.  12 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
held in public banks’ portfolios. This has resulted in a set of programmes 
initiated by the Central Bank of Egypt to settle these loans by cash 
injections (funded by privatisation receipts), settlements and investment 
sales. Although the private banks have been increasing their network in 
recent years, most of the branches remain in urban areas. Access to banking 
remains low, as in Algeria, with over 24,000 habitants per branch (see Table 
1.5).  
Table 1.5 Structure of Egyptian economy and banking system 
  2004-05  2005-06  2006-07  2007-08  2008-09 2009-10 
GDP per capita ($)  1,283  1,506  1,771  2,160  2,450 1,283 
GDP per capita growth (%)  2.38  4.90  3.74  4.89  2.62 2.38 
Inflation (%)  8.80  4.20  10.95  11.70  16.24 8.80 
Deposit rate (%)  7.23  6.02  6.10  6.58  6.49 7.23 
Lending rate (%)  13.14  12.60  12.51  12.33  11.98 13.14 
Bank assets (% of GDP)  131  123  126  121  105 101 
Top-3 banks (% share)  58  59  57  55  .. .. 
Public banks (% of total 
assets) 
..  ..  ..  67  .. .. 
Number of commercial 
banks 
52  43  41  40  39 39 
… of which: public  7  7  6  6  5 5 
Number of branches  2,841  2,944  3,056  3,297  3,443 3,490 
… of which: public  2,185  2,222  2,074  2,089  2,088 2,080 
Inhabitants per branch  25,308  25,000  25,360  23,992  24,252 24,212 
Note: Deposit rates correspond to interest rates for three-month time deposits. 
Sources: IMF, Central Bank of Egypt and Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). 
 
Under the reform programme initiated in 2004, a number of publicly-
owned banks with high non-performing loans have been eliminated by 
sales, purchases and mergers. In 2006, the country’s fifth largest bank, Bank 
of Alexandria, was successfully privatised with its acquisition by the Italian 
Sanpaolo IMI group. These measures have reduced the share of the 
publicly-owned banks. Nevertheless, the state continues to maintain a 
significant proportion of the banking system, either directly, as is the case 
of the top-two banks, which are public, representing over one-quarter of 
total assets, or indirectly via partial stakes, as is the case in a number of CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 13 
 
specialised banks and joint-venture stakes held by public banks. There are 
concerns over the future roles of the remaining state banks, as the private 
banks continue their growth and expansion into underserved sectors, 
(World Bank, 2008).  
The state’s influence in banking is not limited to its direct or indirect 
ownership. More broadly, the level of government debt held by banks has 
been very high in Egypt, accounting for an increasingly greater share in the 
banks’ balance sheets. As of October 2010, the share of public debt and 
loans represents around 40% of the total assets of Egyptian banks, up from 
less than a quarter in 2001 (Figure 1.2).  
Figure 1.2 Assets of Egyptian banks  
 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt. 
 
One chief underlying reason for banks’ increasing willingness to hold 
more public debt than private credit is the attractive yields offered by the 
treasury bonds, crowding out credit to other segments.10 The aggregate 
                                                      
10 Since 2004, the Egyptian Treasury bills have often had yields exceeding 9%, 
significantly above the overnight and short-term (3-month) deposit rates, which 
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information on the banks’ balance sheets gives details on the activities of 
Egyptian banks (Table 1.6). More specifically, public debt held by the banks 
has increased substantially in recent years and has surpassed the total 
outstanding private loans as of October 2010. Meanwhile, customer 
deposits represent nearly two-thirds of the total balance sheet. 
There is some evidence that the policies implemented since the early 
2000s to diminish NPLs have also made banks more reluctant to lend to the 
private sector, especially to more risky lines of business. Deficiencies in the 
availability of credit-worthiness information and managerial skills of most 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have also contributed to 
greater-than-normal risks in the real sector. Outstanding bank credits are 
by-and-large concentrated in the blue-chip corporations, with retail and 
SME sectors remaining relatively underserved due to inherent risks. 
Facilitating bank intermediation remains one of the key challenges in Egypt 
and has been the main aim of the recent reform initiatives (IMF, 2010b).  
In recent years, Egypt has made significant strides in the field of 
credit information-sharing. The Central Bank of Egypt, which supervises 
the Egyptian banking system, has operated a public credit registry (PCR) 
since 1957. In 2002, an online system was adopted, permitting banks to 
extract and transmit information electronically. In 2004, the coverage of the 
registry was improved by lowering the threshold for reporting credit to 
E£30,000 (approximately €4,000) (Emerging Markets Group, 2006). In the 
same year, the CBE required the larger credit institutions to report any 
credit card delinquencies (defined as 90 days past due and/or with legal 
proceedings) in an effort to compile a “Negative List Database”; however, 
the database is not distributed directly by the public registry. Legal 
amendments introduced in 2006 allowed the public registry to share 
information with the country’s first private credit bureau, I-score, founded 
by a consortium of the country’s main banks in 2005. Other banks, non-
bank financial institutions and utility companies have also been invited to 
join the private credit bureau in 2008. With these changes, the private 
database is expected to cover a large majority of the lending portfolio of all 
banks.  
                                                                                                                                       
remain around 6 to 7%. These conditions allow the Egyptian banks to earn 
handsome amounts by simply collecting deposits and investing them in public 
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Table 1.6 Assets and liabilities of Egyptian banks (billions of Egyptian pounds) 
  2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 2007 2008  2009  2010* 
Assets  428.4 495.5  577.9  633.4  703.6  761.6 937.9  1,083.3  1,092.0  1,220.7 
Cash 3.5  4.5  5.6  5.4  6.6  6.8 7.7  10.3  11.1  12.4 
Public debt  71.1  87.7  111.3  137.4  170.7  194.0 176.1 201.9  332.6  405.9 
Balances with domestic 
banks 
67.0 83.2  110.9  116.3  125.0  121.7 217.4 278.2  173.5  200.7 
Balances with foreign banks  16.3  20.0  29.8  43.3  51.2  72.6 124.4 122.8  77.1  57.4 
Loans 241.5  266.1  284.7  296.2  308.2  324.0 353.7 401.4  430.0  466.0 
… of which: Public  42.3 45.5  48.2  51.6  59.3  53.6 50.9 57.8  63.6  69.2 
… of which: Private  199.2 220.6  236.5  244.6  248.9  270.4 302.9 343.6  366.3  396.8 
Other assets  29.0  33.9  35.7  34.8  42.0  42.5 58.6 68.8  67.7  78.2 
Liabilities  428.4 495.5  577.9  633.4  703.6  761.6 937.9  1,083.3  1,092.0  1,220.7 
Capital 12.0  12.5  18.2  20.3  22.9  27.1 33.0 37.6  41.6  46.6 
Reserves 10.2  11.2  11.8  11.5  12.4  13.4 12.6 19.8  21.4  28.5 
Provisions 31.2  35.9  40.1  44.6  49.5  55.0 53.5 62.3  69.7  70.4 
Long-term loans & bonds  11.9  14.1  14.9  15.0  14.3  17.5 26.4 22.3  22.0  21.7 
Liabilities to domestic banks  28.2  35.1  35.6  29.9  22.7  21.5 82.6 98.7  31.0  53.9 
Obligations to foreign banks  11.5  11.8  16.2  10.3  12.3  8.8 10.0 13.3  18.2  20.3 
Deposits 291.2  340.9  403.1  461.7  519.6  568.8 650.0 747.2  809.7  892.5 
… of which: Public  .. ..  ..  ..  108.7  108.2 107.1 126.3  139.9  151.9 
… of which: Private  .. ..  ..  ..  410.7  460.9 546.7 624.7  676.4  744.1 
Other liabilities  32.2  34.0  38.0  40.1  49.9  49.5 69.9 82.1  78.4  86.8 
* October 2010 figures. 
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Despite significant improvements in credit information-sharing, 
barely any progress has been noted in improving the legal and institutional 
framework for credit. A number of notable weaknesses exist in loan 
enforcement and collateral foreclosure practices, including an incomplete 
definition of secured transactions that are allowable as collateral. 
Administrative costs for registering land titles and mortgages remain high, 
which make collateralisation difficult. Out-of-court enforcement remains 
largely unavailable, except for secured claims over securities. In particular, 
collection of unsecured debt or secured real estate transactions is only 
possible through complex and lengthy court proceedings. The CBE has 
sought to address these challenges through the creation of an NPL 
Management Unit, the launch of a conciliation and arbitration mechanism, 
and regulatory changes in the real estate finance law. However, these 
moves are unlikely to be as efficient as a full-scale revision of the legal and 
institutional framework for credit.  
The introduction of an explicit deposit insurance scheme was 
foreseen under the second phase of the banking sector regulation reform 
initiated in 2008. Information obtained from the authorities and the CBE’s 
website shows that the scheme aims to protect small depositors. Other 
details on the scheme, such as the type of funding, risk-responsiveness of 
premiums and potential government backing are not available. At this 
moment, no timeline has been provided on when the scheme will become 
operational.  
Other reforms on the agenda that are currently at play include the 
comprehensive implementation of the Basel II standards along with 
supplementary prudential measures to limit excessive risk in the financial 
sector. To that extent, there is some scope for cooperation with the EU for 
capacity-building purposes. The authorities have also expressed an interest 
in encouraging banks to publish more detailed information, where 
cooperation opportunities also exist.  
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Table 1.7 Egyptian banking system: Key financial soundness indicators 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Regulatory capital 
(as % of RWA) 
10.2% 11.0% 11.1% 11.4% 13.7% 14.7% 14.8% 14.7%  15.1% 
NPLs 
( as % of total loans) 
15.6% 20.2% 24.2% 23.6% 26.5% 18.2% 19.3% 14.8%  13.4% 
Provisions (as % of 
classified loans) 
69.4% 62.3% 57.0% 60.2% 51.0% 76.2% 74.6% 92.1%  100.4% 
Return on assets  0.8%  0.5%  0.5%  0.5%  0.6%  0.8%  0.9%  0.8%  0.8% 
Return on equity  13.7%  8.9%  8.9%  9.8% 10.2% 14.3% 15.6% 14.1%  13.0% 
Sources: IMF, Global Financial Stability Reports, 2005-2010. 
 
Although the Egyptian government has been actively engaged in a 
variety of regulatory reforms in recent years, some of the endemic 
problems in the banking sector continue to exist and may well remain 
unaddressed in the upcoming years. Indeed, despite the privatisation 
move, by the end of 2008, the market share of institutions that were wholly- 
or majority-owned by the state remained over half of the total banking 
assets (Table 1.5). Although the NPL rates have dropped considerably, they 
still represent 13.4% of gross loans by the end of 2009. Additionally, a 
significant amount of untapped financial liquidity continues to remain 
dormant within the banking system. The aggregate loan-to-deposit ratio – 
dropping to 53% in 2009 – points to a clear under-leveraging in the sector, 
which has become a more acute problem in recent years, especially after the 
recent set of reforms aimed at improving the banks’ balance sheets. The 
remainder of the banking assets are held in safe and higher-yield 
government debt, with treasury bills held representing nearly one-third of 
total assets. 
These points underscore the present trade-offs between the level of 
public debt, restrictiveness of prudential regulations, extent of information 
sharing, adequacy of corporate governance practices and credit availability. 
Although the government has pursued an ambitious reform agenda in 
some of these areas, a comprehensive assessment is necessary to ensure 
that the post-reform conditions are consistent with the country’s long-term 
development strategy of facilitating endemic growth in the private-sector.  18 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
1.4  Morocco 
Morocco has one of the largest banking sectors in the Southern 
Mediterranean, with the total assets of commercial banks representing over 
120% of the country’s GDP. Commercial banks play a crucial role in the 
country’s financial system and have increasingly developed links with 
other financial intermediaries in the rapidly expanding insurance, 
securities, leasing and factoring sectors. The banking system is relatively 
concentrated, with the market share of the top three banks remaining 
around two-thirds of the total bank assets. In 2009, the sector consisted of a 
total of 13 privately-owned banks, seven of which are majority-owned by 
foreign shareholders, and six publicly-owned banks. In addition to these 
depositary institutions, there are six offshore banks and 12 microfinance 
institutions, which are not included in the figures below.  
The central bank, Bank Al-Maghrib (BAM), was created in 1959 
(under its prior name, Banque du Maroc) to issue banknotes and coins, 
safeguard the stability of the currency and to preserve the soundness of the 
banking system. More specifically, the by-laws of BAM stipulate that the 
chief role of the body is “to ensure the well-functioning of the banking 
system and the implementation of the laws and regulations relating to the 
surveillance and control of the activities of credit institutions and related 
institutions”.11 The head of the body, the Governor, is elected by the 
Sovereign; the head of the supervisory unit within BAM is named by the 
Governor of BAM, with an undefined tenure – possibly for life.  
Macroeconomic conditions have improved in recent years, thanks to 
increased foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittance inflows as well as 
tourism receipts. Fiscal conditions have also recovered due to structural 
reforms and fiscal consolidation efforts.12 Since Morocco has a pegged 
currency, fixed at a basket of currencies consisting of the euro and the US 
dollar, and a partially closed capital account, the capital inflows have 
contributed to increase domestic liquidity and, in parallel, banks’ liquid 
                                                      
11 As translated from Article 9 of Law no. 76-03 on the status of Bank Al-Maghrib.  
12 The fiscal conditions have deteriorated in 2008-10 due to a jump in subsidies and 
lower tax revenues. These conditions are not expected to threaten the long-term 
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assets.13 The central bank (Bank Al-Maghrib-BAM) has increased the banks’ 
required reserves and used its deposit facility regularly to absorb excess 
liquidity and to keep price stability under control. 
Table 1.8 Structure of the Moroccan economy and banking system 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 2009 
GDP per capita ($)  1,308  1,385  1,688  1,905  1,967  2,142  2,427  2,827 2,865 
GDP per capita 
 Growth (%) 
..  2.1%  5.1%  3.5%  1.7%  6.4%  1.5%  4.1% 4.3% 
Inflation (%)  ..  2.8%  1.2%  1.5%  1.0%  3.3%  2.0%  3.9% 1.0% 
Deposit Rate  ..  4.5%  3.8%  3.6%  3.5%  3.7%  3.7%  3.9% 3.8% 
Lending Rate  ..  13.1%  12.6% 11.5%  11.5%  ..  ..  .. .. 
Bank assets 
(% of GDP) 
85%  86%  86%  88%  96%  102%  117%  120% 121% 
Top-3 banks 
(% of total assets) 
..  51%  54%  64%  64%  64%  63%  65% 66% 
Number of banks  19  18  18  17  16  16  16  18 19 
 of which: public  7  7  6  6  5  5  5  5 6 
of which: foreign  7  5  5  5  5  5  5  7 7 
Public banks 
(% of total assets) 
..  ..  ..  ..  ..  29%  27%  26% 25% 
Foreign banks 
(% of total assets) 
..  ..  ..  ..  ..  22%  22%  21% 21% 
Branches 1,805  1,878  1,948  2,033  2,223  2,447  2,748  3,138 3,538 
Inhabitants per 
branch 
15,974 15,540 15,154 14,677 13,559 12,463 11,230 9,952 8,913 
Note: Deposit rate is determined based on the 3-months TD rate and the lending rate is 
determined by the maximum export credit. 
Sources: IMF and Bank al-Maghrib. 
 
                                                      
13 There are several outward capital controls in place in Morocco; inward controls 
have been lifted in recent years. For currency transactions, exporters can deposit 
up to 50% of foreign exchange receipts in the foreign exchange accounts. For 
capital inflows, commercial banks may only borrow abroad to finance foreign 
trade or investment transactions or for covering currency risks for customers. Also, 
outward direct investments of resident firms and citizens are subject to approval.  20 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
The Moroccan banking sector has undergone significant changes 
following the reform process of early 1990s. The process aimed to establish 
a financial sector that serves the market economy, mobilising savings and 
optimally allocating investments. The requirements for private banks to 
hold development bank bonds were largely abolished by the banking law 
of 1993. Interest rate subsidies and controls were completely eliminated in 
the years that followed, with the exception of sight deposits and small 
savings deposits, which continue to be non-remunerated. The more recent 
2006 banking law has reinforced the autonomy and roles of the country’s 
regulatory authority, Bank al-Maghrib (BAM), enlarged its control to the 
entire banking sector, enhanced deposit insurance schemes and broadened 
its supervisory authority. 
Despite the excess liquidity, credit to the private sector remained flat 
in the first half of the 2000s, remaining around 50% of GDP (Figure 1.3). A 
number of underlying factors can be put forward to explain the 
unresponsiveness of credit conditions to the overall availability of liquidity. 
The Moroccan economy is made up of a large number of small firms 
operating in the informal sector with opaque information on 
creditworthiness. Additionally, the banks had a large portfolio of non-
performing loans (NPLs), which undermined their appetite for risk. Lastly, 
the handsome interest earnings from holding excess reserves also 
competed with any real lending activity that the banks might undertake.  
 
Figure 1.3 Private sector credit in Morocco (as % of GDP) 
 
Source: Beck & Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). 
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Private credit growth picked up substantially in the second half of the 
decade, representing over 80% of the GDP by the end of 2009. These 
developments are partly explained by dropping NPL ratios, which might 
have contributed to an increasing risk appetite for banks (Table 1.9). 
Moreover, BAM encouraged lending by strengthening credit information 
standards and risk management capacity of banks, most notably by setting 
up a credit bureau in 2009. The resources of public credit guarantee 
schemes have also been expanded substantially, reaching $370 million 
(0.4% of GDP) in outstanding guarantees in 2009, compared to $251 million 
in 2007.14 Lastly, the rising asset prices, notably in the real estate markets 
(reaching 20% in some cities in 2007), have created a wealth effect and 
increased collateral values, lifting both the demand and supply of credit 
(Allain & Oulidi, 2009).  
Table 1.9 Moroccan banking system: Key financial soundness indicators, 2001-09 
  2001  02  03  04  05  06  07  08 09 
Regulatory 
capital 
(as % of RWA) 
12.6  12.2  9.3  10.5  11.5  12.3  10.6  11.2 11.7 
NPLs (as % of 
total loans) 
17  17  18  19  16  11  8  6 6 
Provisions 
(as % of NPL) 
53  55  55  59  67  71  75  75 74 
Return on equity  10.2  1.9  -2.1  10.9  6.3  17.4  20.6  16.7 17.0 
Return on assets  0.9  0.3  -0.2  0.8  0.5  1.3  1.5  1.2 1.3 
Source: Bank al-Maghrib.  
The aggregate balance sheet for the Moroccan banking sector 
highlights some of the issues discussed (Table 1.10). Unlike their 
counterparts in Algeria and Egypt, public debt represents a small 
proportion of the portfolios of Moroccan banks. This is especially the case 
since 2008, when the ratio of public debt and public loans to total assets 
dipped below 10%.  
                                                      
14 It is not entirely clear to what extent Morocco’s credit guarantee scheme serves 
smaller firms. According to 2009 figures, the average value of guarantees currently 
stand at $155,000, or 60 times per capita income, which are much larger than 
regional and global averages (Saadani et al., 2010).  22 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
Table 1.10 Assets and liabilities of Moroccan banks (millions of Moroccan Dirham) 
  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008  2009  2010* 
Assets  409,576  442,487  507,702  591,284  720,313 828,100  888,566  925,571 
Balances with non-residents  15,862  19,693  28,038  30,618  32,299 28,856  28,599  23,602 
Balances with central bank  38,637  47,753  48,987  53,206  65,932 61,097  42,829  32,184 
Loans 232,305  249,594  289,345  352,198  455,729 561,907  630,504  680,125 
…of which: Government  4,451  4,984  6,723  6,549  6,177 12,252  16,108  16,175 
… of which: Non-bank private  224,369  241,513  271,983  329,483  429,208 534,061  589,555  637,144 
Negotiable debt securities  88,811  85,437  99,278  101,240  103,610 101,275  97,041  98,311 
… of which: Government  78,568  73,752  83,558  88,838  89,344 78,875  69,990  68,906 
… of which: Non-Bank Private  2,430  3,513  6,545  7,130  6,329 12,726  14,795  14,446 
Money market funds  0  0  548  4,084  1,280 1,316  1,756  2,634 
Shares and other equity  13,435  18,084  16,246  21,328  25,161 35,404  45,977  45,407 
Fixed assets  11,494  12,736  13,485  13,727  14,795 15,770  16,806  17,853 
Other assets  9,033  9,190  11,775  14,883  21,507 22,475  25,054  25,456 
Liabilities  409,576  442,487  507,702  591,284  720,313 828,100  888,566  925,571 
Liabilities to non-residents  13,785  11,430  12,022  12,847  12,372 13,472  12,282  19,290 
Liabilities to public & fin. inst.   17,685  17,042  28,466  36,816  48,918 57,887  74,031  84,917 
Non-bank private deposits  279,474  302,863  347,158  403,273  474,915 524,672  542,820  549,676 
… of which: Sight deposits  151,868  170,767  199,490  233,667  291,721 306,617  323,302  326,329 
… of which: Term & saving accounts  127,607  132,096  147,668  169,606  183,194 218,055  219,518  223,348 
Money market funds  0  0  15,323  22,107  30,546 39,202  50,893  59,899 
Negotiable debt securities  9,592  7,559  5,672  6,873  12,236 29,223  36,031  35,956 
Shares and other equity  36,271  37,074  38,986  47,137  57,041 66,266  73,212  78,966 
Other liabilities  34,263  42,256  41,824  37,006  45,865 38,766  39,553  40,299 
* October 2010 figures. 
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In fact, the total outstanding public debt has declined over the last 8 
years while the total assets have increased by more than two-fold. On the 
liability-side, the funding is mostly through customer deposits, which have 
represented roughly 60% of the total liabilities. The banks increasingly use 
the money market for their funding, although their share in total liabilities 
remains small.  
The 2000s have also witnessed the opening of a number of 
microfinance institutions. The 1999 microcredit law allowed these 
institutions to borrow funds from the domestic financial market and offer 
credit without being restricted by rate caps.15 Within several years, 
Morocco became a regional leader in the microfinance sector, currently 
supervised by BAM (after the introduction of the new banking law in 2006). 
By 2008, the Moroccan microfinance sector provided funding to over 1.2 
million active borrowers and a total loan portfolio of over $700 million, 
representing approximately 1% of loans to the private sector.16  
The government’s limited role in the banking sector is another aspect 
that sets Morocco apart from its neighbours. This has not always been the 
case as the Moroccan government maintained a substantial proportion of 
banking under its control in late 1990s and early 2000s. In recent years, 
however, considerable progress has been made in restructuring public 
banks, sale of public shares and the full compliance of remaining public 
banks with regulatory requirements by 2007. The state-owned banks 
continue to represent a significant proportion of total activities, but their 
market shares have declined substantially, down to 25% of total assets in 
2009 from 40% in 2002 (Table 1.8).  
The government’s involvement is not strictly restricted to its direct 
control over the banking sector. The Moroccan government, like its 
neighbours, has used the domestic banking sector to fund the public 
budget. In the 1980s and 1990s, all banks were required to hold a 
substantial proportion of their portfolio in treasury bonds. The banks were 
                                                      
15 Currently, microcredit institutions are not allowed to take retail deposits.  
16 Partly owing to their rapid expansion and diminishing asset quality in recent 
years, the Moroccan microcredit institutions have been hit hard by the 2007-09 
financial crisis, facing unprecedented levels of non-performing and problem loans. 
I n  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  s e c t o r  h a s  s h r u n k  b y  6 %  i n  2 0 0 8  a n d  i s  l i k e l y  t o  f a c e  
consolidation in the upcoming years (MIX, 2009).  24 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
also required to hold bonds issued by the various development banks, 
which were publicly owned. By late 1990s, most of these requirements were 
dropped. As a consequence, the government securities now account for a 
much smaller proportion of the banks’ balance sheets, dropping from 20% 
of total assets in 2003 to about 7% in October 2010 (Table 1.10).  
As noted in the IMF’s (2008) revised assessment, Morocco’s banking 
supervision complies with the majority of the Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision (BCP).17 Morocco has required all banks to 
apply the standardised approach to risk under Basel II since 2007, earlier 
than all other countries in the region.18 BAM has published several 
guidelines for the implementation of the second and third pillars of Basel II, 
in line with the Basel Committee’s recommendations. Minimum capital 
adequacy levels have been shifted to 10% of risk-weighted assets (RWA) in 
2008 with an intention to raise them further to 12% in the upcoming years.  
Morocco is also a leader in other areas of regulation in the region. The 
country is one of the two South-MED countries covered in this study (apart 
from Algeria) to have an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Created in 
2006, the scheme is funded by the banks and compensates depositors for 
lost funds up to 80,000 Moroccan Dirhams (DH) (approximately €7,200 as 
of end-2010) per depositor.19 If the fund is insufficient to pay out all eligible 
deposits, proportional haircuts are applied to the legal protection. The 
funds may also be used to provide emergency credit to problem banks, 
which has been identified as a potential source of conflict by the IMF in its 
most recent FSAP update, even though the fund has never been used for 
that purpose in practice (IMF, 2008).  
As another regional ‘first’, a private credit bureau became operational 
in October 2009. The bureau is developed and operated by Experian, which 
is a global leader in credit information services. The setup of private credit 
                                                      
17 In the IMF’s (2008) assessment, the country’s regulatory structure was compliant 
or largely compliant with 21 of the 25 BCP principles.  
18 The tier 1 requirements have been defined by Regulation No. 24/G/2006 on the 
prudential capital requirements for credit institutions on individual and 
consolidated bases. Upon receiving interest from several banks on the use of 
internal model-based approach to risk, BAM has started work on preparing the 
guiding principles with a preliminary implementation date of 2011-12.  
19 The coverage was raised from 50,000 DH by the 2006 banking law.  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 25 
 
bureaus was heralded by a series of regulatory arrangements in 2007, 
delegating the credit information exchange functions to the private sector 
and effectively abolishing the similar functions of the public credit 
registers.20 According to the legal framework for private credit bureaus, 
BAM acts as an intermediary in the flow of information. All regulated 
credit institutions, including microcredit institutions, are required by law 
(i.e. mandatory reporting) to provide positive and negative information 
about the creditors to BAM. The full data files are then passed over to the 
credit bureau.21 
Despite the absence of formal agreements (i.e. MoUs) or participation 
(i.e. observer in European Committee of European Banking Supervisors – 
CEBS), the Moroccan authorities have also been relatively eager to 
cooperate with their EU counterparts on select matters. Cooperation on 
assisting publicly-owned institutions was in place in early 2000s. Moreover, 
BAM has shown its intention to engage in cooperation on the 
implementation of the internal ratings approach under Basel II and the 
upcoming Basel III agreements. 
To summarise, Moroccan authorities have successfully implemented 
the reform programmes over the last decade to modernise the financial 
services sector. Today, the country is exemplary for its banking regulations, 
deposit guarantee scheme, information-sharing infrastructure and in the 
microfinance sector. The main challenge the country will face in the 
upcoming years will be the potential for instability from external markets 
as capital flows and exchange rate policies are liberalised, as intended by 
                                                      
20 Regulations 27/G/2007 and 28/G/2007 of BAM. For more information on the 
fundamental aspects of the private credit bureaus in Morocco, see the document 
entitled “Enjeux et Modes Opératoires de la Délégation de la Centrale des Risques 
de Bank Al-Magrhip”, 26 November 2007 (available at http://www.bkam.ma/ 
wps/wcm/resources/file/eb455a459c84942/Dpliant%20Dlgation%20de%20la%20
gestion%20du%20Service%20Central%20des%20Risques.pdf).  
21 As noted in Madeddu (2010, pp. 22-23), this innovative “delegated model” 
implemented by BAM is attractive as it i) prevents market segmentation through 
the formation of credit bureaus that have data from only some creditors (i.e. 
‘vertical informational silos’); ii) can facilitate entry by other private information 
providers; iii) prevents lenders’ reluctance to share data directly with the private 
bureaus; and iv) supplements the central bank’s supervisory role by creditor 
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the authorities. Although the IMF’s (2008) stress tests have revealed that 
the banking sector is resistant to credit, liquidity and interest risks, there 
are vulnerabilities arising from concentration risks and exposure to the real 
estate sector. More broadly, the authorities have to ensure that the recent 
jump in private credit does not lead to a resurgence of non-performing 
loans.  
1.5  Tunisia 
Following Morocco, Tunisia’s banking system is the most developed in the 
region, with total assets representing nearly 97% of GDP in 2009. The 
banking system dominates the financial markets, with the capital and 
insurance markets representing a very small proportion of the overall 
financial activities.22 The banking sector is comprised of 18 commercial 
banks, three of which remain publicly-controlled, i.e. with majority state-
ownership.23 The system is relatively dispersed, with the market share of 
the largest three banks accounting for about one-third of the total assets of 
commercial banks.  
The banking system is supervised by an organ of the central bank, 
Banque Central de Tunisie (BCT), although the control over the state-
owned institutions is exercise in part by the Ministry of Finance. The head 
of the supervisory body is appointed by the Governor of the central bank 
with an undetermined tenure.  
The macroeconomic conditions have remained relatively stable in the 
past decade. Following structural reforms, fiscal and external 
vulnerabilities were significantly reduced. Real GDP growth in this period 
remained at around 5% while inflation remained less than 6% for most of 
the decade. Despite these positive aspects, unemployment remains high, at 
around 13 to 14%. The conditions are particularly dire among the youth, 
with 30% of those aged 15-24 remaining unemployed. Indeed, the high 
unemployment rates are blamed as one of the principal causes (in addition 
                                                      
22 The market capitalisation and turnover of the Tunis Stock Exchange remains at 
15% and 4%, according to the 2009 year-end figures.  
23 Other credit institutions, including development banks and microfinance 
institutions, are not included in the figures and constitute a negligible proportion 
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to low levels of accountability) of the protests and fall of the Ben Ali 
government at the beginning of 2011.  
Starting with late 1990s and early 2000s, the Tunisian authorities have 
embarked on an ambitious financial reform. In addition to attempts to 
strengthen the credit culture, the authorities have also revised the laws on 
the central bank and credit institutions in the 2000s.24 The prudential rules, 
first adopted in 1991, were revised in 2001, setting the standards on capital 
requirements, reserve requirements, liquidity requirements, risk 
management and relations with affiliates.25 In the same year, new laws 
were enacted to give the BCT a number of surveillance powers on 
monetary and on-site supervision.26  
Table 1.11 Structure of Tunisian economy and banking system 
  2000  2004  2009 
GDP per capita ($)  2,036  2,845  3,852 
GDP per capita growth (%)  ..  5.1%  1.9% 
Inflation (%)  ..  3.6%  3.7% 
Commercial bank assets (% of GDP)  89%  89%  97% 
Top-3 banks (% of total assets)  ..  ..  34% 
Number of commercial banks  13  16  18 
… of which: public  5  3  3 
Public banks (% of total assets)  49%  44%  32% 
Branches ..  ..  1,209 
Inhabitants per branch  ..  ..  8,541 
Sources: IMF and Banque Central de Tunisie (BCT). 
Although recent privatisation efforts have reduced direct state-
ownership, public banks continue to play a predominant role in the 
banking sector, representing just under one-third of total assets in 2009. The 
                                                      
24 Law no. 58-90 of 1958 on the creation and organisation of the Banque Centrale de 
Tunisie (BCT) was amended in 2006 (Law No. 2006-26) and in 2007 (Law No. 2007-
69). The law on credit institutions (Law no. 2001-65) was amended in 2006 (Law 
No. 2006-19).  
25 Regulation No. 91-24 of 1991 on prudential regulations concerning banks was 
revised in 2001 by Regulation 2001-04.  
26 BCT’s supervisory powers are defined by Law No. 2001-65 and its amendment 
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three banks that remain majority-owned by the state are among the largest 
four banks in the country. The largest one, which also happens to be the 
second largest bank in Tunisia, Société Tunisienne de Banque (STB), 
accounts for around one-third of all loans to the tourism sectors. The 
second largest public bank, Banque National Agricole (BNA), provides 
more than half of the loans to the agriculture and fisheries sectors. The 
third public bank, Banque de l’Habitat (BH), provides nearly one-fifth of 
the real estate loans, which represent a substantial proportion of total 
outstanding credit.  
One of the key characteristics of Tunisia’s banking system is the 
persistently low quality of assets, emanating from problem loans. In 1997, 
the authorities launched a plan to tackle the problem though restructuring. 
As noted in IMF (2002 and 2007), the authorities allowed banks in the early 
2000s to create asset management companies as their subsidiaries in order 
to purchase and pool NPLs. The problem loans to public enterprises were 
similarly restructured, this time backed with government guarantees. In 
2001, reporting requirements were toughened, requiring banks to obtain 
detailed financial statements certified by external auditors or rating 
agencies for large exposures.27 Starting in 2004, the BCT forced banks to 
allocate their net incomes and withhold dividends, if necessary, to cover 
any under-provisions. Two public banks with extensive problem loans 
were privatised in the same year, even though the government continues to 
hold significant minority stakes. Legal reforms to facilitate recovery were 
also implemented in recent years in an attempt to streamline sale of assets 
and restrict undue delays in recovery of claims. More recently, the 
authorities increased the provisioning requirements and expanded the tax 
deductibility of provisions.  
                                                      
27 Detailed information requirements for large exposures were set by Regulation 
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Table 1.12 Assets and liabilities of Tunisian banks (millions of Tunisian Dinar – TD) 
  2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 2007  2008  2009  2010* 
   
Assets  23,745 26,278 27,015  28,185  31,138  33,954  36,470 41,377  46,682  51,892  53,840 
Cash 146  144  139  139  138  136  201 241  235  259  276 
Deposits at BCT  302  605  530  558  764  1,058  1,341 1,920  3,204  3,689  2,824 
Foreign assets  928  808  957  853  906  1,281  1,393 1,996  1,755  2,160  2,258 
Claims on state  1,620  1,487  1,559  1,664  2,145  2,271  2,609 2,817  2,501  3,060  3,014 
Private credit  14,538  16,241  17,122  18,141  19,981  21,561  23,149 25,465  29,322  32,191  34,715 
Securities 746  797  1,020  1,120  1,232  1,415  1,539 1,650  1,803  2,128  2,252 
Other assets  5,465  6,195  5,688  5,711  5,972  6,232  6,237 7,287  7,863  8,404  8,501 
Liabilities  23,745 26,278 27,015  28,185  31,138  33,954  36,470 41,377  46,682  51,892  53,840 
Sight deposits  3,583  3,959  3,697  3,919  4,265  4,721  5,422 6,271  7,000  8,263  8,795 
Other deposits  8,365  9,293  10,119  10,868  12,151  13,273  14,674 16,539  19,278  21,427  22,261 
Foreign liabilities  2,783  2,886  3,280  3,180  3,695  4,194  4,331 4,899  5,147  5,819  5,804 
Liab. to BCT  454  870  504  444  93  4  123 17  18  2  53 
Special resources  849  945  1,080  993  1,033  1,105  1,135 1,092  1,139  1,163  1,177 
Equity 2,841  2,881  3,076  3,431  4,014  4,486  4,928 5,471  6,258  7,064  7,225 
Other liabilities  4,870  5,444  5,260  5,350  5,888  6,170  5,857 7,089  7,842  8,153  8,525 
* May 2010 figures. 
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Despite regulators’ attempts and a generally good performance of the 
Tunisian economy in recent years, the NPLs have remained relatively high. 
As shown in Table 1.13, over the last decade the ratio of NPLs to gross 
loans has remained around 15 to 20% for most years in both publicly-
owned and privately-owned banks. The NPL ratios have declined in recent 
years in line with the objectives set by authorities to reduce them below 
15% by the end of 2009 (see Table 1.13). These developments are, at least in 
part, due to the improved risk assessment practices on the part of banks 
through the increased availability of borrower information, reforms to 
facilitate the sale of collateral, privatisation of public banks as well as the 
new tax and regulatory arrangements on provisioning. Nevertheless, the 
NPLs continue to be a problem in the country’s banking sector, 
representing over 13% of gross loans. 
Table 1.13 Tunisian banking system, financial soundness indicators (%) 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 2009 
Reg. capital 
(as % of RWA) 
11.3  11.1  10.2  9.3  11.6  12.4  11.8  11.6  11.7 12.4 
Private banks  10.6  10.5  10.3  8.4  12.4  13.5  12.1  9.7  11.0 11.6 
Public banks  11.8  11.8  10.1  10.8  10.1  10.0  9.3  9.9  9.6 10.9 
NPLs* ( as % 
of total loans) 
21.6  19.2  20.9  24.2  23.6  20.9  19.3  17.6  15.5 13.2 
Private banks  15.4  16.1  18.1  21.6  20.4  20.0  19.0  18.1  15.3 12.5 
Public banks  26.8  22.8  24.3  26.7  27.4  22.1  19.7  17.3  15.9 14.1 
Provisions 
(as % of NPL) 
49.2  47.4  43.9  44.1  45.1  46.8  49.0  53.2  56.8 58.3 
Private banks  54.7  47.7  44.9  39.9  43.5  45.9  48.4  52.0  55.0 59.2 
Public banks  46.6  47.1  42.9  46.2  47.6  49.1  50.2  55.0  58.1 57.1 
RoA 1.3  1.1  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.9  1.0 1.0 
RoE 14.5  13.2  7.6  4.6  4.8  5.9  7.0  10.1  11.2 11.7 
Sources: IMF (2007 and 2010d). 
Aside from politically-connected lending, several reasons can be put 
forward to explain the persistence of problem loans in Tunisia’s banking 
system.  
First, some of the recent jumps in problem loans in the existing loan 
portfolio can be explained by the external economic environment and 
events. For example, the global slowdown and the recession in the tourism 
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attack in Djerba have severely affected the asset quality of the banking 
system. This pushed the NPL ratios up by 4 to 5% between 2001 and 2003.  
Second, NPL ratios often have a lagged policy response when the 
stock of older NPLs does not improve significantly over time. According to 
IMF (2009), although the new NPLs remain low, the asset quality of the 
existing stock of loans has not improved over the last few years. This was 
largely due to the perverse incentives provided by the prior restructuring 
efforts, giving banks no incentives to opt for a deeper restructuring (i.e. full 
write-offs) or a thorough assessment of the debt-repayment capacity of 
borrowers.  
Third and last, most of the recent policies to address credit quality 
problems are backward-looking and do not have a direct impact on 
reducing NPLs before they arise. This includes a majority of the regulatory 
arsenal put forth by the authorities to address the high level of NPLs, such 
as the use of provisions or the legal reforms, which have only an ex-post 
impact. Indeed, these measures can only mitigate the transaction costs and 
legal uncertainties once the loans are deemed problematic. More forward-
looking risk assessment measures are needed to minimise NPLs before they 
arise. These include the adoption of Basel II standards, more regular stress-
testing, developing CAMEL-type28 regulatory assessment tools and 
enhancing the credit information environment by developing a private 
credit bureau (IMF, 2010d).29  
The (previous) presidential programme of 2010-14 identifies the 
strengthening of the financial sector as a key policy objective. Perhaps most 
importantly, the authorities have shown their willingness to implement the 
Basel II framework, although no clear timeline has been set for the adoption 
of the international standards. A deposit insurance scheme is also under 
preparation under the programme. Other aims include the consolidation of 
the banking institutions, increasing b a n k s ’  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  e c o n o m y ,  
restructuring the public sector and promoting Tunisia as a regional 
                                                      
28 CAMEL-type regulatory tools combine ratios on capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity to develop a composite rating score that is 
used to assess the soundness of financial institutions.  
29 According to the Tunisian authorities, an Early Warning System that permits the 
BCT to rapidly intervene in banks in difficulty is being created.  32 | OVERVIEW OF THE BANKING SECTORS 
 
banking services hub. The relevance of the programme in the aftermath of 
the events of January 2011 remains to be seen.  
Despite the absence of formal arrangements with EU supervisors, the 
BCT will take part in a ‘twinning project’ with the Banque de France to put 
in place the monetary policy tools for supporting price stability and 
reinforcing institutional capacities, including transparency of monetary 
policy actions.  
As the events in the beginning of 2011 amply demonstrate, political 
stability is a key challenge for the country and the region as a whole. It is 
therefore questionable to what extent these ambitious aims, especially those 
relating to the branding of Tunisia’s banking sector as a regional centre, can 
materialise without stable and sustainable political conditions. In addition, 
the Tunisian authorities have to aim more at devising a forward-looking 
supervisory and regulatory regime, giving banks the proper incentives and 
ability to manage risks and limiting moral hazard.  
1.6  Summary 
The foregoing analysis reveals several common features of the banking 
sectors of the Southern Mediterranean countries. In recent years, the 
authorities of the four surveyed countries have engaged in a variety of 
reforms to modernise their banking systems. These include restructuring 
and privatisation of public banks, implementation of prudential regulation 
and risk management frameworks and enhancing supervisory 
responsibilities. Morocco and Egypt have improved the availability and 
sharing of credit information. These reforms have led to a persistent 
growth of credit to the private sector.  
The discussion above shows that one potential explanation of 
financial under-development is the heavy presence of the state, either 
directly in the form of publicly-owned banks or indirectly in the form of 
public debt in banks’ portfolios. For the latest years for which data are 
available (2008-09), the market shares of public banks range from a low of 
one-quarter of total banking assets in Morocco and Tunisia to highs of 67% 
over 90% Egypt and Algeria, respectively. These ownership structures and 
the underlying conditions, such as the high returns that government debt 
earns in Egypt, are likely to crowd out the credit to private enterprises. 
Indeed, public debt and loans, including loans to public enterprises, 
account for nearly one-third of the total balance sheets of the Algerian and 
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Aside from crowding out private credit and constraining financial 
development, the state’s dominant role in the banking sector appears to 
have a serious negative impact on credit quality. Indeed, the ratios of non-
performing loans to gross loans for the Southern Mediterranean countries 
are among the highest globally. Owing to the relatively limited role of the 
state, Morocco is once again an exception, with the lowest NPL ratios 
among the four countries. Moreover, the four countries have implemented 
policies to improve the quality of loans, including privatisation 
improvements in credit information systems, loan repurchase programmes 
and other plans to clean balance sheets. Nevertheless, the banking systems 
of the four Southern Mediterranean countries have the worst loan qualities 
in the region (Figure 1.4).  
Figure 1.4 Non-performing bank loans in the Mediterranean and Middle East  
(% of total loans, 2008)  
 
Note: The 2008 figures on NPLs do not reflect substantial worsening in loan qualities in most 
countries, notably Greece.  
Sources: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2010 and Bank of Algeria. 
The persistence of the non-performing assets and underdeveloped 
financial systems remain leads to questions on the adequacy of the recent 
regulatory reforms in the banking sector in the four countries covered in 
this study. As noted above, the prevalence of the publicly-owned banks 
may be at the root of the problem. However, shortcomings in various legal, 
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regulatory and supervisory frameworks may also matter. The next section 
provides a deeper analysis of the regulatory conditions over several 
dimensions, providing the analytical tools for making cross-country 
comparisons over time.   
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2.  CONVERGENCE OF BANKING SECTOR 
REGULATIONS 
he previous chapter has shown that all the four countries have faced 
substantial reforms in their financial sectors in recent years. In this 
chapter, a number of indices are developed in order to assess and 
track the evolution of the adequacy of banking regulations using publicly 
available and comparable surveys on banking regulations for a large 
sample of countries since the early 2000s. To allow comparability across the 
Mediterranean, the section develops the measures for a total of 11 
Mediterranean countries, including five South-MED countries (Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia); and six EU-MED countries (Cyprus, 
Spain, Greece, Italy, Malta and Portugal).  
The aim of this section is to develop quantitative measures of 
regulatory development that could serve as an indicator in the empirical 
exercises that follow. Seven distinct regulatory areas are identified for 
assessing different dimensions of regulatory adequacy. These cover 
definition of banking, licensing requirements, capital requirements, 
independence and power of supervisor, presence of safety nets, disclosure 
and availability of credit information using distinct data sources. Although 
these provide a broad view of the extent of regulation, several potential 
areas (i.e. payment and settlement systems, credit guarantee schemes, 
financial inclusion, etc.) have been excluded due to the unavailability of 
comparable information sources for the sampled countries.  
2.1  Methodology  
The main source of information for the regulatory adequacy indices are the 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys (henceforth the ‘BRSS’) 
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developed by Barth et al. (2001), later revised in 2003 and 2007.30 All three 
surveys are built on official responses to questionnaires that were sent to 
the national regulatory and supervisory agencies of over 120 countries, 
most of which were returned.31 The questions cover a wide variety of areas, 
including banking activity, entry, capital regulations, supervisory 
authority, private monitoring, deposit insurance and external governance.  
One of the key advantages of the BRSS is that the questionnaires have 
remained relatively similar over the years, although the later versions cover 
more areas than the original survey. This particular feature of the datasets 
allows us to make comparisons by building composite indices based on 
specific answers over time to track the evolution of the different regulatory 
and supervisory elements. 
Figure 2.1 Average response rates for Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys 
(BRSS) of Barth et al. 
 
Note: Response rates are averaged over the three surveys and correspond to the number of 
questions with complete (i.e. excluding empty or partial) answers divided by the total 
number of questions for that year.  
Source: BRSS. 
                                                      
30 For the discussion of the results and other aspects of the data, see Barth et al. 
(2006 and 2008).  
31 The number of countries responding to the survey has increased over time. The 
original survey of Barth et al. (2001) had 117 country respondents, including a wide 
diversity of developed, developing and underdeveloped countries. The later 
revisions achieved greater participation, with 152 in 2003 and 142 country 
participants in 2007. 
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A key disadvantage of the Barth et al. (2001) survey is that the 
number of questions responded to in the 2003 and 2007 revisions vary from 
one country to another. For the Mediterranean countries, the aggregate 
response rates are in generally greater than for the entire sample. As noted 
in Figure 2.1, Morocco’s regulatory authorities have been the most 
responsive to the survey, with nearly a 95% average response rate. In turn, 
the other three Southern Mediterranean countries – Algeria, Egypt and 
Tunisia – have achieved the lower response rates, at about 85%, which is 
below the mean for the Mediterranean countries and comparable with the 
average rate for the entire sample.  
Although the response rates appear high in general, the existence of 
even a single partial or empty answer renders the construction of a relevant 
composite index dubious since there is no clear way of scoring for missing 
responses.32 Moreover, some countries, such as Tunisia and Algeria, have 
not responded to all the three surveys, with Tunisia responding only in 
2003 and Algeria in 2003 and 2007. To avoid any inconsistencies, all of the 
indices used in this study are constructed using questions for which there 
are complete (i.e. non-missing) responses. Moreover, the assessment of 
regulatory convergence is based on the calculation of regional averages, 
weighted by the total banking assets of each country. These allow us to 
make a sounder judgment of whether the regulatory conditions on both 
coasts of the Mediterranean are converging.  
A second disadvantage of Barth et al. (2001) and its revisions was that 
the questions did not cover all the regulatory and supervisory areas. Two 
major areas where the surveys lacked depth were the details on deposit 
insurance guarantee schemes and institutional variables, such as the extent 
of credit information sharing and creditors’ legal rights. In order to cope 
with this shortcoming, several additional sources were used to supplement 
the construction of the composite indices, including the deposit insurance 
database of Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovalı and Laeven (2005), IMF and 
World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment reports, World Bank’s Doing 
Business Indicators and the websites of the national authorities.  
In addition to the data from international organisations and national 
authorities, a questionnaire of the Southern Mediterranean regulatory 
                                                      
32 Our approach differs from Barth et al. (2006), where empty answers were scored 
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agencies was also conducted to obtain deeper and more recent information. 
The questionnaires were of a quantitative and qualitative nature, 
comprising an aggregate data collection exercise (section I), which was 
completed by the country experts using official data and a face-to-face 
interview (section II) with a senior official from the regulatory or 
supervisory agency. In addition to completing some of the missing 
elements of the Barth et al. (2001) surveys, the surveys also focused on 
existing cooperation with the EU authorities as well as self-assessments on 
foreign entry and competition, quality of audits, issues relating to the 
application of Basel II standards, credibility of the insurance schemes and 
other challenges.33  
The face-to-face interviews and data collection were carried out by 
country experts Mohammed Yazid Boumghar (Algeria), Jawad Kerdoudi 
(Morocco) and Moez Labidi (Tunisia). No interviews or data requests were 
conducted in Egypt. For Tunisia and Morocco, the responses for the face-to-
face interviews were low, with a large number of the requested items 
remaining unanswered. A face-to-face interview could not be held with the 
Algerian authorities, although a detailed summary of the financial market 
developments and regulations were provided by the country expert (see 
Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 Response rates to the CEPS questionnaire (% of questions responded) 
Algeria  Tunisia  Morocco 
Section I – Data request 
1. Supervisory agency  70%  90%  0% 
2. Entry & licensing  43%  49%  0% 
3.Information disclosure  50%  100%  0% 
4. Prudential requirements  22%  67%  0% 
5. Crisis management  33%  100%  0% 
6. Deposit insurance scheme  71%  n.a.  0% 
7. Market infrastructure  63%  100%  0% 
TOTAL – Section I  49%  65%  0% 
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Section II - Interviews 
1. Supervisory agency  0%  86%  64% 
2. Entry & licensing  0%  83%  67% 
3.Information disclosure  0%  75%  75% 
4. Prudential requirements  0%  100%  79% 
5. Crisis management  0%  95%  90% 
6. Deposit insurance scheme  0%  n.a.  88% 
7. Market infrastructure  0%  75%  13% 
8. Final remarks  0%  100%  75% 
Total – Section II  0%  90%  72% 
Total – Sections I & II  31%  75%  27% 
Notes: See Annex for an entire list of questions covered under each area. There were no 
responses to Sections I and II from the Moroccan and Algerian authorities, respectively. The 
questionnaires were not sent to the Egyptian authorities. Since a deposit scheme is not in 
place in Tunisia, the questions under part 6 were not applicable.  
 
Seven composite indices are created using the various data sources 
identified above, covering:  
I.  Scope restrictions 
II.  Entry obstacles 
III.  Capital requirement stringency 
IV.  Supervisory authority 
V.  Deposit insurance 
VI.  Private monitoring 
VII.  Credit information and laws 
These areas provide a relatively broad coverage of the quality and 
evolution of banking regulation and supervision. The composite indices 
were calculated for each country and also for the South-MED (plus Israel) 
and Euro-MED countries included in our sample.  
The following sections revise and compare the evolution of the 
regulatory conditions in each of the seven areas noted above.  
2.2  Area I: Scope Restrictions 
As is evident from the differing business models of financial institutions 
across the world, financial institutions are growing increasingly complex 
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to a narrow range of activities, such as taking deposits and issuing credit 
with little flexibility in debt and asset management, while others provide 
more flexibility. The regulations typically restrict the extent to which banks 
may engage in the business of i) securities underwriting, brokering, 
dealing, and all aspects of mutual fund industry; ii) insurance underwriting 
and selling; and iii) real estate investment, development and management. 
The composite indicator used in this area to assess the extent of 
restrictions imposed on banking activity is based on the Banking Activity 
Restrictiveness Index in BRSs.34 The surveys provide measures on the 
degrees of restrictiveness for each one of the above three categories, 
ranging from unrestricted (1 point) and mostly permitted (2 points), to fully 
prohibited (4 points). The Banking Activity Restrictiveness Index sums up 
the scores for each category to come up a measure of the extent to which 
restrictions are present on banks, with a maximum restrictiveness score of 
12 points, where no activity other than narrow banking is allowed.  
Table 2.2 Banking activity restrictiveness (% of maximum score) 
 
 
Note: Greater values represent more restrictive rules as percent of maximum of 12 points.  
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
                                                      
34 Banking activity restrictiveness index is constructed by summing up the scores 
for the World Bank Guide (WBG) questions 4.1-4.3, as detailed in Appendix 2 of 
Barth et al. (2006).  
   2000  2003  2007 
Algeria    42  50 
Egypt    58  58 
Israel  83  83  75 
Morocco  83  58  75 
Tunisia    67   
SOUTH-MED*  83  72  68 
Cyprus  42  67  67 
Spain  50  42  42 
Greece  58  67  50 
Italy  58  67  75 
Malta  58  67  67 
Portugal  50  58  75 
EU-MED*  55  57  59 
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The country-specific results summarised in Table 2.2 show that the 
regulators in the South-MED impose more restrictions than the EU-MED 
countries in general. A deeper analysis of the survey results (not included 
here) shows that on both coasts of the Mediterranean, regulators impose 
some form of restriction on insurance activities, although at a declining 
extent over the years. Israel’s banks face the least flexibility among the 
sampled countries, where all real-estate activities and some securities and 
insurance activities are prohibited. Morocco’s banks cannot engage in real-
estate investment, except for a brief period around 2003. In turn, Algeria’s 
banks face few restrictions, with complete freedom to engage in securities 
and real-estate investment activities. Egypt imposes some restrictions on 
insurance and real-estate, largely comparable with the EU-MED countries. 
Although it is not possible to judge the changing conditions in Tunisia due 
to the lack of data for 2000 and 2007, the country remained close to the 
South-MED averages. Turning to the EU-MED, while the banks in Spain 
and Greece face fewer restrictions than their neighbours, there appears to 
be an opposite tendency for the other countries, especially for Cyprus, Italy 
and Portugal.  
The figures show that there is a convergence tendency when the 
regional weighted-averages are considered. Indeed, while the EU-MED 
weighted-averages move up gradually over time, the South-MED averages 
go down, converging on the former. However, there are clear differences 
within each sub-region. For example, Israel imposes substantial restrictions 
while Egypt has the most flexible system. As for the EU-MED, Spain’s 
system imposes the least amount of restrictions while Italy has increasingly 
narrowed the scope of banking activities over the years.  
2.3  Area II: Entry obstacles 
The competitive conditions in a country depend crucially on the regulatory 
structures, and conditions hinder or prevent entry into the banking sector 
by domestic or foreign banks. In some countries, the obstacles may take the 
form of excessive licensing or entry requirements, which is applicable for 
domestic and foreign banks together. In others, the governments may 
restrict foreign entry as part of a conscientious policy choice, either 
explicitly through setting limits on ownership or more importantly by 42 | CONVERGENCE OF BANKING SECTOR REGULATIONS 
 
rejecting foreign applications in a disproportionate manner.35 Lastly, a 
banking sector that is predominantly state-owned may be disadvantageous 
for the development of privately-owned banks.36  
Three indicators are utilised to construct the composite index 
assessing the impact of entry obstacles.  
The first indicator that comes to mind for measuring how much the 
regulatory structure obstructs entry are the legal licensing requirements, 
which may hamper entry by making the procedures unnecessarily 
cumbersome. The relevant measure is based on the set of requirements for 
the licensing application to be considered valid. The index is built on the 
total number of required documents, including: i) draft by-laws, ii) 
organisational chart, iii) financial projections, iv) financial information on 
potential shareholders, v) background of directors, vi) background of 
management, vii) details of funding sources and viii) market differentiation 
intended.37  
Table 2.3 shows that most South-MED countries impose similar levels 
of stringency in terms of entry requirements with the EU-MED countries. In 
particular, all of the eight requirements named above are commonplace in 
almost all of the South-MED. In this respect, the entry requirements in 
Israel can be clearly distinguished, where potential entrants are only 
expected to submit financial projections and backgrounds of directors as 
well as managers. As for the EU-MED, most countries require all or almost 
                                                      
35 Denials of domestic banks are not considered here as they are more likely to arise 
from prudential concerns, including funding deficiencies or other financial 
problems, which are common place for home-grown banks in countries with less 
developed financial systems that have limited access to external capital.  
36 Aside from their potentially negative impact on entry, state-owned banks may 
fulfil an important developmental role in under-developed regions. Recent 
evidence shows that in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, public 
banks compensate for the low private bank involvement in the SME sector, 
e n g a g i n g  i n  m o r e  r i s k y  l o a n  i s s u a n c e ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  s e e m  t o  h a v e  l e s s  t h a n  
sufficient capacity to manage such risks (Rocha et al., 2010b). See also Andrianova 
et al. (2010) for recent evidence that government ownership of banks is associated 
with higher long-run growth rates in developing countries. 
37 The entry into banking requirements index is constructed by summing up the 
scores for the World Bank Guide (WBG) questions 1.8.1-1.8.8, as detailed in 
Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006).  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 43 
 
all of the eight documents. Cyprus has also reduced its requirements in 
recent years, where potential entrants are required only to submit draft by-
laws and the background of managers as well as directors.  
Table 2.3 Entry into banking requirements (% of maximum score) 
   2000  2003  2007 
Algeria    88  100 
Egypt  75  100  100 
Israel  75  38  38 
Morocco  100  100  100 
Tunisia    100   
SOUTH-MED*  78  71  71 
Cyprus  100  75  38 
Spain  100  88  88 
Greece  100  100  100 
Italy  100  100  100 
Malta  88  88  88 
Portugal  100  100  88 
EU-MED*  99  98  92 
Note: Greater values represent greater restrictive 
rules as share of a maximum of 8 points. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
These results show that most countries in the Mediterranean require 
similar documents for licensing. This means that these figures probably 
gives at best an incomplete picture of the obstacles faced by potential 
entrants. More realistically, these requirements are most likely used on 
both sides of the Mediterranean to screen potential entrants, ensuring that 
they are ‘fit and proper’ to run a banking business. In contrast, in Israel and 
Cyprus, the bar is set much lower, possibly to attract foreign and domestic 
banks to set up their offices on these countries to facilitate entry.  
As noted above, the set of licensing requirements do not paint a 
complete picture of entry obstacles. The second index considers the more 
discretionary power that the authorities enjoy by granting or rejecting 
entry. More specifically, the index is based on the fraction of foreign 
banking licensing applications that have been denied within the past five 
years from the day the questionnaire was conducted.38 The relevant data 
                                                      
38 Share of foreign denials are addressed by World Bank Guide (WBG) question 
1.10, as detailed in Appendix 1 and 2 of Barth et al. (2006). 
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are only available for the 2003 and 2007 questionnaires.  
Table 2.4 clearly shows that foreign banking application denials are 
more commonplace in the South-MED countries, which is in stark contrast 
with the EU-MED where such denials are very rare.39 In particular, all of 
the (four) foreign banking licensing applications for the years between 1998 
and 2002 have been denied in Egypt. More recently, Egypt has denied 
nearly a third of the foreign licensing applications (13 out of 41) within the 
five years leading to 2007. Morocco has denied one of the two applications 
at the same period. Israel has also refused nearly one-fifth of all the foreign 
applications, potentially offsetting its relatively relaxed licensing 
requirements as noted above. Algeria and Tunisia do not appear to use 
foreign denials as an entry obstacle. These results show that foreign denials 
could be one place where there is little sign of convergence between some 
of the South-MED and EU-MED countries.  
The third and last indicator on entry obstacles relates to the 
dominance of government-controlled banking. The index is a simple 
measure of the market power of banks that are majority-owned by the 
state, i.e. 50% or more, in terms of total assets.40  
Table 2.5 points at significant differences on both sides of the 
Mediterranean. While the state has little control over banking in the EU-
MED countries, except for Portugal and Greece, public banks represent 
between 30 to 90% of the banking activity in the South-MED. This is 
particularly the case for Algeria and Egypt where the state has a control 
over a significant majority of the banking sector. State-owned banks in 
these countries often enjoy implicit or explicit state guarantees, with access 
to public funding and possibly subject to less strict or flexible rules, which 
may be a disadvantage for potential entrants and more generally 
undermining competition (Barth et al., 2004). 
                                                      
39 The responses to our own survey do not reveal any particular reasoning—
political or otherwise—for the elevated foreign denial rates in the four Southern-
Mediterranean countries. In their response to the relevant question on foreign 
entry (Question 2.3.a, see Annex), the Tunisian authorities have stated that 
although foreign entry could be advantageous on bank governance and 
accumulation of ‘know-how’, it can also serve to elevate risks by facilitating the 
transmission of external shocks to the domestic financial system.  
40 Share of government-controlled banks is addressed by World Bank Guide (WBG) 
question 3.8.1, as detailed in Appendix 1 of Barth et al. (2006). CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 45 
 
Table 2.4 Share of foreign applications denied 
 
Notes: Question not included in the 2000 questionnaire. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
** For Tunisia, the 2007 result obtained from own survey. 
Source: BRSS. 
Table 2.5 Market share of government-controlled banks (% of total assets) 
 
Notes: Figures represent share of banks with at least 50% state ownership. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
 
   2003  2007 
Algeria  0%   
Egypt  100%  32% 
Israel  17%  20% 
Morocco    50% 
Tunisia  0%  0%** 
SOUTH-MED*  39%  27% 
Cyprus  0%  0% 
Spain  7%  0% 
Greece  14%  0% 
Italy  13%  3% 
Malta  0%  0% 
Portugal  0%  0% 
EU-MED*  10%  1% 
   2003  2007 
Algeria  96  90 
Egypt  65  67 
Israel  46  0 
Morocco  35  29 
Tunisia  43   
SOUTH-MED*  55  33 
Cyprus  4  3 
Spain  0  0 
Greece  23   
Italy  10  9 
Malta  0  0 
Portugal  23  25 
EU-MED*  8  6 
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Put together, the three indices provide a contrasting picture of the 
sampled countries in terms of entry obstacles. The set of documents needed 
for a valid licensing application are similar on both sides of the 
Mediterranean to large extent. These requirements are most likely used to 
ensure that only ‘fit and proper’ undertakings are allowed to operate as 
banks. Only two countries, Cyprus and Israel, can be distinguished in this 
respect, with few licensing requirements. Turning to less official controls 
that the authorities exert on the banking sector, foreign entry denials are 
proportionally high in some of the South-MED countries, particularly in 
Egypt, Israel and Morocco. The state also maintains a substantial direct 
control over the banking sector in most of the countries in the region, with 
publicly owned banks accounting for more than two-thirds of the banking 
sector activities in Algeria and Egypt. In short, although the official entry 
conditions appear comparable, there are significant and persistent entry 
obstacles that can curtail competition in the South-MED banking sectors, 
possibly emanating from official authority in practice and political 
interference.  
2.4  Area III: Capital requirement stringency 
One of the common aims of regulating banks is to ensure that they operate 
soundly. Regulatory capital requirements are an important part of these 
rules, which determine the minimum amount of capital a bank should hold 
relative to its total assets. 
Comparing the capital ratios represents a good first step towards 
understanding how sound the banking sector is. There are clear signs that 
the capital ratios have converged over time. For example, as depicted in 
Table 2.6, the total capital ratios have converged over time across both sides 
of the Mediterranean over time. First of all, with the exception of Malta, 
which can be considered as an offshore centre, all the countries have 
maintained a total capital ratio of between 9 to 15%.41 In recent years, the 
                                                      
41 The banks in the so-called ‘offshore financial centres’ often provide a number of 
advantages to their clients, including low taxes, light regulation and account 
anonymity. These side benefits enable them to collect deposits at relatively low 
costs and place them in safe and liquid assets. As a consequence, these banks often 
have above-average capital adequacy ratios; see Barth et al. (2006, pp. 173-177, 
especially Figure 3.27), for evidence.  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 47 
 
banks in South-MED countries have actually become better capitalised, 
with the average capital ratios reaching to 13% in 2009.  
Table 2.6 Regulatory capital ratios (% of risk weighted assets) 
 
 
 
Notes: Figures represent share of total capital in risk-weighted assets using the 1988 Basle 
Accord definitions. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Sources: BRSS and IMF Global Financial Stability Reports (GFSR). 
The Southern-MED banks appear to be at least as well-capitalised as 
their Northern counterparts, especially after early 2000s. Does this result 
reflect the stringency of capital requirements or a lower appetite for risk? In 
other words, is it the regulations that make the banks sounder or are the 
banks simply not willing to take too many risks? In order to answer this 
important question, it is necessary to look deeper into the rules.  
There are different ways of measuring the stringency of capital 
requirements. The index that is used here gives consideration to the types 
of capital allowed, the risk-weights applied, and whether the minimum 
capital ratios vary with risk. More specifically, the capital stringency index 
aims to determine the extent to which capital requirements restrict leverage 
potential and risky behaviour, including questions on i) whether the 
minimum capital-to-asset requirements are in line with 1988 Basle Accord 
definitions; ii) whether the minimum ratio varies with the bank’s credit risk 
or iii) market risk; and whether the value of iv) unrealised loan losses, v) 
unrealised security losses or vi) foreign exchange losses are deducted from 
   1998  2001  2005  2009 
Algeria    11.9  12.0   
Egypt  10.2  9.8  14.1  15.1 
Israel  9.2  9.5  10.7  12.6 
Morocco  13.1  12.6  11.5  11.8 
Tunisia    11.1  12.4  12.4 
SOUTH-MED*  10.0  10.3  12.1  13.1 
Cyprus  9.9  14.0     
Spain  12.5  13.0  11.7  12.2 
Greece  11.4  13.6  13.3  11.7 
Italy  13.4  10.4  10.6  12.1 
Malta  15.3  18.4  20.6  23.9 
Portugal  12.3  9.5  11.3  10.5 
EU-MED*  12.9  11.0  11.3  12.0 
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regulatory capital. Additionally, the index aims to measure the restrictions 
imposed on the source of regulatory capital, such as vii) whether these 
funds are verified by regulatory authorities; and, whether viii) cash and 
government securities, or more generally ix) non-borrowed funds are the 
only allowed forms of capital for initial disbursements and subsequent 
injections.42 A greater number of affirmative responses to these questions 
lead to a higher stringency score. 
Table 2.7 summarises the comparison of the stringency of the capital 
requirements for the countries in our sample. A quick glance through the 
figures reveals a contrasting picture. Among the South-MED countries, 
Algeria is a clear exception according to the results of the 2007 survey, with 
affirmative answers to all questions except the variability of minimum 
capital ratio according to an individual bank’s market risk. The capital 
requirements are relatively flexible for other countries in the South-MED. 
For example, in Egypt minimum capital ratios do not vary and the 
unrealised loan, security or foreign exchange losses are not deducted from 
regulatory capital. The same also is the case for Morocco and, to a lesser 
extent, Israel.43 The 2003 rules in Tunisia appear to be comparable, at least 
according the 2003 survey for which data are available, to the EU norms.  
Among the EU-MED countries, Spain has the most stringent capital 
requirements, with affirmative answers to all of the nine questions in 2003 
and 2007, followed by Portugal, Malta and Cyprus. For the latter two, there 
is a clear tendency of substantial strengthening of rules following their EU 
accession in 2004. Italy has the most lenient capital requirements, where the 
minimum capital ratios are constant for all banks, only unrealised securities 
losses are deducted from regulatory capital and there are no restrictions on 
the source of regulatory capital as noted in the questionnaire.  
                                                      
42 The stringency of capital requirements index is addressed by World Bank Guide 
(WBG) questions 3.1.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9.1, 3.9.2, 3.9.3, and 1.5—1.7. The calculation of the 
index is detailed in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006), pp. 337-338. One question 
(WBG 3.7) on the fraction of revaluation gains allowed as part of capital is omitted 
from the calculation of the index since the responses were not available for most 
countries in our sample.  
43 Morocco has recently enacted laws to make its capital requirements more 
stringent. In 2009, the minimum capital ratio was raised from 8% to 10%. The 
Moroccan authorities are also preparing to apply an even-higher capital adequacy 
requirement of 12% to the more risky undertakings.  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 49 
 
Table 2.7 Stringency of capital requirements (% of maximum score) 
 
Note: Greater values represent greater restrictive rules as a share of a maximum score of 9 
points. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
 
With these results in hand, it is easy to see that there is a pattern of 
divergence. Some of the EU members have exceptionally flexible capital 
requirements, while the opposite is true for others, especially the new 
member states. In turn, capital requirements of most of the South-MED 
countries are in general less stringent than the EU-MED averages, 
especially regarding rules on deductions for unrealised loan losses and 
risk-based supervision.44 Therefore, the capital adequacy ratios are high in 
the South-MED, most probably not because of the stringency of the 
underlying rules but because of the business models and the risk-aversion 
of banks.  
                                                      
44 These results are largely in line with the key regulatory shortcomings identified 
for the region in Tahari et al. (2007), using compliance of European countries with 
Basel Core Principles on prudential regulations and requirements (BCPs 6 to 15) as 
a benchmark. 
   2000  2003  2007 
Algeria    33  89 
Egypt  56  33  33 
Israel  33  67  44 
Morocco  44  44  33 
Tunisia    67   
SOUTH-MED*  43  51  45 
Cyprus  11  44  67 
Spain  89  100  100 
Greece  44  56  33 
Italy  33  22  22 
Malta  67  56  67 
Portugal  44  78  89 
EU-MED*  54  57  62 
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The findings should be interpreted with care. The capital requirement 
standards as summarised by the Basle Accords were designed, at least until 
very recently, for and by the regulators in advanced economies. Our own 
surveys in Morocco and Tunisia reveal that the regulators face constant 
challenges in applying the capital requirements. The key difficulties 
identified by the authorities are instructive and include: i) absence of 
external rating systems; ii) deficiencies in banks’ information systems, 
which favour foreign banks over domestic institutions; iii) lack of well-
developed credit information systems; iv) financial opaqueness in most 
enterprises and v) resistance to change, both from banks and borrowers. 
There is also evidence that the strict enforcement of capital adequacy 
requirements can lead to a severe ‘credit crunch’ in countries where the 
alternatives to bank-based financing are less developed (Chiuri et al., 2002). 
In turn, all of the Southern Mediterranean countries, with the exception of 
Morocco, have substantial stocks of non-performing loans, which warrant a 
more severe approach to provisioning practices.  
These remarks highlight the fact that the regulations that are 
conceived with developed countries in mind may not always be applicable 
for developing countries, calling for refinements in certain areas, 
including—but not limited to—the applicability of the internal-ratings 
based approach to risk in Basel II.  
2.5  Area IV: Supervisory authority 
A key issue in the effectiveness of banking regulations is whether the 
supervisory authorities have the necessary powers to apply a variety of 
measures to discipline or, at the extreme, resolve banks that violate the 
rules or engage in imprudent activities. To that extent, in most countries, 
the supervisors take prompt corrective action against a bank if the capital 
falls below the minimally required level. If the deterioration of the bank 
continues, the supervisor must have the ability to find a resolution before 
the bank becomes insolvent, posing a systemic threat. In order to be 
effective, the supervisors need access to reliable and frequently updated 
information on the condition of the banks. The judicial systems often allow 
the courts to intervene, diminishing, postponing or reversing illegitimate 
supervisory actions; however these should not undermine the supervisor’s 
chief responsibility of protecting and ensuring an orderly operation of the 
banking market. These aspects of the supervisory system issues should be 
in line with the regulatory priorities and not subject to political patronage. CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 51 
 
In short, the supervisors should have the authority to discipline potentially 
troubled banks and resolve problems while remaining independent from 
political influence.  
Two indices are used for measuring supervisory authority.  
The first index measures the official power of the supervisor to take 
specific actions to correct or prevent problems. The relevant questions 
include the ability of supervisors to i) meet external auditors without 
approval of bank; ii) communicate directly with auditors on illicit activities 
undertaken by bank’s management or directors; iii) receive disclosure of 
off-balance sheet items; iv) take legal action against negligent auditors; v) 
change organisational structure of troubled banks; vi) order management 
or directors to cover losses; vii) suspend dividend distributions; viii) 
bonuses and ix) management fees. Additionally, for the 2003 and 2007 
surveys, additional questions on troubled banks were also considered on 
the supervisors’ ability to x) declare insolvency; xi) suspend ownership 
rights; xii) supersede shareholder rights and xiii) fire or hire management 
or xiv) directors.45 An affirmative answer to any of these questions 
represents a greater supervisory power. Some of these powers may only be 
exercisable by some supervisory-like institutions, such as the depository 
insurance agency or the bank restructuring agencies, which grant a more 
moderate power to supervisors.46 I n  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  t h e  c o u r t s  o r  t h e  
government may be involved, which would serve to void the power of the 
supervisors in those actions.  
Interestingly, Table 2.8 shows that the South-MED grant more power 
to their supervisory authorities. This is particularly the case in Egypt, 
which has responded affirmatively to all of the questions in all three 
surveys. In Morocco, the supervisory authorities also exert substantial 
power, although they cannot take legal action against external auditors for 
negligence. In Algeria, which is the only South-MED country with 
decreasing official power in 2007, the supervisory agency may no longer be 
                                                      
45 The official supervisory power index is addressed by World Bank Guide (WBG) 
questions 5.5-5.7, 6.1, 10.4, 11.2, 11.3.1-11.3.3, 11.6, 11.7, and 11.9.1-11.9.3. The 
calculation of the index is detailed in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006), pp. 339-342.  
46 In these cases, the aggregate score is augment by only ½ points; for more details, 
see calculation of the index is detailed in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006), pp. 339-
342.  52 | CONVERGENCE OF BANKING SECTOR REGULATIONS 
 
able to suspend the granting of executive bonuses and management fees for 
troubled banks. In Tunisia, only the courts can declare a bank insolvent, 
which is increasingly the case in most developed countries.  
Table 2.8 Official supervisory power (% of maximum score) 
 
Note: Greater values represent greater restrictive rules as share of a maximum score of 14 
points in 2003 and 2007 and 9 points in 2000. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
Turning to the EU-MED countries, it is interesting to see that the new 
member states, Cyprus and Malta, grant increasing official power to their 
authorities. The same applies to Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Spain. Italy 
once again obtains the lowest score in official supervisory power: unlike 
other countries in our sample, the Italian supervisory authority has no right 
to sue external auditors for negligence, order directors or managers to 
cover losses, suspend the decision to distribute dividends, bonuses, or 
management fees, or remove the management.  
The second index for assessing supervisory authority turns more 
generally to the independence of the supervisor from political influence. 
For this index, three questions from the BRSS are considered: i) Are 
supervisory bodies accountable only to a legislative body? ii) Are 
supervisors legally liable for its actions committed in exercise of their 
duties? iii) Does the head of the agency have a fixed term? The level of 
   2000  2003  2007 
Algeria    100  79 
Egypt  100  100  100 
Israel  44  50  71 
Morocco  78  89  93 
Tunisia    93   
SOUTH-MED*  69  76  83 
Cyprus  100  57  86 
Spain  44  64  82 
Greece  56  86  71 
Italy  33  36  50 
Malta  67  100  100 
Portugal  67  100  100 
EU-MED*  41  54  69 
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independence is determined by points obtained by counting affirmative 
answers to questions (i) and (iii) and a negative answer to (ii).47  
The results depicted in Table 2.9 show a clear divergence in terms of 
independence from political interference. While the banking supervisors of 
the EU-MED countries have become more independent, not much has 
changed in the South-MED countries. The biggest concern remains the 
accountability of the supervisor directly to the executive arm, i.e. president, 
prime minister or other cabinet members, which is the case in all of the 
Southern Mediterranean countries.48  
Table 2.9 Independence from political interference (% of maximum score) 
 
 
Notes: Greater values represent more independence as share of a maximum score of 3 points. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
                                                      
47 The independence from political interference index is addressed by World Bank 
Guide (WBG) questions 12.2, 12.10, and 12.2.2. The calculation of the index is 
slightly different than the specification in Appendix 2 of Barth et al. (2006), pp. 349-
350, in that in order to score a point in question 12.2 the supervisory bodies should 
be accountable to no one other than a legislative body, such as the Parliament or 
the Congress.  
48 In the case of Morocco, the governor of the Bank Al-Maghrib serves at the 
discretion of the King.  
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   2003  2007 
Algeria  33  0 
Egypt  67  67 
Israel  33  33 
Morocco  33  33 
Tunisia  67   
SOUTH-MED*  44  36 
Cyprus  67  100 
Spain  67  100 
Greece  67  67 
Italy  0  33 
Malta  100  67 
Portugal  100  100 
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Of particular concern is Algeria, where none of the three criteria 
outlined above is satisfied in 2007, which implies an enormous potential for 
political interference. The same can also be said for other countries, such as 
Israel, Morocco and possibly Tunisia. In comparison, the supervisor is 
accountable to the Parliament in almost all EU members except Italy and 
Malta. Once again, the Italian supervisory authority remains well below the 
EU standards in terms of independence from political interference due to 
its accountability to the central government and its legal liability for 
damages to a bank in exercise of its duties. Another key distinguishing 
factor is the fixed-term for the head of the regulatory authority, which is 
not available as an option in Algeria, Israel or Morocco but has become 
increasingly popular among the EU members.  
The results of the BRSS surveys reviewed in this section show that the 
powers granted have increased or remained constant in almost all of the 
countries. Moreover, the official powers granted to supervisors appear to 
be on the rise on both sides of the Mediterranean. Turning to operational 
independence, the government officials have the ability to politically 
interfere in the work of the supervisors. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
supervisors are assigned almost full authority, it is possible that these 
powers remain notional due to government interference. Provided that 
some of the South-MED countries have substantial government presence in 
the banking sector (already noted above), the operational independence 
should be a guiding principle to ensure that all banks – publicly or 
privately-owned – are treated equally. 
2.6  Area V: Deposit insurance 
Deposit insurance systems are among the key elements of a country’s 
financial safety net, designed to prevent any disruptions to the financial 
markets and the economy. By protecting depositors, the deposit insurance 
schemes provide confidence to relatively small depositors and prevent 
bank runs. At the same time, they may introduce moral hazard, 
diminishing the depositors’ incentives to monitor and screen the banks and 
amplifying the shareholders’ incentives to engage in excessive risk. The 
moral hazard problem implies that banks have incentives to take on risk 
that can be shifted to a deposit insurance fund or, ultimately, the tax 
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Efforts are being taken across the world to mitigate moral hazard 
problems arising from deposit guarantee schemes.49 First, the amount of 
coverage matters. In some countries, aside from limits on the total amount, 
a co-insurance is imposed to ensure that depositors bear some part of the 
costs.50 Second, the use of risk-adjusted premiums may also serve to better 
internalise the costs of the risks that they take. Third, the way that the 
deposit insurance schemes are funded also matters. For example, when the 
government is explicitly or implicitly involved in providing the necessary 
funds, moral hazard may be attenuated, especially in countries where the 
government has ample resources. In turn, when the system is backed with 
funds by banks, moral hazard can be limited by the understanding that the 
amount of guarantees is restricted with the pooled reserves.  
Looking at the existing schemes, there are clear differences on both coasts 
of the Mediterranean (Table 2.10). The revised EU Deposit Insurance 
Directive requires member states to maintain deposit insurance with a 
coverage limit of at least €100,000, raised from a minimum of €20,000 in the 
aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis. 51 Most of the countries in the EU-
MED have chosen to set this base amount as their coverage limits, 
representing between to 4 to 7 times the average annual income figures. 
The 2009 amendment has also abolished the co-insurance system, which 
allowed up to 10% of losses to be shared with covered depositors. Risk-
based premiums exist only in Italy and Portugal. Setting itself clearly apart 
from the other countries in the region, Italy has an ex-post funding 
structure, where the banks are required to contribute after the deposit 
guarantee scheme is activated. Cyprus and Malta have hybrid systems in 
which substantial amounts of supplementary (ex-post) funding may be 
activated if the funds’ resources fall below pre-set levels. The levels of ex-
ante funds display substantial variation, wherever they exist, with a low of 
0.01% of eligible deposits in Cyprus and a high of 1.00% in Portugal.  
                                                      
49 See Kane (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005) for a review of the potential 
effects and key design features of the deposit insurance schemes.  
50 Empirical evidence shows that the coverage limits and co-insurance practices 
serve to reduce bank failure likelihoods substantially, (Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002).  
51 Directive 2009/14/EC, which amended the Deposit Guarantee Directive 
94/19/EC. The minimum amount of €100,000 has been in force as of 31 December 
2010.  56 | CONVERGENCE OF BANKING SECTOR REGULATIONS 
 
Table 2.10 Deposit guarantee schemes in the Mediterranean, latest available figures 
  Est. 
date 
Coverage limit  Primary 
funding 
by 
Co-
insurance 
Risk-based 
premiums 
Ex-post/ 
ex-ante 
Ex-ante 
coverage 
ratio** 
€ (Dec. 
2010) 
(% of GDP per 
capita, PPP) 
SOUTH-MED                 
Algeria  1997 6,200  108%  Banks  No No  Ex-ante  n.￿. 
Egypt  -               
Israel  -               
Morocco  2￿06 7,200  228%  Banks  No N  Ex-ante  1.40% 
Tu￿isia                 
EU-MED                 
Cyprus  1997 100,00  4￿3%  Banks  No* No  Hybrid  0.01% 
Spain  1977 100,000  439%  Banks  No* No  Ex-ante  0.80% 
Greece  1995 100,000  482%  Banks  No* No  Ex-ante  0.58% 
Italy  1987 103,291  462%  Banks  No* Yes  Ex-post  0.00% 
Malta  2003 100,000  785%  Banks  No* No  Hybrid  0.10% 
Portugal  1992 100,000  595%  Banks  No* Yes  Ex-ante  1.00% 
 
 * Co-insurance has been abandoned by the amending Directive 2009/14/EC. 
** The actual coverage ratio is calculated as the ratio of ex-ante funds and eligible deposits using published figures for 2007-08. 
Sources: European Commission (2010), IMF (2008), Bank Al-Maghrib (BAM) and Banque d'Algérie (BNA) . 
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Tuning to the South-MED countries, Egypt, Israel, and Tunisia have 
no schemes in place.52 In Algeria and Morocco, the coverage limits 
represent one to two times the average annual incomes, pointing at a much 
lower level of protection afforded than in the EU. As in the EU-MED, the 
deposit guarantee schemes do not have a co-insurance option or use risk-
base premiums. Algerian authorities are involved in the funding of the 
system, which is not surprising since the publicly-owned banks represent 
nearly 90% of the total banking assets.  
The deposit insurance scheme index identifies the level of observance 
of standards that are thought to mitigate the moral hazard problem. Since 
recent information is available, the index is constructed for the years 2003, 
2007 and 2010. For countries with an explicit system, three issues are 
relevant: i) whether a co-insurance discount is applicable to payouts, ii) 
whether premiums are risk-adjusted and iii) whether only banks take a 
primary role.53 An additional point is scored for an affirmative answer to 
each one of these questions. A score of zero is assigned to countries where 
no explicit system exists, since in those cases the government is assumed to 
provide implicit guarantees, implying a greater incentive to take risks by 
banks.54  
                                                      
52 In Egypt, although the legal framework allows for the establishment of an 
autonomous deposit insurance fund, no scheme has been setup yet. 
53 The calculation of the deposit insurance scheme index follows the format 
detailed in Barth et al. (2006, p. 354), except that a score of zero is assigned for 
countries with no explicit insurance scheme.  
Three separate sources were used for the deposit insurance scheme information. 
First, the BRSs provided the basic information and evaluation for 2003 and 2007. 
Whenever the BRSS gave conflicting or incomplete results, the information 
contained in Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005), the European Commission’s (2010) 
assessment of EU deposit guarantee schemes as well as the legal documents from 
the websites of Bank Al-Maghrib (BAM) and Banque d’Algérie (BNA) were used. 
54 Gropp & Vesala (2004) shows that credible implicit guarantees operating 
through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress can aggravate 
the moral hazard problem when compared to explicit deposit guarantee schemes. 
As the authors note, the key issue is whether the institutional and fiscal conditions 
would make the inherent guarantees credible. It is assumed here that the three 
countries with no explicit systems, namely Egypt, Israel and Tunisia, have ample 
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Table 2.11 Deposit insurance index (% of maximum score) 
 
 
Notes: Greater values represent greater restrictive rules as share of a maximum score of 
3points. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
** The Algerian deposit guarantee system, which existed since 1997, was partly funded by 
the government in 2003.  
Sources: BRSS, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005), European Commission (2010), Bank Al-Maghrib 
(BAM) and Banque d’Algérie (BNA). 
The figures in Table 2.11 show that moral hazard issues are more of a 
threat in the South-MED countries. For the most part, this is due to the 
absence of deposit guarantee schemes in Egypt, Israel and Morocco (in 
2003), and Tunisia. The Algerian system was equivalent to an implicit 
guarantee in 2003 since the government had a direct funding role.55 
Turning to countries with explicit systems, some similarities emerge. Out of 
the three issues outlined above, Algeria, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Malta and 
Morocco only satisfy the requirement that the banks (and not the 
government) take the primary role of funding the scheme in 2010. The 
                                                                                                                                       
fiscal resources and the necessary institutional framework that could make such 
guarantees credible.  
55 Under Law no. 90-10 of 1990 regarding money and credit, the Algerian Treasury 
was a contributor to the deposit guarantee fund (Art. 170). More recently, the 
government’s funding role has been replaced with full funding by banks under the 
amending Law no. 03-11 of 2003 regarding money and credit (Art. 118).  
   2003  2007  2010 
Algeria  0**  33  33 
Egypt  0  0  0 
Israel  0  0  0 
Morocco  0  33  33 
Tunisia  0  0  0 
SOUTH-MED*  0  8  8 
Cyprus  67  33  33 
Spain  33  33  33 
Greece  33  33  33 
Italy  67  67  67 
Malta  67  33  33 
Portugal  100  100  67 
EU-MED*  55  52  50 
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Italian and Portuguese systems, in turn, include risk-adjusted premiums, 
impacting significantly the EU-MED averages. Lastly, the EU-MED 
averages display a downward trend, which is entirely due to the gradual 
abandonment of the co-insurance payouts.  
Many of the South-MED countries have been reluctant to develop 
deposit insurance schemes. A badly designed scheme can invite additional 
risks and may not be better than a system with no scheme at all. The results 
show that the schemes that exist in Algeria and Morocco (as well as in other 
EU-MED countries) may indeed amplify the moral hazard risks. These 
conclusions, however, should be interpreted with care. As the recent 
financial crisis has shown, when a run on a bank has the potential to spur 
broader panic, the governments are likely to step in to stop a potential bank 
run, notwithstanding the type of explicit arrangements in place.56 One may 
wonder, quite justifiably, whether the named arrangements do really 
mitigate moral hazard when they may be so easily replaced with limitless 
state support. However, it should not be forgotten that such blanket 
guarantees are not viable in most of the South-MED countries with limited 
public resources. Therefore, the explicit schemes, wherever they exist, are 
the only viable insurance for depositors, highlighting the importance of the 
design issues in resource-poor countries.  
2.7  Area VI: Private monitoring 
Most of the regulatory factors considered in this study relate to the rules 
and standards set forth by the regulators, which are used to distinguish 
between acceptable and unsound behaviour. In this manner, the regulatory 
principles are often well-defined, calling for compliance with specific rules 
or standards. However, banks are also influenced by these hard-wired 
forces. Market forces and investors may also be crucial in shaping the 
decisions and, in particular, restraining risky behaviour. For example, 
block-holders can, at least in theory, exercise their voting power to 
influence managerial actions. More realistically, debtors or stockholders 
use available information to assess the bank’s conditions and indirectly 
influence the management by withdrawing funds, which has an impact on 
                                                      
56 This was amply demonstrated during the Northern Rock fall of 2007 when the 
UK Treasury, extended the existing guarantees on bank deposits – with a 
maximum payout of £31,700 at the time—to cover all deposits.  60 | CONVERGENCE OF BANKING SECTOR REGULATIONS 
 
the borrowing costs of the banks. As far as depositors and other debt-
holders are concerned, private monitoring could be seriously undermined 
when an explicit and overly generous deposit insurance scheme exists.  
The availability of reliable and timely information to investors is at 
the core of market disciple. The index is therefore based on the survey 
responses to a number of questions on disclosure rules and standards, 
comprising whether: i) a certified audit is required; all of top-10 banks are 
rated by ii) domestic and iii) international credit rating agencies; income 
standards include accrued through unpaid interest on iv) performing or v) 
non-performing loans; vi) banks are required to produce consolidated 
accounts; vii) directors are liable for erroneous or misleading reporting; 
v i i i )  s u b o r d i n a t e d  d e b t  a l l o w a b l e  o r  r e q u i r e d  a s  p a r t  o f  c a p i t a l ;  i x )  o f f -
balance items are disclosed to the public; x) banks are required to disclose 
risk management procedures and xi) supervisors are required to make 
enforcement actions public.57 The private monitoring score increases with 
affirmative answers to the previous set of questions.  
The comparisons points at a small but growing disparity between the 
coasts of the Mediterranean (Table 2.12). Although most countries fulfil a 
majority of the requirements, the constant progress of the European 
countries is not paralleled in Southern countries.  
The most striking difference between the Southern and Northern 
countries is the share of the top-10 banks that are rated by (international or 
domestic) credit rating agencies, which has widened substantially 
according to the 2007 survey. In particular, almost all of the top-10 banks 
are rated by credit rating agencies in the EU, except Malta. In the South-
MED countries, most banks are not rated. In some cases, this is due to the 
inherent structure of the market. For example, Algeria’s largest banks are 
state-owned and were not subject to ratings as of 2007. In other countries, 
there are clear problems with disclosure. In two of the most developed 
                                                      
57 The private monitoring index is addressed by World Bank Guide (WBG) 
questions 5.1, 5.3, 10.7.1-2, 10.1, 10.1.1, 10.3, 10.6, 3.5-6, 10.4.1, 10.5, and 11.1.1. The 
calculation of the index is slightly different than the specification in Appendix 2 of 
Barth et al. (2006, pp. 350-352), excluding a question on the presence of an explicit 
deposit insurance, which is already covered in another index. CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 61 
 
markets in the region, Israel and Morocco, only half of the top-10 banks are 
rated.58  
Table 2.12 Private monitoring (% of maximum score) 
 
Note: Greater values represent greater restrictive rules as share of a maximum score of 11 
points. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
Another common issue, especially more recently, is the exclusion 
accrued (though unpaid) interest from income statements, which allows 
them undue flexibilities in determining their earnings. Also, Tunisian and 
Algerian banks are not required to produce consolidated accounts that 
cover all financial subsidiaries. Lastly, according to the 2003 BRSS, the 
banks in Tunisia are not required to make public their risk management 
procedures, which became standard in the region in recent years.  
These results show that the regulatory structures of South-MED 
countries have not matched the progress in the North countries in 
enhancing their disclosure rules. It is true that there are broad similarities 
on both sides of the Mediterranean. For example, a certified audit is 
compulsory in all of the sample countries and the accounting rules exhibit 
                                                      
58 These results may also arise from a small or highly concentrated banking sector. 
In such a case, only a handful of top banks will dominate the banking sector while 
the other (smaller) banks will be subject to less investor scrutiny.  
   2000  2003  2007 
Algeria    73  64 
Egypt  64  73  73 
Israel  73  82  82 
Morocco  64  82  73 
Tunisia    55   
SOUTH-MED*  68  77  71 
Cyprus  73  82  82 
Spain  82  82  91 
Greece  64  82  91 
Italy  64  82  82 
Malta  73  82  82 
Portugal  82  64  73 
EU-MED*  71  80  86 
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similarities in most of the countries. However, the proportion of banks 
subject to independent ratings has not changed much in the South-MED 
countries over the past few years. These results call for a serious 
examination of the readiness or the appropriateness of deposit insurance 
coverage in these countries.  
2.8  Area VII: Credit information and laws 
Access to information and creditor protection laws are crucial for ensuring 
the smooth operation of credit markets. Economic theory suggests two 
crucial limits to the amount of credit that financial institutions can grant to 
potential borrowers. On the one hand, credit conditions are clearly bound 
by the ability of creditors to enforce contracts, require repayment, claim 
collateral and possibly gain control over the receivables. The easier these 
actions, the more likely will be the lenders to grant the loans. On the other 
hand, lenders would like to have access to accurate information on the 
potential borrowers, such as credit histories, other lenders and other 
banking transactions.  
Theoretical models suggest that an operational information-sharing 
infrastructure can reduce adverse selection in credit markets and facilitate 
access to credit, especially among more opaque borrowers such as small- 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993). When such 
information is available, the creditors can make a better judgement on the 
credit-worthiness of the borrowers. Other studies have documented the 
importance of creditors’ rights on the availability of credit (La Porta et al., 
1998 and Levine, 1998). Recent studies have confirmed these views with 
increasingly convincing evidence that both credit information mechanisms 
and creditors’ rights have a nontrivial impact on the flow of credit and  
financial development (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002; Djankov et al., 2007; and 
Haselmann et al., 2010). 
The credit information and laws indices developed in this subsection 
are based on the Getting Credit methodology developed in the World 
Bank’s Doing Business surveys.59 The relevant area covers the legal rights 
                                                      
59 First started in 2003, the World Bank’s Doing Business surveys cover over 180 
countries, providing a snapshot of regulatory and legal conditions and their effects 
on businesses, especially on small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Each year, 
the surveys are sent out to a large number of local experts specialising in different 
fields, including lawyers, consultants, officials and other professionals who are in 
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of borrowers and lenders with respect to secured transactions and the 
extent of credit information-sharing. Two sets of indicators are used for 
these purposes.  
The first set describes how well the collateral and bankruptcy laws 
facilitate lending, covering: i) ability to use moveable assets while keeping 
possession of assets; ability to obtain non-possessory security rights in ii) a 
single or iii) all moveable asset classes without requiring a specific 
description of the collateral; iv) extension of security rights to future or 
after-acquired assets; v) ability to secure all types of debts and obligations 
via a general description; vi) availability of a collateral registry; ability of 
secured creditors to obtain priority without exceptions in the case of vii) 
defaults viii) liquidations, and ix) restructuring; and x) possibility of out-of-
court agreements on collateral enforcement. An affirmative answer to any 
one of these questions enhances the relevant scores.60 
Table 2.13 Strength of legal rights (% of maximum score) 
 
Note: Greater values represent more independence as share of a maximum score of 10 
points. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
Source: BRSS. 
                                                                                                                                       
close contact with the legal and regulatory structures of the covered countries (the 
results of the surveys are available from http://www.doingbusiness.org/).  
60 See the World Bank’s Doing Business website on more details on the 
methodology (http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/getting-credit).  
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Algeria  30 30 
Egypt  30 30 
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Morocco  30 30 
Tunisia  30 30 
SOUTH-MED*  57  55 
Cyprus   90 
Spain  60 60 
Greece  30 30 
Italy  30 30 
Malta    
Portugal  30 30 
EU-MED*  41  44 
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Table 2.13 shows that the legal rights granted to creditors are slightly 
less in the South. Israel does exceptionally well, better than almost all 
countries, by satisfying all but one criterion on the availability of out-of-
court agreements on collateral enforcement. Among the EU-MED 
countries, Cyprus also does equivalently well, complying with all but one 
criterion, namely regarding the secured creditors’ claims during 
reorganisation. Spain also performs well but fails to grant some of the 
sought-after rights to secured creditors and over future assets. Other 
countries, including those in the South-MED, do relatively badly, 
complying only with the standards on the use of movable assets as 
collateral, ability to grant non-possessory rights for a group of assets and 
the use of debts in collateral agreements.  
The second index measures the availability, coverage and depth of 
credit information, either through public credit registries or private credit 
bureaus. The relevant questions relate to the i) collection both positive and 
negative information, ii) collection of data on firms and information, iii) 
collection of data from retailers and utility companies, iv) availability of 
credit history for at least two years, v) availability of data on small loans 
(i.e. less than 1% of annual incomes) and vi) ability of borrowers to access 
their credit history. As above, an affirmative answer to any one of these 
questions leads to an additional score for the credit information index. 
Table 2.14 clearly shows that the South-MED countries lag behind 
their Northern counterparts in terms of the depth of credit information. The 
figures also show that the differences have diminished in recent years. 
Israel is clearly an outlier, especially according to the more recent Doing 
Business survey where it satisfies all of the six criteria except the 
distribution of positive and negative credit information. With no credit 
information sharing infrastructure in place, Cyprus is another exception.  
More broadly, the EU-MED countries comply with almost all of the 
criteria. A common shortcoming, present in Italy, Greece and Portugal, is 
that the private registries do not collect information from retailers or utility 
companies. The South-MED countries (except Israel) have notable 
deficiencies on credit information availability and sharing, despite 
significant improvements over the last few years. As of 2008, two countries 
in the region had operational private credit bureaus: Egypt and Israel. 
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relatively low since borrowers have no right to inspect their credit histories 
and since data from retailers are not used.61  
Table 2.14 Depth of credit information (% of maximum score) 
 
Note: Greater values represent more independence as share of a maximum score of 6 points. 
* Regional averages are weighted by total banking assets. 
** The 2007-08 figures for Morocco do not take account of the fact of the creation of the new 
private credit bureau that became operational in 2009.  
Source: BRSS 
Public credit registers exist in all of the countries, although their 
effectiveness varies. Focusing on the South-MED countries with public 
registries only, i.e. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, several common 
weaknesses are notable. 62 First, none of the countries provide borrowers 
the right to access or contest information on their own credit histories. 
Second, the registries do not collect and distribute data from retail and 
utility companies. Also, Tunisia and Morocco also scores relatively low, 
                                                      
61 Egypt has substantially improved on these weaknesses in 2009-10 and has 
increased its score to a perfect 100%, according to the Doing Business 2011 survey 
results. For more information, see http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/ 
overview/economy/egypt.  
62 According to the most recent Doing Business 2011 survey for the year 2010, 
Morocco obtains an almost perfect score (83%). For more information, see 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/overview/economy/morocco.  
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mostly due to the absence of detailed data collection. Lastly, although the 
Algerian public registry collects and distributes both positive and negative 
information, it does not distribute detailed information on a borrower’s 
history or small loans. 
In summing up, the figures above show that despite substantial 
reforms in recent years, the South-MED countries clearly lag behind in 
terms of the use of credit information. The same cannot be said concerning 
the strength of legal rights; most of them on both sides of the 
Mediterranean have a similar set of legal rights granted to the creditors. 
Based on recent findings that highlight the importance of credit 
information-sharing not only for the availability of credit but also for the 
stability of the banking sectors as a whole, the South-MED countries should 
do all they can to converge to the EU’s standards on this front (Houston et 
al., 2010). The types of reforms that have been introduced in several 
countries, such as Egypt, should be a model for others in the region to 
assure an even development of their economies with the flow of credit 
flowing to the smaller and more opaque firms.  
2.9  Conclusions 
The previous sections reviewed the quality and the level of convergence of 
the regulatory and supervisory structures of the South-MED and EU-MED. 
The assessment included seven dimensions, including scope of banking, 
entry obstacles, the stringency of capital requirements, the power and 
independence of the supervisory authority, incentives provided by the 
deposit insurance scheme, private monitoring and creditors’ rights and 
access to information. This section will provide a summary of these areas, 
offering a comparative analysis of the seven composite indicators that 
aggregate the relevant indices.  
Figure 2.2 and Table 2.15 diagramme and summarise the key 
remaining weaknesses that distinguish the South-MED countries from their 
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Figure 2.2 Regulatory standards in South-MED and EU-MED regions 
 
 
 
Note: The diagrammes above sum up the weighted averages for the regulatory indices in 
each of the seven areas discussed in sections 2.2 to 2.8. The North-South disparities are 
highlighted in shades of red, with darker shades representing greater differences, i.e. more 
than 25% disparity. For entry into banking, depth of credit information and strength of legal 
rights indices, the South-MED averages exclude Israel as an outlier. For credit information 
and laws indices, 2004-05 and 2007-08 figures were used.  
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Table 2.15 Key regulatory weaknesses in the South-MED 
  Description General  remarks  Algeria Egypt  Morocco  Tunisia 
AREA I. Scope 
restrictions 
Restrictions on or 
prohibition of 
various activities 
In line with EU-
MED standards 
Some restrictions on 
insurance 
Some restrictions on 
real-estate 
Some restrictions on 
insurance; real-
estate activities 
prohibited 
Some restrictions on 
insurance & real-
estate activities 
AREA II. Entry 
obstacles 
Licensing, foreign 
entry & presence of 
public banks 
Below EU-MED 
standards due to 
foreign denials & 
role of government 
Public banks 
represent >90% of 
bank activity 
Foreign denials; 
public banks 
represent > 60% of 
bank activity 
Foreign denials  Few obstacles; 
public banks have 
diminishing role 
AREA III. 
Capital 
requirements 
Extent to which 
capital requirements 
restrict risks 
Increasing disparity 
due to risk-
insensitivity 
Surpassing most of 
EU-MED standards 
Market & credit 
risks not considered; 
broad def. of capital 
Market & credit risk 
not considered; 
broad def. of capital 
Comparable with 
EU-MED standards 
AREA IV. 
Supervisory 
authority 
Ability of 
supervisors to 
prevent & correct 
problems 
Below EU-MED 
standards due 
potential for 
political interference 
High potential for 
political interference 
Supervisor enjoys 
full set of powers 
Some potential for 
interference 
High potential for 
political interference 
AREA V. 
Deposit 
insurance 
Presence of an 
explicit scheme & 
mitigation of moral 
hazard 
Below EU-MED 
standards due to 
implicit insurance & 
adverse incentives 
No co-insurance or 
risk-adjusted 
premiums 
Implicit government 
guarantees 
No co-insurance or 
risk-adjusted 
premiums 
Implicit government 
guarantees 
AREA VI. 
Private 
monitoring 
Availability of 
reliable & timely 
information to 
investors 
Increasing disparity 
due to poor 
accounting practices 
Top banks not rated; 
flexibility in 
accounting 
Several top banks 
not rated 
Several top banks 
not rated; flexibility 
in accountings 
Flexibility in 
accounting rules; no 
risk mgt. disclosure 
AREA VII. 
Credit info. & 
laws 
Ability of legal & 
information systems 
to facilitate lending 
Below EU-MED 
standards due to 
deficient info system 
Public registry only; 
no borrower access 
or detailed info 
Private registry 
established in 2006 
Public registry only 
prior 2009; common 
issues prior that 
date 
Public registry only; 
no borrower access 
or detailed info 
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The collective assessment of the convergence of the regulatory and 
supervisory structures of the South-MED countries with the EU-MED 
standards gives a mixed picture (Figure 2.2 and Table 2.15). Despite some 
improvements, key weaknesses remain in deposit insurance, entry 
obstacles and credit information. Moreover, some recent issues recent 
disparities have also become apparent, especially in the stringency of 
capital requirements, potential for political interference and private 
monitoring.  
The deposit insurance index has failed to improve since neither the 
Egyptian nor Tunisian authorities have put in place an explicit insurance 
scheme. As discussed in Section 2.6, implicit schemes may enhance risk-
taking through a blanket government guarantee for the leading institutions. 
Moreover, even in Algeria and Morocco, no effort has been made to align 
the banks’ incentives by implementing risk-based premiums or co-
insurance schemes, which would help internalise some of the costs to the 
deposit guarantee schemes due to excessive risk-taking.  
The South-MED countries have implemented a number of reforms to 
improve the availability and use of credit information by financial 
institutions. Egypt and, more recently, Morocco have established private 
credit bureaus in 2006 and 2009, respectively. Nevertheless, the South-
North gap has not been narrowed. Algeria and Tunisia continue to rely 
only on public registries, restrict the borrowers’ right to inspect their credit 
histories, fail to collect and distribute detailed data, including from non-
bank sources, such as retail stores or utility companies. Although the 
literature provides little guidance, private credit bureaus have an improved 
access to new technologies and know-how to ensure that information-
sharing mechanisms work effectively. The countries in the region should 
continue to monitor developments and spearhead innovative systems to 
use the stock of information and infrastructure already set-up by the public 
systems.63  
                                                      
63 Morocco may serve as interesting example, by effectively combining the data 
collection roles and capacities of the Bank Al-Maghrib, which operates the public 
registry, and the newly established private credit bureau, Experian-Morocco. For a 
comparative analysis of the Moroccan and Egyptian credit information systems, 
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Another major issue, the presence of entry obstacles, continues to be a 
key weakness of the regulatory structures of the region. Although the 
licensing requirements exhibit similarities on both sides of the 
Mediterranean, other indicators point at substantial barriers to entry. 
Government ownership, which is widespread in the region, gives undue 
advantages to incumbent banks and restricts entry incentives. In Morocco, 
the government-owned banks represent a declining proportion of total 
bank activities; in Algeria, Egypt and (to some extent) in Tunisia, the 
government-ownership persists. Although government ownership may 
have some beneficial side benefits, the authorities have to ensure that such 
roles are well-defined and should not be an obstacle to the development of 
the financial system.64 The rates of foreign denials are also very high, 
further supporting the idea of substantial entry barriers and competitive 
advantages enjoyed by domestic incumbent banks.  
In addition to these three key weaknesses, the 2007 survey points at 
three new concerns. The stringencies of capital requirements, which were 
in line with the EU standards in 2003, have deteriorated according to the 
latest BRSS survey. There are some exceptions, like Algeria and, to a lesser 
extent, Tunisia. However, in Egypt and Morocco, the capital requirements 
and accounting standards have become more flexible and less risk-
sensitive. Poor accounting practices have also contributed to an increasing 
disparity in private monitoring indices.  
Lastly, political interference has become a significant possibility, 
potentially undermining supervisory authority and reinforcing the 
governments’ direct control – an additional concern on the competitiveness 
and efficiency of the banking sector. As the eruption of public discontent in 
Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 clearly attests, the region’s governments 
have attempted to maintain (perhaps for far too long) a tight grip on their 
countries’ political and economic systems. It is exactly such forms of 
interference that may conflict with the objectives of the financial and 
competition authorities.  
                                                      
64 Rocha et al. (2010a) notes the essential role that public banks fulfil in the region 
by providing financing to the SMEs. The authors note that private banks are unable 
to fill this gap largely due to the generally weak quality of financial infrastructure, 
including the availability and reliability of information on potential borrowers.   
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3.  ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY AND 
CONVERGENCE 
he process of financial reform undertaken by both developed and 
developing countries aimed to establish a market-based financial 
sector, to boost bank competition through improved mobilisation of 
savings, to enhance market-based allocation of resources and to foster more 
efficient risk-management capabilities. However, the conventional wisdom 
relating to the positive effect of reforms on financial sector performance is 
not always validated by empirical studies (Berger et al., 2000). Despite a 
vast literature on the effects of deregulation on the efficiency and 
productivity of banks (see Berger & Mester, 2003; Mukherjee et al., 2001, 
Isik & Hasan, 2003, Zhao et al., 2010, among others) deregulation seems to 
have had a positive effect in some countries but not in others. Indeed, the 
outcome of deregulation policies seems to reflect several country-specific 
demand and supply conditions of the banking industry prior to 
deregulation. 
This part of the study attempts to shed light on these issues by 
examining the effect of financial reform on the efficiency of the banking 
sector in 11 countries in the Mediterranean region: Cyprus (CY), Algeria 
(DZ), Egypt (EG), Spain (ES), Greece (GR), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), Malta (MT), 
Morocco (MA), Portugal (PT) and Tunisia (TN) over the period 1995-2008. 
The second part of the analysis aims to contribute to the current debate on 
fostering integration in the Mediterranean region. Following Casu & 
Girardone (2010), we use the concepts of β-convergence and σ-convergence 
and employ a dynamic panel data analysis to assess the speed at which 
financial markets are integrating.  
Our results indicate an improvement in bank efficiency across the 
region, particularly in the latter part of the sample period. The overall mean 
efficiency in the region is increasing, driven by technological improvements 
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by the best practice banks. Spanish banks dominate the region both in 
terms of overall efficiency and of meta-technology ratios. Nonetheless, 
during the sample period, the average meta-technology ratio for the region 
is also increasing, thus indicating an ability of banks in all countries to 
appropriate the best available technology.  
These results are supported by the estimation of β-convergence  σ-
convergence. The β coefficient is always negative and statistically 
significant, thus indicating that convergence in efficiency scores has 
occurred across countries in the MED-11 area. Furthermore, results for the 
σ-convergence suggest an increase in the speed of convergence as the σ 
coefficient is always negative and statistically significant. This indicates 
that, whereas the technological gap is still wide, it is narrowing at a faster 
speed. 
3.1  Literature review 
There is a vast literature on the use of frontier techniques to evaluate bank 
efficiency, using both parametric and non-parametric methodologies. 
While earlier studies focused on one methodological approach and on 
individual countries (mainly the US, or EU countries) (Berger & 
Humphrey, 1997; Goddard et al., 2001), in recent years both the number of 
cross-country studies and the number of studies focusing on developing 
countries has increased, mainly due to the unprecedented economic 
reforms implemented in such countries (for a review of recent literature 
see, among others, Berger (2007), Goddard et al. (2007) and Hughes & 
Mester (2010).  
Most cross-country studies assume that banks in different countries 
can access the same banking production technology. In other words, they 
assume a common production frontier for all countries in order to be able 
to compare efficiency results across borders. The interpretation of the 
resulting efficiency scores relies significantly on the validity of this 
assumption. In some cases this is a major drawback, as the production 
technology is substantially different among countries, particularly if 
countries are at different levels of financial development. Bank efficiency 
estimates may be influenced by factors not generally included in the 
efficiency analysis, such as differences in bank type, ownership and other 
bank specific conditions. In such cases, the assumption of a common 
frontier may be misleading. Further, such an assumption can lead to bias 
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in regulatory, competitive and economic conditions that are beyond a 
bank’s control (Dietsch & Lozano-Vivas, 2000 and Chaffai et al., 2001). The 
Bos & Kool (2006) study indicates that if environmental factors are not 
appropriately controlled, efficiency estimates may be biased. Recent 
empirical studies have attempted to overcome this problem by integrating 
country-specific environmental variables into the efficiency estimation.  
The influence of environmental variables on cross-country efficiency 
levels has been of interest for many researchers. Bikker (2004) investigates 
the differences in X-efficiency levels of European banks and concludes that 
X-efficiency estimates from single-country studies, as often found in the 
literature, can be very misleading. He documents significant differences in 
cost-efficiency scores across countries and sizes of banks, bank 
specialisation as well as institutional conditions (supervisory rules, 
government interference, customer preferences and level of development). 
Bos et al. (2005) analyse the effects of accounting for heterogeneity on the 
German bank efficiency scores for the period 1993-2003. They find that 
banks of different sizes, geographic origins and types (cooperative and 
savings) have significantly different cost efficiency scores. Dietsch & 
Lozano-Vivas (2000) investigated the influence of the environmental 
conditions on the cost-efficiency of the French and Spanish banking sector 
over the period 1992-98. They showed that the specific environmental 
conditions of each country occupy an important role in the definition and 
specification of the common frontier of different countries.  
In fact, when environmental variables are incorporated in the model, 
the differences between both banking industries are reduced substantially 
and the cost-efficiency scores improved. The Chaffai et al. (2001) study, on 
a sample of European countries over the period 1993-97, report similar 
findings. They conclude that controlling for environmental conditions 
reduces the differences in average operational inefficiency scores among 
countries. Grigorian & Manole (2006) use a DEA approach to estimate the 
efficiency levels of transition countries between 1993 and 1995 and a two-
step approach to explain the differences in efficiency across countries. They 
find that foreign ownership and enterprise restructuring enhance 
commercial bank efficiency. Bos & Kool (2006), on the other hand, find that 
market specific factors and regional macroeconomic factors are of limited 
importance in explaining operational efficiency of the Dutch cooperative 
banking sector. Battese et al. (2004) have recently proposed a so-called 
‘meta-frontier’ as the method to estimate country or regional-specific 
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absolute sense. The meta-frontier results from the envelopment of regional 
specific frontiers. Bos & Schmiedel (2003) apply the meta-frontier 
methodology to eight European banking markets for the period 1993–2000. 
The authors conclude that for most countries included in the study, profit 
efficiency in particular improves significantly when estimated using a 
meta-frontier instead of a common frontier arguing that this may be 
evidence of the importance of local market circumstances. Ben Naceur et al. 
(2011) examine the effect of financial-sector reform on bank performance in 
selected Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries in the period 
1994-2008 using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and employ a meta-
frontier approach to calculate efficiency scores in a cross-country setting. 
They then employ a second-stage regression to investigate the impact of 
institutional, financial and bank-specific variables on bank efficiency. 
Overall, their results show that the observed efficiency levels of banks vary 
substantially across markets, with differences in technology explaining 
most of the efficiency differentials. 
Several studies investigate the existence and implications of financial 
convergence, especially in relation to the deregulation processes.65 Only a 
few studies, however, directly address the issue of the relationship between 
financial integration and bank efficiency. Tortosa-Ausina (2004) examines 
the convergence in efficiency of Spanish banks following deregulation 
through a model of distribution dynamics and finds evidence of decreased 
dispersion of efficiency scores at the end of the deregulation period. 
Murinde et al. (2004) investigate the convergence of the banking systems in 
Europe following the launch of the single market programme in 1993. They 
find weak evidence of convergence and only for specific products. Weill 
(2009) attempts to provide evidence of financial integration by estimating 
the convergence of cost efficiency derived from the application of SFA 
methodology. His results indicate an on-going process of convergence at 
the EU level. More recently, Casu & Girardone (2010) evaluate the 
dynamics of EU banks’ cost efficiency by means of DEA and then assess 
their convergence both towards an EU-wide frontier and towards best 
practice. Their results seem to provide supporting evidence of convergence 
of efficiency levels towards an EU average. Nevertheless, the potential 
                                                      
65 See Baele et al. (2004) for a review of different measures of financial market 
integration. CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 75 
 
gains brought about by increased integration seem to have been offset by a 
decrease in the overall efficiency levels of EU banks.  
3.2  Methodology 
3.2.1  Data Envelopment Analysis 
DEA is a mathematical linear programming technique developed by 
Charnes et al. (1978), which identifies the efficient frontier from the linear 
combination of those units/observations that (in a production space) use 
comparatively fewer inputs to produce comparatively more outputs. The 
original (or Charnes, Cooper and Rhoades - CCR model) assumes constant 
returns to scale (CRS), which is the optimal scale in the long run. Banker, 
Charnes and Cooper (1984) (or the BCC model) include an additional 
convexity constraint (λ) to allow for variable returns to scale (VRS). In 
particular, if at any time t there are N firms that use a vector of inputs to 
produce a vector of outputs, the input-oriented BCC measure of efficiency 
of a particular firm is calculated as: 
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where  i θ 1 ≤  is the scalar efficiency score for the i-th unit. If  i θ =1 the 
i-th firm is efficient as it lies on the frontier, whereas if  i θ  < 1 the firm is 
inefficient and needs a (1-  i θ ) reduction in the inputs levels to reach the 
frontier.  
The choice of using a DEA is based on several considerations: it 
works well even with a small sample size and it does not require any 
assumption about the functional form of the frontier or of the inefficiency 
component. We adopt an input-minimisation orientation, based on the 76 | ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY AND CONVERGENCE 
 
assumption that during periods of regulatory changes and increased 
competition, market participants strategically focus on cutting costs. 
Therefore we would expect changes in inputs used to be closely associated 
with the changes in market structure.  
3.2.2  Meta-frontier analysis 
There are various ways to incorporate environmental variables in the 
estimation of bank efficiency, the most commonly used are the one-step 
and the two-step approach. In the one-step approach, environmental 
variables are included directly in the estimation of efficiency whereas in the 
two-step approach, efficiency scores obtained in the first stage of analysis 
are then regressed on a number of country-specific environmental 
variables. Both approaches are employed in the literature: the one-step 
approach seems to be the preferred choice if using a parametric approach 
to the efficiency evaluation, following the maximum likelihood procedure 
of Battese & Coelli (2005). On the other hand, the two-step approach seems 
to be the favoured approach if efficiency is estimated by means of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In a typical two-stage study, the relative 
efficiency of each institution is evaluated in the first stage based and then 
regressed (as the dependent variable in an ordinary least squares or a Tobit 
regression) on various explanatory variables in the second stage to identify 
the factors whose impact on efficiency is statistically significant. A 
theoretical justification for the use of a two-stage method that uses DEA in 
the first stage is provided by Banker & Natarajan (2008).  
Departing from the standard two stage approach, Battese et al. (2004) 
and O’Donnell et al. (2008) recently proposed a so-called ‘meta-frontier’ 
method to estimate country or regional-specific frontiers and obtain 
comparable efficiency scores, as the meta-frontier results from the 
envelopment of regional specific frontiers.  
In this study, to accommodate the potential country variation of 
available banking technology and to obtain comparable technical 
efficiencies for the countries in our sample, we follow the meta-frontier 
approach. If we consider the available technology to be a state of 
knowledge in existence at a given point in time, we can define the meta-
technology as the totality of the regional/country-specific technologies. The 
meta-frontier production function is therefore a frontier function that 
envelops all frontiers of individual countries/groups. CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 77 
 
T o  a p p l y  t h e  m e t a - f r o n t i e r  a p p r o a c h  w i t h  D E A ,  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
solve separate models (equation 1) for each country in order to specify the 
country-specific frontiers and one for the joint data set for solving the meta-
frontier. The efficiencies measured relative to the meta-frontier can be 
decomposed into two components: a component that measures the distance 
from an input-output point to the group frontier (the common measure of 
technical efficiency) and a component that measures the distance between 
the group frontier and the meta-frontier (representing the restrictive nature 
of the production environment).  
The meta-technology ratio (DEA-MTR), that is the relative 
productivity of technologies, can be obtained as the ratio between meta-
frontier (in)efficiency (DEA-M) and the country-specific (in)efficiency 
(DEA-C). The higher the ratio, the closer a country’s production technology 
is to the ‘best practice’ in the region. Vice versa, the lower the ratio, the 
bigger is the technology gap.  
3.2.3  Modelling convergence 
To investigate the convergence of bank efficiency levels across the 11 
countries in the Mediterranean region (MED-11) over the period 1994-2008, 
we follow Casu & Girardone (2010) and employ the concepts of β-
convergence and σ-convergence (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992 and 
1995; and Quah, 1996). 
To estimate unconditional β-convergence or the ‘catch-up effect’, we 
employ the following equation: 
t i t i t i t i y y y , 1 , 1 , , ) (ln ε ρ β α + Δ + + = Δ − −  (2) 
where i=1,…11 and t=1,…14;  t i y , = the mean efficiency of the banking 
sector of country i at time t;  1 , − t i y = the mean efficiency of the banking 
sector of country i at time t-1;  ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , , − − = Δ t i t i t i y y y ; α, β and ρ are the 
parameters to be estimated and εi,t = error term. A negative value for the 
parameter  β implies convergence; the higher the coefficient in relative 
terms the greater the tendency for convergence. Equation (2) is first 
estimated without including the lagged dependent variable ( 1 , − Δ t i y ), as in 
the conventional growth theory models. The β-convergence equations are 
estimated by pooled OLS regression and Generalised Method of Moments 78 | ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY AND CONVERGENCE 
 
(GMM) to introduce dynamic behaviour in the time series and cross-
sectional variation (Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
To estimate cross sectional dispersion or σ-convergence, that is to 
estimate how quickly each country’s efficiency levels are converging to the 
average, we adopt the following autoregressive distributed lag model 
specification:66 
t i t i t i it E E E , 1 , 1 , ε ρ σ α + Δ + + = Δ − −  (3) 
where  ) ln( ) ln( , , t t i t i y y − = Ε
;  ) ln( ) ln( 1 1 , 1 , − − − − = Ε t t i t i y y
;  t i y , and  1 , − t i y
 
are defined as before;  = t y  the mean efficiency of the MED-11 banking 
sectors at time t;  = −1 t y the mean efficiency of the MED-11 banking sectors 
at time t-1;  1 , , − − = Δ t i t i it E E E
; α, σ and ρ are parameters to be calculated 
and εi,t is the error term. σ < 0 represents the rate of convergence of  t i y ,
 
towards  t y ; the larger is σ in absolute value, the faster the rate of 
convergence. The model in equation (3) is estimated initially without the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable ( 1 − Δ it E ), as we did for the β-
convergence in equation (2). 
3.3  Descriptive statistics 
The sample relates to a balanced sample of commercial and savings banks 
in the following 11 countries in the Mediterranean region: Cyprus (CY), 
Algeria (DZ), Egypt (EG), Spain (ES), Greece (GR), Israel (IL), Italy (IT), 
Malta (MT), Morocco (MA), Portugal (PT) and Tunisia (TN) over the period 
1995-2008.  
Table 3.1 below provides some descriptive statistics of the total 
number of observations in the sample and the average total assets by year 
and country. 
                                                      
66 Similar specifications have been estimated, among others, by Fung (2006), Parikh 
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Table 3.1 Number of observations and average total assets (€ million)  
 
N. of 
obs. 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Change 
1995-2008 
CY  4  2,369  2,895  3,371  3,653  4,505  5,435  6,585  7,053  7,652  8,653  10,489  14,221  18,209  21,300  899% 
DZ  2  2,851  2,739  2,440  2,477  2,574  2,547  2,642  2,354  2,297  2,266  2,716  2,848  3,002  4,021  141% 
EG  14  1,459  1,571  1,803  1,962  2,403  2,777  3,114  2,784  2,169  2,229  3,129  3,511  4,146  4,321  296% 
ES  65  10,264  11,275  12,658  13,605  15,184  18,663  19,919  19,818  21,749  30,402  36,931  41,634  47,559  51,800  505% 
GR  8  7,812  8,690  10,035  10,972  13,497  15,804  16,956  17,248  17,723  18,848  22,279  27,218  33,131  38,674  495% 
IL  5  3,489  3,655  3,666  3,579  4,798  5,771  6,346  4,615  4,074  4,072  4,765  5,305  5,631  6,462  185% 
IT  80  3,049  3,347  3,592  3,926  4,078  4,386  4,693  5,057  5,113  5,694  6,232  6,795  7,246  8,429  276% 
MA  4  2,320  2,334  2,318  2,634  2,973  3,274  3,390  3,509  3,685  4,965  6,095  7,444  8,658  10,537  454% 
MT  4  1,008  1,162  1,314  1,474  1,670  1,837  1,975  2,137  2,203  2,281  2,395  2,692  2,904  3,161  314% 
PT  10  8,910  9,617  10,845  12,500  14,495  18,857  20,559  20,928  22,458  23,646  26,185  28,842  31,887  34,340  385% 
TN  10  1,088  1,121  1,078  989  1,163  1,379  1,544  1,453  1,404  1,435  1,575  1,633  1,733  1,941  178% 
Mean  206  4,056  4,401  4,829  5,252  6,122  7,339  7,975  7,905  8,230  9,499  11,163  12,922  14,919  16,817  375% 80 | ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY AND CONVERGENCE 
 
As is apparent from Table 3.1, Italy and Spain dominate the sample, 
while the number of observations for Algeria, Israel, Morocco and Malta is 
particularly low. Data availability improves in the final years of the sample 
period, probably due to better reporting of accounting data; however, for 
the purpose of the present analysis, we concentrate on continuously 
operating institutions over the time period. 
Substantial differences in the average size of banks are apparent, with 
Spanish banks being the largest. The average size (total assets) of all 
institutions in the sample increases from €4,056,000,000 in 1995 to 
€16,817,000,000 in 2008. It is necessary to point out, however, that in some 
countries the high number of small- and medium-sized institutions has an 
impact on the overall country averages (for example, Italy), whereas in 
other countries only a small number of large banks is present in the sample 
(for example, Israel). 
3.3.1  Input and output variables 
There are two main approaches to the definition of inputs and outputs of 
financial institutions: the production approach and the intermediation 
approach. Both approaches are widely used in the literature and there is no 
consensus on the superiority of one or the other. In this study we follow a 
variation of the intermediation approach (Sealey & Lindley, 1977). This 
approach views financial institutions as mediators between the supply and 
the demand of funds. As a consequence, deposits are considered as inputs, 
and interest on deposits as a component of total costs, together with labour 
and capital.  
In the cross-country setting of the present study, the need for 
comparable data from different countries imposes strong restrictions on the 
variables one is able to use, not least because of the various accounting 
criteria used in the four countries under investigation. To minimise 
possible bias arising from different accounting practices, the broad 
definition of variables as presented by Bankscope was chosen.  
Specifically, the input variable used in this study is Total Costs 
(Interest Expenses + Overheads), whereas the output variables capture both 
the traditional lending activity of banks (total loans) and the growing non-
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We aggregate the cost expenditure67 into a single input to minimise 
the well-known dimensionality problem associated with DEA. In small 
samples, if we have a high number of variables relative to the number of 
observations, units can be wrongly identified as efficient because too many 
constraints have been specified. Observations tend to become incomparable 
and hence figure on the frontier owing to the inability of DEA to indentify 
peers. One way around this, commonly used in the literature, is to 
aggregate the input variables in a single monetary value. Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 
3.4 report the descriptive statistics of the input variable (total costs) and the 
two output variables (total loans and total other earning assets), 
respectively. 
Table 3.2 Total costs (average, € million)  
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Change 
1995-
2008 
CY  179 221 254 288 320 392 418 464 465 494 547 615 913  1,130 630% 
DZ  149 163 141 124 104 137 127  81  65  65  106  72  102  92  62% 
EG  116 133 150 159 195 240 252 193 138 135 208 247 275 354  305% 
ES  909 940 885 913 894  1,216 1,312 1,131 961  1,020 1,397 1,706 2,277  2,852 314% 
GR  899 987  1,026 1,165 1,282 1,386 1,118 992 903 940 980  1,297 1,867  2,496 278% 
IL  209 171 275 306 361 428 564 242 246 240 314 230 244 278  133% 
IT  297 306 283 267 231 261 276 267 258 252 261 307 376 463  156% 
MA  129 137 135 147 155 179 178 186 178 261 277 269 326 397  307% 
MT  55 66 76 86  109  110  115  106  99 92 96  105  120  132 238% 
PT  815 799 781 919 883  1,123 1,276 1,130 1,105 1,176 1,215 1,408 1,793  2,247 276% 
TN  68 73 56 64 69 84 96 93 85 87  102  108  120  122 180% 
Mean  348 363 369 404 418 505 521 444 409 433 500 579 765 960  276% 
 
Total costs increase steadily (+276%) over the sample period; costs 
increase in all countries. The largest increase is displayed by banks in 
Cyprus (+630%) and the smallest by banks in Algeria (+ 62%). 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the averages for the two output variables, 
total loans and total other earning assets. 
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Table 3.3 Total loans (average, € million) 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008 
Change 
1995-
2008 
CY  1,334 1,639 1,903 2,185 2,610 3,155 3,592 4,019 4,360 4,841 5,484 7,474 10,327 13,413  1005% 
DZ  863 792 602 429 539 690 842 734 763 784 939 893 994  1,358  157% 
EG  656 740 865 971 1,270 1,506 1,604 1,309 902 884 1,160 1,233 1,430  1,658  253% 
ES  4,619 5,183 6,169 7,021 8,072 9,967 11,027 11,622 13,112 18,454 22,804 28,097 32,289 34,605  749% 
GR  2,734 3,110 3,516 4,224 5,437 6,679 7,926 9,427 10,569 11,477 13,410 17,193 22,395 28,460  1041% 
IL  2,481 2,535 2,422 2,434 3,167 3,938 4,504 3,386 2,885 2,707 2,978 3,237 3,373  3,907  158% 
IT  1,480 1,522 1,678 1,902 2,178 2,506 2,713 2,972 3,219 3,501 3,916 4,381 4,946  5,938  401% 
MA  1,233 1,259 1,217 1,420 1,624 1,718 1,724 1,690 1,759 2,390 3,270 3,926 4,956  6,365  516% 
MT  500 656 711 775 851 918 961 997 1,034 1,106 1,141 1,312 1,454  1,648  330% 
PT  3,629 4,125 5,161 6,948 8,791 11,937 13,462 14,291 14,657 15,632 16,757 18,706 21,665 24,134  665% 
TN  722 711 672 700 782 979 1,103 1,076 1,037 1,027 1,110 1,142 1,167  1,325  183% 
Mean  1,841 2,025 2,265 2,637 3,211 3,999 4,496 4,684 4,936 5,709 6,634 7,963 9,545 11,165  606% 
 
Total loans are steadily increasing in all countries, with the highest 
percentage change displayed by Greek and Cypriot banks. This might be a 
consequence of increased lending following EU membership. Other earning 
assets are also increasing steadily, but n o t  a t  t h e  s a m e  r a t e  o f  l o a n s  
(percentage change 230% versus 606%). 
Table 3.4 Total other earning assets (average, € million)  
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Change 
1995-
2008 
CY  685 878  1,094 1,038 1,238 1,545 2,221 2,072 2,416 2,963 4,117 5,220 6,242 6,009 877% 
DZ  1,577 1,620 1,508 1,707 1,655 1,476 1,217 1,017 916 865 1,102 1,329 1,303 1,780  113% 
EG  693 724 824 863 962 1,089 1,305 1,296 1,156 1,242 1,810 2,104 2,483 2,346 338% 
ES  4,731 5,105 5,383 5,320 5,503 6,425 6,383 6,045 6,485 9,888 11,731 11,049 12,163 13,258  280% 
GR  4,559 4,993 5,742 6,061 7,029 7,994 7,736 6,773 6,115 5,456 6,640 6,988 6,853 6,334  139% 
IL  818 851 669 655 985 1,044 999 653 633 860 1,388 1,732 1,997 1,646 201% 
IT  1,298 1,536 1,593 1,673 1,500 1,462 1,467 1,507 1,325 1,596 1,897 2,000 1,829 1,822  140% 
MA  600 601 609 683 962 1,229 1,436 1,369 1,394 1,687 1,849 2,341 2,465 2,891 482% 
MT  411 408 487 571 660 744 827 942 973 1,010 1,074 1,171 1,187 1,330 323% 
PT  4,285 4,447 4,509 4,281 4,034 5,108 5,008 4,613 4,902 5,939 7,549 7,997 8,091 7,625  178% 
TN  104 139 135 189 238 274 294 260 250 293 329 345 412 386 371% 
Mean 1,797 1,937 2,050 2,095 2,251 2,581 2,627 2,413 2,415 2,891 3,590 3,843 4,093 4,130  230% 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates the trend of the input and output variables, both 
as averages and as percentage change (1995 as base year). Bank growth in 
these countries has been mainly driven by development of the traditional 
lending function, and the increase in total costs seems to be mirrored by the 
steady growth of bank loans. Cypriot and Moroccan banks display the 
most remarkable increase in other earning assets; this is possibly due to the 
entry of foreign banks. 
Figure 3.1 Average and percentage change- input and output variables 
 
 
3.4  Results 
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Table 3.5 Country-specific DEA efficiency scores (DEA-C) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean 
CY  96.9 97.2 96.6 97.9 100.0 98.2 99.8 100.0 97.3 95.2 95.6 95.1 92.9 99.3 97.3 
DZ  100.0  94.4 93.1 95.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 94.7 90.4 91.3 90.2 91.4 98.6 95.7 
EG  89.4 88.7 91.3 88.6 86.1 86.6 85.1 83.9 80.8 89.5 90.4 89.5 83.7 79.0 86.6 
ES  90.4 90.3 87.4 86.2 83.1 87.4 87.3 86.4 87.1 84.1 83.0 85.2 86.1 87.5 86.5 
GR  96.0 94.0 94.9 88.1 94.8 96.5 97.5 96.9 94.0 91.5 94.2 89.6 93.2 93.4 93.9 
IL  94.9 93.0 98.2 93.4 96.5 96.5 99.0 96.6 89.7 98.6 99.1 93.8 95.3 88.9 95.2 
IT  81.2 83.2 86.8 85.6 83.5 81.6 83.2 80.8 68.4 79.4 80.8 80.5 84.0 82.3 81.5 
MA  100.0  97.3 98.0 96.6 99.2 96.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 98.2 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  99.0 
MT  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.2 100.0  100.0  99.9 
PT  89.8 89.4 91.6 95.4 95.1 91.2 93.7 93.5 90.3 89.1 93.4 92.7 93.5 95.3 92.4 
TN  80.3 86.1 92.5 92.5 91.3 96.9 94.9 89.3 92.8 93.0 93.0 96.4 87.8 94.9 91.6 
Mean 92.6 92.2 93.7 92.7 93.6 93.8 94.6 93.4 90.5 91.7 92.8 92.0 91.6 92.7  
 
The average annual efficiency scores of banks of each country relative 
to each country’s frontier (DEA-C) reveal a general steady trend. The 
results relative to the country frontiers are reported only for completeness 
of the analysis. Recall that these efficiencies are calculated relative to each 
country’s frontier; the boundaries of these frontiers are restricted 
technology sets, where the restrictions derive from the available economic 
infrastructure and other characteristics of the production environment, as 
discussed above. Also recall the small number of observations in some 
countries, which causes dimensionality problems 
We now move to the crucial part of this analysis, the measurement of 
efficiency relative to a meta-frontier, defined as the boundary of an 
unrestricted technology set. It is interesting to note that in most countries, 
the country-specific frontiers were at least partially tangent to the meta-
frontier. This is the case when at least one observation from each country 
lies both on the country and on the meta-frontier and it is therefore 
positioned in the point of tangency between the country and the meta-
frontier. This indicates that the meta-frontier closely envelops the country-
specific frontiers and that the value of the technological gap ratio equals the 
maximum value of one for at least one observation in each of the sample 
countries.  
Looking at the efficiency scores derived from the estimation of the 
meta-frontier as displayed in Table 3.6, Spanish banks dominate the region, 
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banks are lagging behind with average efficiency scores of 55.6%, 49.5% 
and 58.1% over the period. The region’s average efficiency score is 63.5%, 
which indicates that Mediterranean banks could, on average, reduce costs 
(inputs) by 36.5% and still produce the same outputs.  
Table 3.6 Mean meta-frontier DEA efficiency scores  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean 
CY  47.7 52.2 70.0 57.9 46.1 53.1 61.6 53.7 46.1 42.5 48.2 60.8 69.9 69.2 55.6 
DZ  74.2 78.3 82.9 94.3 87.8 71.2 70.0 73.2 64.3 57.2 52.1 73.7 72.6 93.7 74.7 
EG  51.7 51.4 60.1 56.1 43.2 45.3 49.3 49.8 44.5 45.7 45.4 53.3 52.0 45.7 49.5 
ES  59.3 65.7 84.0 85.3 82.3 87.2 85.5 85.7 75.7 83.0 82.9 84.2 85.0 79.2 80.4 
GR  45.4 43.5 52.7 48.4 41.0 48.4 65.3 62.4 56.6 50.4 52.9 54.2 63.9 68.1 53.8 
IL  74.6 92.3 69.9 56.7 46.2 52.2 48.5 67.1 43.2 42.4 37.5 66.6 74.2 77.9 60.7 
IT  44.5 47.9 58.6 65.6 63.9 69.8 71.8 71.8 57.6 63.2 62.0 64.0 70.3 73.5 63.2 
MA  57.8 55.9 74.4 69.2 58.8 65.1 71.8 60.3 49.1 45.4 49.7 65.0 85.5 93.9 64.4 
MT  76.1 79.5 87.3 81.5 63.4 65.2 67.7 57.3 63.8 56.2 59.7 62.9 62.7 70.4 68.1 
PT  59.8 62.9 80.8 73.0 68.1 76.3 78.2 78.0 65.5 67.6 70.3 66.7 68.5 64.2 70.0 
TN  43.3 46.9 82.5 76.3 62.9 70.1 72.3 63.4 47.8 48.2 44.1 45.2 49.9 60.6 58.1 
Mean 57.7 61.5 73.0 69.5 60.3 64.0 67.4 65.7 55.8 54.7 55.0 63.3 68.6 72.4 63.5 
 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the trend of efficiency levels over the period 
1995-2008. For all countries, it is possible to note an improvement in 
efficiency levels in the later stages of the analysis, from 2005 onwards (with 
the exception of Egypt). This improvement is particularly remarkable for 
Algerian and Moroccan banks. The overall mean efficiency in the region is 
improving, once again driven by improvements in the best practice. 
Minimum average efficiency scores also seem to be increasing, following a 
drop in 2008. 
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Figure 3.2 Average meta-frontier DEA scores 
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Table 3.7 illustrates the meta-technology ratios. The meta-technology 
ratio (DEA-MTR) or technological gap, is calculated as the ratio between 
meta-frontier (in)efficiency (DEA-M) and the country-specific (in)efficiency 
(DEA-C) and it indicates the relative productivity of technologies. The 
higher the ratio, the closer a country’s production technology is to the ‘best 
practice’ in the region. Vice versa, the lower the ratio, the bigger is the 
technology gap. An increase in the meta-technology ratio can be seen as 
convergence towards the best practice. 
Table 3.7 Average meta-technology ratios 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Mean 
CY  48.9 53.5 72.5 59.1 46.1 54.0 61.7 53.7 47.1 44.6 50.3 63.6 75.2 69.6 57.1 
DZ  74.2 84.6 90.4 98.7 87.8 71.2 70.0 73.2 68.8 65.2 57.7 85.9 80.8 95.1 78.8 
EG  57.6 57.3 65.5 63.3 50.4 52.6 58.1 59.0 54.0 50.8 50.1 59.1 62.0 57.3 56.9 
ES  65.3 72.3 96.0 99.0 98.9 99.8 97.7 99.1 86.5 98.4 99.8 98.7 98.8 90.4 92.9 
GR  47.0 46.1 55.0 55.2 42.9 49.9 66.8 64.4 60.0 54.8 56.0 60.2 68.5 73.1 57.1 
IL  78.2 99.2 71.2 60.3 47.8 54.1 49.1 69.6 48.1 43.1 37.8 70.4 77.6 86.8 63.8 
IT  54.2 56.9 67.3 76.5 76.6 85.6 86.3 89.0 85.1 79.6 76.7 79.6 84.0 89.7 77.6 
MA  57.8 57.2 75.8 71.6 59.2 67.1 71.8 60.3 49.1 46.2 49.7 65.0 85.5 93.9 65.0 
MT  76.1 79.5 87.3 81.5 63.4 65.2 67.7 57.3 63.8 56.2 59.7 63.3 62.7 70.4 68.1 
PT  66.2 70.6 87.8 76.4 71.2 82.9 83.3 83.3 72.3 75.8 75.0 71.7 73.4 67.5 75.5 
TN  52.5 54.0 89.5 82.6 68.7 72.4 76.3 70.8 51.4 52.1 47.8 47.0 58.3 64.4 63.4 
Mean 61.6 66.5 78.0 74.9 64.8 68.6 71.7 70.9 62.4 60.6 60.1 69.5 75.2 78.0 68.7 
 
During this period of analysis, the average meta-technology ratio is 
increasing indicating an ability of banks in all countries to appropriate the 
best available technology. Spanish banks exhibit the highest meta-
technology ratio; the ratios also display increasing trend overtime. This 
indicates that Spanish banks consistently improved their performance and 
their technology became best practice. The dominance of Spanish banks is 
clearly illustrated in Figure 3.3. Moroccan and Algerian banks seem to 
catch up with best practice.  88 | ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY AND CONVERGENCE 
 
Figure 3.3 Average meta-technology ratios 
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3.4.2  Convergence results 
To evaluate β-convergence for our cross-section of Mediterranean 
countries, we estimate equation (2) by OLS and GMM. Table 3.8 shows 
regression estimates of the convergence coefficient β for the period 1995-
2008. The results from equation (2) that exclude the lagged dependent 
variable are reported in the first column. The beta coefficient is always 
negative and statistically significant, thus indicating that convergence in 
efficiency scores has occurred across countries in the MED-11 area. The 
results are confirmed in all three models although the goodness of fit for 
the SYS-GMM (last column) shows that the p-value for AR(1) is greater 
than 5%. 
Table 3.8 Beta convergence  
Coefficients  
 
Equation (2) without 
lagged dependent 
variable 
Equation (2) 
  Pooled OLS  
Robust 
Pooled OLS  
robust  
SYS-GMM 
two step robust 
 
β -.2502*** 
(.0588) 
-.3174*** 
(.0679) 
-.3952*** 
(.1816) 
ρ -  -.1682* 
(.8813) 
+.1516 
(.1801) 
α 1.0481*** 
(.2461) 
 1.321*** 
(.2843) 
1.6448** 
(.7520) 
      
Goodness of fit:       
R2  0.1227 0.1626   
m1 p-value     0.245 
m2 p-value     0.720 
Sargan/Hansen     1.000 
Note: OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; SYS-GMM= System GMM. 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Asymptotic standard error in 
parentheses. Two-step estimates are Windmeijeier corrected (Windmeijer, 2005). m1 and m2 
are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation. Sargan & Hansen is a test of the 
over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimators.  
 
Table 3.9 reports the results for the σ-convergence. In our case sigma 
convergence indicates how quickly each country’s efficiency levels are 
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convergence of  t i y ,  towards  t y ; the larger is σ in absolute value, the faster 
the rate of convergence. We firstly estimated the model with pooled OLS 
and fixed effects (the Hausman test allows us to reject random effects). 
Potential problems with these two models are addressed by the estimation 
of a dynamic GMM model. The last column of Table 3.10 reports the SYS-
GMM estimations results (equation 3). Following Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998), the use of a GMM estimator should 
help mitigate possible endogeneity problems and omitted variable bias. 
Results for all the estimations suggest an increase in the speed of 
convergence as the σ coefficient is always negative and statistically 
significant. Further, the SYS-GMM results satisfy the three additional 
conditions: a significant AR(1) serial correlation, lack of AR(2) serial 
correlation and a high Sargan/Hansen test. 
Table 3.9 Sigma convergence (dependent variable ΔE) 
Coefficients  Equation (3) without 
lagged dependent 
variable 
Equation (3) 
 Pooled 
OLS 
robust  
Fixed 
effects  
Pooled 
OLS 
robust  
Fixed 
effects 
SYS-GMM 
two step 
robust 
 
σ -.1874*** 
(.0607) 
-.4131*** 
(.0687) 
-.2129*** 
(.0641) 
-.5645*** 
(.0805) 
 -.1791***  
(.4521)  
ρ     -.0151 
(.0972)  
-.1271  
(.0864) 
-.1359 
(.4760) 
μ -.00032   
(.0093)  
-.0074 
(.0100) 
-.0029  
(.0097) 
-.0095 
(.0092) 
-.0019 
(.0198) 
        
Goodness of fit:        
R2  0.0961  0.1194    
F-test    39.09***  26.08***   
m1 p-value       0.342 
m2 p-value       0.843 
Sargan/Hansen        1.000 
Note: OLS= Ordinary Least Squares; SYS-GMM= System GMM. 
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Asymptotic standard error in 
parentheses. Two-step estimates are Windmeijeier corrected (Windmeijer, 2005). m1 and m2 
are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation. Sargan &Hansen is a test of the 
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3.5  Conclusions 
This study examines the dynamics of cost efficiency in 11 Mediterranean 
countries over the period 1994-2008. For all countries, the results indicate 
an improvement in efficiency levels in the later stages of the analysis, from 
2005 onwards (with the exception of Egypt). This improvement is 
particularly remarkable for Algerian and Moroccan banks. The overall 
mean efficiency in the region is improving, once more driven by 
improvements in the best practice. Spanish banks dominate the region, 
with average efficiency scores of 80.4% against the region's average of 
63.5%. Spanish banks also exhibit the highest meta-technology ratio and the 
ratios increase overtime. This indicates that Spanish banks consistently 
improved their performance and their banking technology became best 
practice. Nonetheless, during this period of analysis, the average meta-
technology ratio is increasing, indicating an ability of banks in all countries 
to appropriate the best available technology.  
These results are supported by the estimation of β-convergence. The 
β coefficient is always negative and statistically significant, thus indicating 
that convergence in efficiency scores has occurred across countries in the 
MED-11 area. Furthermore, results for the σ-convergence suggest an 
increase in the speed of convergence as the σ coefficient is always negative 
and statistically significant. This indicates that, whereas the technological 
gap is still wide, the gap is narrowing at a faster speed. 
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4.  IMPACT OF BANK REGULATIONS ON 
EFFICIENCY 
lthough the quality and adequacy of banking regulation and 
supervision are often touted as the essential factors contributing to 
a sound and well-performing banking sector, few studies have 
produced empirical evidence to back these assertions. A common finding is 
that certain specific regulatory elements may have a positive impact, while 
others may do the opposite or invite instability. Moreover, an adequate and 
well-functioning regulatory system appears to improve various 
performance or stability measures as long as they are complemented by 
other institutional and macroeconomic conditions.  
This section focuses on a very specific question: Are the banks in the 
Mediterranean more cost efficient in countries with sounder regulatory and 
supervisory conditions? The results echo the recent findings in the 
literature. Certain regulatory aspects, such as disclosure requirements, 
credit information availability and entry obstacles, are highly important. 
The presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme also improves 
efficiency, drawing attention to the importance of enhancing confidence for 
depositors. Other findings are less clear and require further investigation. 
For example, although restrictions on activities lower efficiency, it is 
possible that they could lead to increased risks.  
The next section provides an overview of the literature. Then, section 
4.2 summarises the data sources and gives an extensive summary of the 
variables used and their hypothesised impacts. Section 4.3 discusses the 
empirical results and section 4.4 summarises the main findings.  
ACONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 93 
 
4.1  Literature review 
The literature on the regulatory and supervisory determinants of bank 
efficiency is still in its infancy. Most studies use relatively broad measures 
of regulatory and institutional conditions. For example, Dietsch & Lozano-
Vivas (2000) and Bos & Kool (2006) draw attention to the importance of a 
number of “environmental factors”, including those relating to bank 
structure and regulation, such as concentration ratios, capital strength and 
intermediation ratios. The authors find that banks that operate in less 
concentrated markets, with greater capital and higher intermediation ratios 
tend to have lower costs. Similarly, Fries & Taci (2005) focus on transition 
economies using a broad measure of banking sector reforms, developed by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), to find 
that banks in countries with an active agenda tend to perform better and 
have higher profitability.  
Our study is similar to several recent studies that assess empirically 
the impact of regulations on different measures of bank efficiency. Barth et 
al. (2006) use the BRSS database for the years 2000 and 2003 to identify the 
regulatory and institutional determinants of net interest margins and cost 
efficiency in 68 countries. The authors’ results provide partial support for 
the importance of capital regulations and supervisory power. More 
specifically, aside from private monitoring, most of the variance in interest 
margins and overhead costs are explained by institutional and macro-
economic factors. The stringency of capital requirements and the power 
bestowed on supervisory authorities are at best weakly associated with 
greater efficiency. These findings provide a broad support for the third 
pillar of Basel II.  
More recently, Pasiouras (2008) also uses the BRSS databases and a 
large sample of banks from 95 countries but develops cost and scale 
efficiency measures. Although the results support all three pillars of Basel 
II, the results are especially strong for the market discipline mechanisms 
(i.e. the third pillar). In addition, the role of bank-specific factors, such as 
bank liquidity and capitalisation, as well as market-specific factors, such as 
access to banking and presence of government-owned banks, are 
reaffirmed in the study. 
In a later study, Pasiouras et al. (2009) assess the impact of regulatory 
conditions on profit and cost efficiency of banks using similar data. The 
authors find that regulations that improve supervisory power and market 
discipline tend to have a positive impact on both of the measures. In turn, 94 | IMPACT OF BANK REGULATIONS ON EFFICIENCY 
 
capital requirements tend to improve only cost efficiency while reducing 
profit efficiency. In addition, the results show that restricting banks’ 
activities may improve their profit efficiencies and worsen their cost 
efficiencies.  
4.2  Methodology and data 
The model for assessing the impact of regulatory and institutional factors 
on bank efficiency is as follows: 
it it it it it R C B f MTR ε + = ) , , (  
where B stands for bank-specific factors that relate to bank i at time t 
while C and R stand for country-specific and regulatory factors and MTR is 
the meta-technology ratio as derived in section 3 which is the bank-specific 
meta-frontier efficiency divided by the country-specific efficiency.  
The Barth et al. database provides up to three observations for each 
country, based on the 2000, 2003 and 2007 surveys. Due to different 
completion times, the surveys give a glimpse of the regulatory conditions 
between the publication year and one (or even two) years prior. For 
example, the 2000 survey was sent to the authorities in 1998, with most 
results arriving in 1999-2000. In order to minimise potential errors from 
misalignments between regulatory and non-regulatory factors, the later 
were averaged over a relevant time period. Moreover, the time spans were 
chosen to ensure that the current explanatory variables are used to explain 
future efficiency scores. Table 4.1 details the correspondence between the 
regulatory and non-regulatory variables.  
Table 4.1 Sample correspondence for survey years 
Survey year  Meta-tech. efficiency 
(MTR) 
Other variables 
(B, I, M) 
2000  Avg. of 1999-2001  Avg. of 1998-2000 
2003  Avg. of 2002-04  Avg. of 2001-03 
2007  Avg. of 2006-08  Avg. of 2005-07 
Note: For all non-regulatory variables (i.e. MTR, B, I, M), the averages for the given periods 
were used.  
 
The level of coverage of the sampled banks is depicted Table 4.2. 
When the entire sample is considered, the database covers just over the half 
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more partial, with the total assets of the banks in the sample representing 
between one-quarter to one-third of the total assets of the banks in the 
region. Moreover, the total activities of the South-MED account for a small 
proportion of the entire sample. More specifically, the total assets of the 
South-MED banks within the sample represent are between 5 to 10% of the 
total assets of all banks in the sample. This is simply an outcome of the size 
of the EU’s banking market. In order to ensure a balanced database, Italy’s 
larger banks were excluded. 
Table 4.2 Coverage of sample 
  Banks in sample 
(number of banks) 
Coverage 
(% of bank assets in 
country) 
Share in sample  
(% of entire sample assets) 
  2000  2003  2007  2000 2003 2007 2000  2003  2007 
Algeria 2 2  2  27.6%  10.3%  8.8%  0.48%  0.97%  0.89% 
Egypt  14  14  14  32.4% 34.5% 47.8% 3.10%  1.91%  1.58% 
Israel  5  5  5  13.6% 12.6% 15.6% 5.05%  3.35%  2.33% 
Morocco  4  4  4  35.1% 38.7% 54.0% 0.96%  0.83%  0.83% 
Tunisia  10  10  10  73.1% 72.2% 74.3% 0.49%  0.42%  0.31% 
SOUTH-
MED 
35  35  35  24.5%  23.9%  31.5%  10.51%  7.65%  5.96% 
Cyprus  4  4  4  51.4% 73.1% 79.9% 1.09%  0.91%  1.19% 
Spain  65  65  65  97.8% 94.1% 95.0% 29.08%  32.66%  38.31% 
Greece  8  8  8  65.9% 66.5% 69.2% 4.96%  4.63%  4.99% 
Italy  80  80  80  19.8% 19.2% 17.4% 45.79%  46.19%  43.34% 
Malta  4  4  4  46.6% 49.2% 30.7% 0.41%  0.39%  0.49% 
Portugal  10  10  10  59.8% 64.4% 72.4% 8.16%  7.58%  5.73% 
EU-MED  171  171  171  55.1%  52.4%  60.0%  89.49%  92.35%  94.04% 
ENTIRE 
SAMPLE 
206  206  206  51.9%  50.3%  58.3%  100.00%  100.00%  100.00% 
Sources: Bankscope, national central banks and the ECB. 
 
Among the 11 countries in the sample, Algeria has the lowest 
coverage. This is entirely due to the fact that most of the Algerian banks are 
publicly-owned for which little information exists. All of the covered banks 
in Algeria are owned privately. For Israel, the detailed balance sheet 
information was available for only a small share of the banks. In other 96 | IMPACT OF BANK REGULATIONS ON EFFICIENCY 
 
South-MED countries, the coverage is more complete. This is particularly 
the case in Tunisia where the total assets of the sampled banks represent 
nearly three-quarters of the total assets of all banks in Tunisia. 
4.2.1  Bank-specific variables 
Four bank-specific variables are used to control for the market power, size, 
liquidity and capital strength.  
The natural logarithm of a bank’s assets, defined as the bank assets 
variable, serves as an indicator of the bank’s size. Size could be a 
determinant of costs if there are increasing returns to scale. For example, 
larger banks may be able to reduce their operating costs by cutting back on 
personnel and administrative costs. Moreover, if a fixed cost is associated 
with financial transactions, larger banks may also be able to recue such 
costs. Lastly, larger banks may be in a better position to diversify their risks 
and thus reduce their borrowing costs.68  
Market power is measured by the bank market share, i.e. the share of 
a bank’s assets in total banking assets for the relevant years. According to 
the traditional ‘quiet life hypothesis’, banks that are in a dominant position 
are unlikely to occupy themselves with cost reduction and are likely to 
behave inefficiently (Hicks, 1935). Alternatively, managers of banks with 
extensive market power may have other incentives than being efficient, 
such as ‘building empires’, (Hughes et al., 2003). These theories would 
suggest that market share would be negatively correlated with efficiency. 
Bank liquidity will be measured by the ratio of cash and due from 
central bank and other banks (i.e. demand and time deposits maintained in 
other banks) to customer deposits. Capital strength is measured by share of 
bank equity in total assets. Well-capitalised and liquid banks tend to face 
lower default risks and are thus likely to face lower funding costs. On the 
other hand, in the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) region, such 
banks tend to hold significant amounts of government debt, possibly under 
                                                      
68 The literature has obtained mixed results on the impact of bank size or scale on 
efficiency, although most studies have found that large banks are either more 
efficient or equally efficient as smaller banks. See DeYoung (1998) for a general 
discussion. For results that are applicable to the Middle East and the North Africa 
(MENA) region, see Olson & Zoubi (2010), who provide evidence for scale 
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direct or indirect government control and with extensive market power, 
both of which could lead to inefficiencies. Thus, there is no clear 
relationship between these two variables and bank efficiency.  
4.2.2  Country-specific variables 
Three country-specific variables are considered: 
Inflation is often thought to increase instability and decrease bank 
efficiency, since it makes price discovery harder and makes interest rates 
less informative about the underlying conditions. High inflation may 
increase labour costs and, by increasing the number of transactions, lead to 
an increased competition in excessive branching and other operational 
costs. Additionally, inflation exacerbates information asymmetries, 
increasing the costs of state verification (Huybens & Smith, 1999). Economic 
growth, or more specifically real GDP growth, is included to control for 
business cycles.  
The third indicator, institutional quality, is built by aggregating 
eight dimensions of the quality of political institutions. These dimensions 
are: i) polity, which measures the relative strength of democratic (or 
conversely autocratic) institutions, determining the extent to which the 
executive arm is controlled by regular checks and balances, guarantee of 
civil liberties, freedom of political expression and participation; ii) 
executive openness, which measures the openness of the executive 
recruitment; iii) executive competitiveness, which controls for the 
competitiveness of the election procedures; iv) executive constraints, 
measuring the extent of authority that can be practiced by the executive 
arm; v) political competitiveness, which measures the competitiveness of 
the political arena; vi) control of corruption, concerning the perception that 
public authorities can exercise their power without obtaining private gain; 
vii) voice and accountability, which measure the degree to which citizens 
can voice their opinions and desires in the political system; and viii) rule of 
law, capturing the perceptions on the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, police, courts and likelihood of crime and violence. The 
institutional quality variable is the first principal component of the seven 
variables identified above. By using a single variable to account for the 
various dimensions, the principal component analysis effectively addresses 
the potential multi-collinearity concerns that would arise from including 
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Institutional and political conditions are likely to be very important in 
determining bank behaviour, stability and performance. For example, 
giving authorities extensive powers in countries where political freedoms 
and checks and balances are limited could lead to a misuse of authority. 
Indeed, Barth et al. (1999) and La Porta et al. (2002), among others, find that 
prevalence of state is associated with poorly operating financial systems. 
Public interference may also be an instrument for politicians to expand or 
maintain their power (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Another interesting 
question is whether banking stability closely reflects the ambitions of 
politicians who are in power.69 
A number of studies find that institutional conditions matter in the 
determination of bank efficiency. Pasiouras (2008) find that the degree to 
which a country’s laws protect private rights matters substantially, such 
that banks in better-governed countries are much more efficient. Using a 
sample that is similar to the present study, Ben Naceur et al. (2009) show 
that several institutional factors, most notably the quality of the judicial 
system and a better legal system, are crucial in explaining cross-country 
differences in bank efficiency across four Middle East and North Africa 
countries: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.  
4.2.3  Regulatory variables 
The regulatory factors are mostly based on the Barth et al. surveys (BRSS) 
and, for the case of credit information, on World Bank’s Doing Business 
Surveys. The variables used and a brief description of their construction 
methodology, already detailed in section 2,  are presented below. 
The index scope restrictions measures the degree of restrictions on 
what a bank can do, including prohibitions on key non-traditional 
activities, such as securities and insurance underwriting, brokering, 
dealing, real estate development and so forth.70 In theory, restricting the 
                                                      
69 Using data on 25 emerging countries, Brown & Dinc (2005) find that bank 
failures are significantly less likely to occur prior to an election, pointing to a 
concern for loss of votes and increased attention paid to stability. Indeed, among 
the failures observed in the sampled countries in the authors’ dataset, only 10% 
have taken place within a year before the election. The study also raises another 
interesting point on crisis management: banks that are taken over by the 
government almost never fail, reflecting the underlying guarantees. 
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range of activities may have opposing effects on efficiency. On the one 
hand, allowing banks to take equity positions can exacerbate the moral 
hazard problems between a borrower and a lender, adversely affecting the 
optimality of investment decisions and the overall bank efficiency (Boyd et 
al., 1998). On the other hand, when banks engage in a broader set of 
activities, their ability to diversify risks is also enhanced. A more stable 
income stream can serve to reduce borrowing costs, which will increase 
efficiency.  
Entry obstacles are measured by aggregating the degree of licensing 
restrictions, the rate of foreign denials (share of denials in total applications 
over the past five years) and the total market share of the government-
owned banks in terms of total assets. A regulatory structure that is more 
amenable to entry is likely to enhance competitive conditions, possibly 
undermining market power and the potential for a ‘quiet life’ (see above). 
Several studies find that foreign entry is associated with more competitive 
conditions, translating into lower costs and profits for domestic banks, 
(Claessens et al., 2001; Claessens & Laeven, 2004). Highly predominant 
state-ownership of the banking sector may also undermine the competitive 
conditions.71 
The  capital requirement stringency considers whether there are 
explicit requirements on the amount and type of capital allowed, risk 
adjustments and initial capital.72 Although stricter rules on capital and an 
autonomous supervisor may make the system as a whole sounder, the 
impact on efficiency is less than clear. More and better capital held by one 
bank could translate into lower borrowing costs and may signal operational 
efficiency. However, when the conditions apply to all the banks, the 
informational benefits do not materialise. Moreover, more stringent rules 
may increase compliance costs, undermining efficiency.  
                                                      
71 Although public banks may have a development role (Gerschenkron, 1962; 
Stiglitz, 1994; Hakenes & Schnabel, 2006) and may even be more stable than their 
commercial peers (Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez, 2008; Ayadi et al., 2009), 
there is a general agreement that is backed by substantial evidence that undue 
public interference leads to an inefficient allocation of credit and risk-taking 
(Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Cole, 2009). 
72 For more details on the capital requirement stringency index, see section 2.4. 100 | IMPACT OF BANK REGULATIONS ON EFFICIENCY 
 
The index of supervisory independence measures the autonomy of 
the supervisor from political influence, considering whether the supervisor 
is ultimately accountable to a minister, could be sued for his/her actions 
committed in exercise of his/her duties, and whether the head of the 
agency has an undetermined (i.e. non-fixed) term.73 Under the ‘private 
interest view’ to regulation, politically-oriented regulators fail to maximise 
social welfare and may thus undermine private-sector efficiency (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994; Barth et al., 2006).  
The  deposit insurance variable  is a dummy that identifies the 
existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. Considering the index’s 
impact on bank efficiency, there may be opposing forces at play. Several 
studies have noted that excessive guarantees may result in moral hazard 
and may encourage excessive risk-taking and increase the likelihood of 
crises (Merton, 1977; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt & Kane, 2002). These risks could 
increase borrowing costs, thereby lowering efficiency. However, having a 
safety net could also enhance efficiency, especially in the context of 
developing countries where the (shadow) cost of funds is often high since 
many potential depositors may not open an account or due to the risks of 
bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). By reinforcing the soundness of 
deposits, the schemes may thus lower costs and enhance efficiency.  
The private monitoring variable is an indicator for the disclosure of 
information, which is at the core of market discipline.74 The disclosure of 
reliable and timely information allows investors and depositors to better 
understand and monitor the underlying risks and inefficiencies and can 
serve as a disciplining tool on the bank’s management.75 There are some 
questions, however, on whether disclosure requirements and practices can 
really function in countries with poor accounting standards and 
underdeveloped capital markets, which tend to be the primary customers 
of such information. In responding to these concerns, Caprio & Honohan 
                                                      
73 For more details on the supervisory independence index, see section 2.5. 
74 For more details on the private monitoring index, see section 2.7.  
75 The idea is at the core of the third pillar of the Basel II framework. Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision’s (1999) consultative paper on capital 
adequacy asserts that “[m]arket discipline imposes strong incentives on banks to 
conduct their business in a safe, sound and efﬁcient manner” (BCBS, 2001, p. 1).  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 101 
 
(2004) note that despite these shortcomings, market discipline could work 
to discipline banks, especially in countries with no credible deposit 
guarantees—explicit or implicit—where market participants have strong 
incentives to engage in monitoring.  
Credit information is an indicator for the availability, coverage and 
depth of credit information.76 Information-sharing can impact efficiency 
levels through various channels. First, it can reduce market power by 
breaking the information monopolies developed by existing banks (Vives, 
1990). In this manner, making information more available can work against 
the ‘quiet life’ that the incumbent banks enjoy. Second, it improves the 
accuracy of credit-worthiness assessments of banks, thereby reducing 
credit risks and the efficiency in the allocation of credit (Pagano & Jappelli, 
1993).  
4.2.4  Data sources 
Perhaps the most important challenge that researchers face in attempting to 
assess the impact of regulations is the availability of reliable data on 
regulatory conditions. Presently, the standard dataset that quantifies the 
quality and adequacy of banking regulations for a large set of countries 
over time is based on the detailed results of the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP). Undertaken jointly by the IMF and the World 
Bank since 1999, the FSAP regularly evaluates the regulatory structures of 
its members by assessing their compliance with international standards. 
For the banking regulations, the assessors use the so-called ‘Basel Core 
Principles’ (BCPs) of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, which 
were issued in 1997 as a basis for their evaluations.77 These assessments are 
conducted according to standardised methods developed by the Basel 
Committee and result in a score of compliance on each one of the 25 BCPs.78 
                                                      
76 For more details on the strength of credit information index, see section 2.8.  
77 The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision comprises representatives from bank 
supervisory agencies from advanced countries, including Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as 
developing countries, including Argentina, Brazil, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa and 
Turkey.  
78 For a thorough review of these methodologies, see World Bank (2005).  102 | IMPACT OF BANK REGULATIONS ON EFFICIENCY 
 
The IMF has compiled an in-house database that provides the level of 
compliance in each one of BCPs for all the evaluated countries since 1999.79  
As the earliest study of its kind, Sundararajan et al. (2001) have used 
the BCP database to show that it does a poor job in explaining interest 
spreads and credit risk. Attempting to explain this counter-intuitive result, 
Das et al. (2005) find that regulatory quality leads to a more sound banking 
sector with less liquidity stresses as long as cross-country differences in 
institutional quality are accounted for. Pointing at a stronger degree of 
conditionality, Podpiera (2006) finds that a greater compliance with the 
BCPs has enhanced asset quality and bank performance when various 
financial, macroeconomic and structural factors are controlled for. More 
recently, Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2010) fail to find a relationship 
between BCP compliance and systemic risk measures.  
Taking a different route, Barth et al. (2004) have compiled an 
alternative dataset on banking laws and regulations, also used in this 
study. The authors’ dataset (referred henceforth as the Barth et al. 
regulatory and supervisory survey or the “BRSS”) is based on the results of 
a worldwide survey, collected from national regulatory authorities in over 
150 countries in the years 2000, 2003 and 2007.80 Analysing the data, the 
authors find regulatory systems that facilitate adequate private monitoring 
(i.e. disclosure requirements) tend to have a beneficial effect across almost 
all the indicators they consider. Other regulatory variables, such as the 
official supervisory power or capital requirements, have no or little impact. 
In later work, Barth et al. (2006) show that several institutional factors, such 
as the absence of corruption and the presence of voice and accountability, 
also have a strong positive impact on net interest margins and overhead 
costs. Using the BRSS, Laeven & Levine (2008) find that the impact of 
regulations on risk depends crucially on a bank’s ownership structure. In 
                                                      
79 The publication of the FSAP results, including the detailed Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), is voluntary. Although most 
developed countries have agreed to publish the detailed assessments and ROSCs, 
among the South-MED countries in our sample, a detailed account of compliance 
with BCPs is only available for Tunisia. Moreover, Egypt has agreed only to 
publish a summary of the FSAP 2008 report. For these reasons, the compilation of 
the BCP compliance scores was not possible for our sample.  
80 The covered years are approximate as the responses have been collected over 
several years in each one of the countries.  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 103 
 
particular, banks with more powerful shareholders tend to take more risks, 
making the link between regulatory environment and risk-taking 
ambiguous (even negative) when ownership is not accounted for.  
Comparing the different approaches to measuring regulatory 
adequacy and quality, one of the main questions is whether the BRSS and 
the IMF’s BCP assessments are measuring the same things. In theory, there 
should be substantial correlation between the two databases since both are 
based on comparable principles. However, Čihák & Tieman (2008) note 
that the correlation between the two databases is exceptionally low. The 
differences can arise due to a variety of reasons. Neither measure is perfect 
in fully implementing the laws as “countries may change the regulatory 
framework to appear better on paper but not on ground” (Barth et al., 2006, 
pp. 81-82). The BCP assessments are likely to be more illuminating in this 
manner, as they depend on independent assessments and not on self-
evaluations. The BRSS, which relies on answers to standardised questions, 
is less likely to contain potential ‘grading biases’ that are more likely in the 
BCP assessments. 
Table 4.3 details the data sources and provides a descriptive 
summary of the variables used in the regressions in this section. The 
institutional quality and the regulatory factors exhibit substantial variance, 
which could make them helpful in explaining the variability in the bank 
efficiency scores. 
Table 4.3. Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable name  Source  Obs.  Mean  St. dev.  Min  Max 
Bank efficiency 
(MTR) 
Own calculations & 
Bankscope 
618  0.817 0.160  0.310 1.074 
Bank  assets  Bankscope  618  8.165 1.523  3.456 13.724 
Bank market share  Bankscope  618  0.047  0.111  0.000  0.780 
Bank  liquidity  Bankscope  618  0.033 0.044  0.000 0.443 
Bank equity  Bankscope  618  0.088  0.045  -0.037  0.364 
Inflation  WDI  618  2.754 0.874  1.317 7.278 
Growth  WDI  618  2.944 1.579  0.230 6.134 
Institutional quality  Polity IV & 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2009)  
606 9.777  3.726 -0.060  11.699 
Scope restrictions  Barth et al. surveys   596  7.065  1.528  5.000  10.000 
Entry obstacles  Barth et al. surveys   596  8.155  11.556  0.292  55.233 
Cap. req. stringency  Barth et al. surveys    596  5.045 2.863  1.000 9.000 104 | IMPACT OF BANK REGULATIONS ON EFFICIENCY 
 
Supervisory indep.  Barth et al. surveys   596  1.099  1.027  0.000  3.000 
Deposit insurance  Barth et al. surveys   596  0.904  0.294  0.000  1.000 
Private monitoring  Barth et al. surveys   596  8.440  0.995  6.000  10.000 
Credit information  Doing Business 
surveys 
400 4.705  1.256 0.000  6.000 
Note: The Bankscope database is compiled and distributed by Bureau van Dijk; World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and Doing Business surveys are both distributed by the 
World Bank; Polity IV is developed and distributed by the Center for Systemic Peace and 
Colorado State University.  
4.3  Empirical results 
This section investigates the impact of complying with the regulatory 
standards developed in earlier chapters on efficiencies of banks. Since the 
efficiency scores developed in section 3 are always positive and almost 
always fall within the unit range, the dependent variable (i.e. the MTR) is a 
limited dependent variable. The empirical estimations in this section use 
the Tobit model. Two specifications were used to ensure that the results are 
robust. First, Table 4.4 gives the results of a pooled regression. Second, 
Table 4.5 provides results for random-effects panel regressions. The effects 
of each of the regulatory variables were estimated separately in order to 
reduce the potential multi-collinearity that exists between these variables.  
Starting with the bank-specific variables, the results are mostly in line 
with prior literature. Bank size, or the natural log of bank assets, has a 
significant and robust impact on efficiency. Larger banks are more efficient, 
which would confirm the presence of scale economies, in line with the 
findings of Olson & Zoubi (2010). In turn, market power, as measured by 
the market share, has generally a negative impact on efficiency. This result 
confirms the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis, which suggests that the market power 
that banks enjoy leads them to forego revenues or cost-saving 
opportunities. Several studies have found evidence for such a relationship 
with a variety of efficiency and performance measures, including Berger & 
Hannan (1998) for the US banks and Maudos & de Guevara (2007) for the 
EU banks.81  
                                                      
81 An alternative explanation is that the management of larger banks are more 
interested in ‘building empires’. For a study documenting how such incentives 
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Banks that are more liquid are significantly less efficient. As noted 
repeatedly in earlier sections, the South-MED banks are more liquid 
because they hold more government assets. Since the opportunity cost of 
holding liquid assets are low, such banks are also more likely to hold more 
cash and cash-like deposits in the central bank and other banks. The 
relative inefficiency of these banks appear to confirm the ‘lazy banks’ view, 
which suggests that banks in developing countries that invest in public 
assets develop more slowly and are substantially less efficient (Hauner, 
2008; Hauner, 2009).  
The results on the impact of capitalisation on efficiency are less conclusive 
for the strength of capitalisation. According to the pooled regression results 
(Table 4.4), well-capitalised banks have a slightly higher efficiency than 
other banks; however, these results are not robust and disappear 
completely in the panel regressions (Table 4.5). It is entirely possible that 
the positive impact of the strength of capitalisation is offset by the business 
models of such banks, which, much like the highly-liquid institutions, 
invest more in government assets. 
Among the two macroeconomic factors, inflation clearly has the more 
robust impact. More specifically, a lower rate of inflation contributes 
substantially to greater bank efficiency, which is in line with the literature, 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004; Kasman & Yildirim, 2006). In turn, economic 
growth is generally positively related to efficiency, pointing to economic 
spillovers and potential opportunities for banks to reduce costs during 
bursts of growth.  
The institutional quality variable, which is an aggregation of a 
number of institutional factors, including the strength of democratic 
processes, political openness, power exercised by the executive arm, 
election procedures, control of corruption, voice and accountability, and the 
rule of law. The coefficient estimates are highly significant in all of the 
specifications and point to a strong positive correlation between the quality 
of institutions and efficiency. These findings are in line with recent findings 
and highlight the fact that bank regulations cannot be viewed in isolation 
from the overall institutional framework, (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004; Barth 
et al., 2006).  
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Table 4.4 Determinants of bank efficiency, pooled regressions 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII 
Bank  assets  0.028*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Bank market 
share 
-0.408*** -0.460*** -0.385*** -0.486*** -0.502*** -0.424*** -0.188** 
  (0.053) (0.063) (0.055) (0.058) (0.054) (0.058) (0.080) 
Bank liquidity  -0.410***  -0.151  -0.486*** -0.416*** -0.398*** -0.475*** 0.138 
  (0.104) (0.119) (0.107) (0.115) (0.107) (0.112) (0.122) 
Bank  equity 0.191* 0.224  0.210* 0.326***  0.262**  0.331***  0.168 
  (0.116) (0.138) (0.119) (0.126) (0.120) (0.123) (0.135) 
Inflation  -0.041*** -0.004  -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.034*** -0.026*** -0.030*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Growth  -0.001 0.010* -0.002 0.024***  0.023***  0.013***  0.031*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Inst.  quality  0.012*** 0.005  0.016*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Scope  restrictions  -0.042***  .. .. .. .. .. .. 
  (0.004)        
Entry  obstacles  .. -0.006***  .. .. .. .. .. 
   (0.001)       
Cap. req. 
stringency 
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    (0.002)      
Supervisory 
indep. 
.. .. .. 0.010*  .. .. .. 
     (0.005)     
Deposit  insurance  .. .. .. .. 0.173***  .. .. 
      (0.020)    
Private 
monitoring 
.. .. .. .. .. 0.032***   
       ( 0 . 0 0 6 )    
Credit 
information 
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0.049*** 
        ( 0 . 0 0 9 )  
Constant  0.899*** 0.591*** 0.473*** 0.329*** 0.317*** 0.191*** 0.254*** 
  (0.064) (0.063) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.049) (0.047) 
         
Observations  584 380 584 584 584 584 400 
Wald χ² (8)  465.4 284.5 437.3 360.3 424.4 386.0 299.9 
Log  likelihood  482.9 335.2 468.9 430.4 462.5 443.3 337.0 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions use the Tobit estimation procedures to account for the limited dependent variable, 
the meta-technology ratio (MTR), or the ratio of bank-specific meta-frontier efficiency and the country efficiency.  
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (p-values), respectively. 
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Table 4.5 Determinants of bank efficiency, random-effects panel regressions 
  I  II  III IV V  VI VII 
         
Bank assets  0.028***  0.022***  0.024*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Bank market share  -0.274***  -0.273***  -0.263*** -0.245*** -0.268*** -0.201**  -0.120 
  (0.077) (0.085) (0.077) (0.080) (0.077) (0.081) (0.085) 
Bank liquidity  -0.306***  -0.184*  -0.317*** -0.325*** -0.325*** -0.338*** -0.022 
  (0.095) (0.097) (0.095) (0.096) (0.093) (0.095) (0.106) 
Bank  equity  -0.079 0.204  -0.108 -0.086 -0.070 -0.074 0.157 
  (0.127) (0.144) (0.128) (0.128) (0.125) (0.128) (0.132) 
Inflation -0.016***  -0.012**  -0.012***  -0.012*** -0.030*** -0.011*** -0.021*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Growth 0.009***  0.011**  0.010***  0.013*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 
  (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Inst. quality  0.021***  0.013***  0.022*** 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Scope  restrictions  -0.010***  .. .. .. .. .. .. 
  (0.003)        
Entry  obstacles  .. -0.003***  .. .. .. .. .. 
   (0.001)       
Cap. req. 
stringency 
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    (0.002)      
Supervisory  indep.  .. .. .. 0.003  .. .. .. 
     (0.003)     
Deposit  insurance  .. .. .. .. 0.140***  .. .. 
      (0.025)    
Private  monitoring  .. .. .. .. .. 0.012***  .. 
       (0.004)   
Credit  information  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.035*** 
        (0.008) 
Constant 0.505***  0.544***  0.408***  0.400*** 0.436*** 0.358*** 0.320*** 
  (0.059) (0.072) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.048) 
         
Observations  584 380 584 584 584 584 400 
Wald χ² (8)  258.2 226.9 252.8 229.8 282.5 243.6 278.8 
Log  likelihood 570.4 370.6 568.7 566.4 580.6 570.3 387.0 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The regressions use the Tobit estimation procedures to account for the limited dependent variable, 
the meta-technology ratio (MTR), or the ratio of bank-specific meta-frontier efficiency and the country efficiency.  
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Turning to the regulatory factors, it is notable that several variables have 
robust and significant impact. The presence of explicit deposit schemes, 
greater disclosure practices for better private monitoring, and the 
availability and use of credit information all contribute strongly to greater 
efficiency. The same can also be said for the stringency of capital 
requirements, although the impact is less significant in the panel regression 
(column II) in Table 4.5. Restrictions placed on banking activities and entry 
obstacles adversely affect bank efficiency. Prohibiting security and 
insurance transactions may indeed reduce the banks’ ability to diversify 
risks and activities which is by and large compatible with the literature on 
the higher profitability of banking conglomerates and universal banking, 
(Vander Vennet, 2002). Supervisory independence has only a weak impact 
on efficiency in the pooled regression (column III of Table 4.4), possibly due 
to the fact that other political factors, i.e. power of executive arm, are 
readily controlled.  
The positive impact of the availability of information on bank 
efficiency is in line with the literature. In particular, the idea that disclosure 
laws and practices that facilitate private monitoring tend to reduce costs is 
echoed in several studies, including most notably Barth et al. (2006), 
Pasiouras (2008) and Pasiouras et al. (2009). Moreover, Brown et al. (2009) 
and Djankov et al. (2007) show that availability of credit information is 
associated with lower transaction costs and moderation of credit risks, 
enhancing the access of credit of opaque borrowers such as small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
A more surprising result is the pro-efficiency impact of the presence 
of deposit insurance schemes. The results reviewed in this section show 
that Mediterranean banks operating under deposit insurance schemes are 
significantly more efficient than those without such schemes. There is some 
weak support for these findings in recent literature. For example, Pasiouras 
(2008) finds that deposit insurance schemes improve efficiency (albeit at a 
marginal level of significance) when other regulatory aspects are 
considered alongside. In other cases, the availability of such schemes seems 
to have no or negative impact on efficiency. The results obtained here 
would seem to support the idea that having a safety net probably enhances 
efficiency by lowering the (shadow) cost of funds, especially in the MENA 
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4.4  Conclusions 
The results of this section clearly show that the banks in countries with a 
sound regulatory structure are significantly more efficient. In particular, 
the presence of deposit insurance schemes, disclosure standards that 
facilitate private monitoring and the availability of and access to credit 
information all enhance the cost efficiencies of banks. The stringency of 
capital requirements also has a positive impact on bank efficiency, albeit to 
a less extent. In turn, according to our findings, there is a case for allowing 
banks to engage in a wider scope of activities and dismantling entry 
obstacles. Supervisory independence seems to have no impact on cost 
efficiency, most likely due to the offsetting impact of increased risks arising 
from concentrated political power.  
In short, our results support mainly the third pillar of Basel II with 
weaker support for the capital requirements. The rapid deployment of 
private credit bureaus, possibly modelled after the regional best-practice as 
evidenced by Morocco’s brand new system, is also important in enhancing 
efficiency. However, none of these factors should be treated in a vacuum. 
Institutional quality, measured here by an aggregation of a number of 
political and governance-related factors, is a substantially important factor. 
Lastly, macroeconomic stability is also an important contributor to the 
efficiencies of banks.  
It should be highlighted that the results of this section have assessed 
the importance of regulatory and supervisory practices for achieving bank 
efficiency. Other issues should also be considered for making a broad 
assessment of the suitability and adequacy of certain rules and standards. 
For example, while certain regulatory conditions may improve banks’ cost 
efficiencies, they may undermine profits (e.g. systemic stability).   
112 | 
 
 
5.  IMPACT OF BANK REGULATIONS ON 
GROWTH 
he key justification for introducing financial regulations is based on 
the idea that financial markets are imperfect and that regulations can 
effectively correct these shortcomings. The various areas of 
regulations considered in this study have all sprung into existence due to 
these considerations. Since customers often have asymmetric information 
regarding the operations of the banks, licensing and disclosure 
requirements are put forward to restrict the possibility of improper 
activities while providing the investors with adequate information. Capital 
requirements are an attempt to contain the risk-taking incentives of the 
owners of banks. The powers granted to the supervisors ensure that they 
have access to adequate information on the financial intermediaries and 
can act in a timely and efficient manner when troubles arise. Deposit 
insurance schemes are put forward to mitigate the likelihood that 
imperfectly informed depositors lead to a bank run. Credit information 
availability is crucial to overcome credit rationing, which arises when the 
financial intermediaries have limited information on borrowers. 
If the regulations and supervisory practices serve to respond to 
market imperfections in practice, they should have a clear pro-growth 
impact. A better functioning financial market that properly treats the 
information asymmetries that exist between the banks, their clients and the 
supervisors should indeed help allocate financial resources more 
efficiently. However, the impact of regulations may be more insidious if the 
authorities choose to use their powers for their own good and not for the 
common welfare. Under this so-called ‘private interest view’, politicians 
may attempt to orient the industry to lend to their politically connected 
clients and banks may capture the regulators to act in their own interests. 
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In short, the political imperfections may pose a greater risk to growth than 
the market imperfections.82 
This chapter turns to a broader investigation of the economic benefits 
of regulatory and supervisory practices. The main question is whether 
banking regulations and practices have an impact on growth. Several 
channels through which the relationship may operate are considered, 
including the impact of regulations on cost efficiency, issuance of credit to 
the private sector and capital market activity. The empirical analysis also 
controls for the presence of other intermediate channels that are not 
accounted for.  
The results show that regulations impact economic growth through 
their impact on bank efficiency and financial development. The role of 
government in the banking sector has a clear negative impact on growth, 
even beyond its impact on the identified intermediate variables. Thus, 
governments that are heavily present in the banking sector also engage in 
other activities that are less favourable to growth. Moreover, the impact of 
disclosure requirements, scope restrictions and capital requirements are 
mostly indirect, operating through the financial development variables.  
5.1  Literature review 
One of the key links between financial regulations and growth is the 
presence of entry obstacles as a key impediment to a competitive market. 
There are several conduits through which financial regulations may exert 
an impact on economic growth. A well-functioning regulatory framework 
can reinforce financial development and, in doing so, facilitates the flow of 
funding to the real sectors. The predominant view in economic literature is 
that a developed financial system can generate significant benefits for the 
economy. Although the idea that the development of the financial services 
sector is essential for economic development goes at least as far back as 
Schumpeter (1934), it was King & Levine (1993) who first empirically 
demonstrated a strong and robust relationship. Since then, several studies 
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have confirmed that financial development enhances growth through the 
availability of external funds, higher employment, firm creation, etc.83 
Economic theory identifies two main channels through which the 
positive impact of financial development on growth operates. On the one 
hand, a sound financial system increases the availability of resources for 
investment by mobilising idle savings, facilitating transactions and 
attracting foreign investments. On the other hand, such a system can 
improve the allocation of funding by enhancing risk management, 
transparency and corporate governance practices; reinforcing property and 
creditor rights; and so forth. A well-functioning financial system is 
particularly important for the development of the private sector, 
particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, which represent a 
significant proportion of economic activity but lack the internal sources to 
grow.84  
Despite its wide recognition, several studies have challenged the 
validity of the so-called ‘finance-growth’ view. Most of these doubts rest on 
the direction of causality.85 In particular, using a panel of less developed 
countries, Demetriades & Hussein (1996) find evidence of bi-
directionality—and in some cases inverse correlation—for a panel of 16 
developing countries.86 Allowing for a non-linear relationship, Deidda & 
Fattouh (2002) fail to confirm the results of King and Levine (1993) for less 
developed countries included in their dataset. Similarly, Rioja & Valev 
(2004) verify that the relationship depends on the level of economic 
development, with little or uncertain impact on low or high extremes of the 
income levels. Using a dataset of 11 MENA countries over the 1979-2003 
period, Ben Naceur & Ghazouani (2007) find that the development of 
                                                      
83 For a more complete survey of the so-called ‘finance-growth’ literature, see 
Levine (1997; 2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008). 
84 Examining a number of national surveys, Fadil (2000) finds that a general lack of 
access to credit markets is one of the principal constraints faced by SMEs to grow 
in line with their cash-flow in the MENA region. 
85 For a review of criticism of studies linking finance development to growth, see 
Wachtel (2001; 2003) and references therein. See also Arestis & Demetriades (1997) 
for reasons on why cross-country empirical studies may suffer from serious 
methodological problems. 
86 The only MED-11 country included in the sample of Demetriades & Hussein 
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banking and the stock market has no – or even a negative – impact on 
growth in the MENA region. 
One explanation of these contrasting results is that some factors that 
are unaccounted for in the empirical analysis may explain why a financial 
system functions well and economic growth occurs (possibly 
simultaneously). The omission of these variables may then lead to an 
incorrect assessment of the direction and strength of the causal 
relationship.87 In response to these criticisms, the literature has turned on 
these deeper structural conditions. Indeed, the emerging academic 
consensus is that financial development could be beneficial as long as 
certain conditions are present to ensure that the system develops 
adequately to serve the financial needs of the citizens and the private 
sector. 
Development of financial regulations can also impact economic 
growth through their effect on efficiency and competitive conditions in the 
financial sector. The previous section has also given some evidence of the 
impact of financial regulations on cost efficiencies of the banks in the 
Mediterranean region. Although the literature on the impact of regulations 
on bank efficiency is currently at its infancy, several studies have reached 
similar conclusions. In particular, Barth et al. (2006) uses the results of their 
own regulatory and supervisory surveys (BRSS) to provide partial support 
for the positive impact of disclosure requirements on net interest margins 
and cost efficiency. Pasiouras (2008) and Pasiouras et al. (2009) also use 
same data source to confirm the results of Barth et al. (2006) while showing 
that certain bank- and market-specific factors also matter.88 
A number of studies have also noted how regulatory conditions may 
impact entry and more broadly the competitive conditions in financial 
markets. Focusing on entry into banking markets, Cetorelli & Strahan 
(2006) find that state-level restrictions on bank entry reduces the share of 
smaller enterprises, effectively reducing the growth potential of the state. 
Larger firms are less affected by entry obstacles, as they can use alternative 
funding sources and have an easier access to capital markets. Restricted 
                                                      
87 The idea that unaccounted for factors and relationships between non-structural 
variables may introduce biases in the empirical assessment of policy impacts goes 
back to Lucas (1976).  
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entry tends to support the market power of the incumbent firms, which 
could reduce the credit available to the economy as a whole and thereby 
have a negative impact on growth, (Cetorelli & Gambera, 2001).89 Using a 
large sample of banks from the Middle East and North African countries, 
Turk-Ariss (2009) shows that the degree of competition, measured by the 
so-called ‘H-statistic’ first developed by Panzar & Rosse (1987), is positively 
correlated with foreign bank entry but is a decreasing function of activity 
restrictions.90 
5.2  Methodology and data 
The basic regression used in this section takes the following functional 
form: 
it it it it it R C F g Growth ε + = ) , , (  
where Growth is the real per capita growth for country i at year t. The 
variables F, C, and R represent financial development, macroeconomic and 
regulatory factors. In order to capture non-linear relationships, the natural 
logarithms forms were used for most economic and financial variables.  
The use of financial development variables as explanatory variables 
may pose a bias in our estimations, since economic growth and financial 
development may be determined simultaneously. To control for these 
potential problems, an instrumental variables approach has been used in 
this section. As in La Porta et al. (1997), legal origin (i.e. French, English or 
mixed) is assumed to shape financial development. The use of legal origins 
as an instrument for financial development has been a popular tool since 
these institutional conditions can be safely treated as a purely exogenous 
(i.e. unchanging) determinant of economic growth. Moreover, several 
                                                      
89 Although greater concentration in the banking sector may reduce the overall 
availability of credit, Cetorelli & Gambera (2001) find that it may enhance funding 
for firms that specialise in research and development, are highly dependent on 
external finance and develop long-lasting relationships with their creditors. These 
issues are less likely to be applicable in the Middle East and North African 
perspective since reliance on external financing is relatively low.  
90 Using 2000-06 figures, Turk-Ariss (2009) finds that market conditions in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia can best be categorised as a monopoly. The banks in other 
MENA countries included in the study (Egyptian banks were not covered in the 
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studies have shown evidence that legal origins influence financial 
development through their impact on the treatment of shareholders, rights 
of creditors, effectiveness of contract enforcement and the use of 
international accounting standards. More specifically, La Porta et al. (1998) 
show that French civil law countries are relatively low performing in terms 
of shareholder and creditor rights, with less comprehensive accounting 
standards.91 Two dummy variables, English or mixed legal origin, are 
included to account for different types of systems. Additionally, a dummy 
variable for Muslim countries is also included.  
Assuming that legal origin indicators serve as appropriate 
instruments of financial development variables (F) is equivalent to a set of 
orthogonality conditions for the instrumental variables on the instrument 
variables (Z) and the error term,  [ ] 0 ' = ε Z E . Two-staged Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) techniques are used to estimate the models 
with the relevant orthogonality conditions.  
Since the number of moment conditions may exceed the number of 
coefficients to be estimated, tests of over-identifying restrictions are carried 
out. These tests determine whether or not the instrumental variables are 
associated with growth beyond their ability to explain any variation in 
financial sector development. More specifically, the Hansen-Sargan test (‘J-
test’) has a null hypothesis of correct model specification, which has an 
asymptotic χ2 distribution with degrees of freedom of the number of over-
identifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). Failure to reject the test supports the 
validity of the model.  
A second set of tests is also carried out to check the weakness or 
strength of the instruments. The so-called ‘Cragg-Donald test’ is simply an 
F-statistic on the hypothesis that the instruments do not enter the first stage 
regression of the two-stage estimations. A failure to reject the null 
hypothesis calls into question the validity of the instrumental variable 
estimates and hypothesis tests. The critical values of the test are given in 
Stock & Yogo (2001). As a simple rule of thumb, specifications with a 
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elements of common British law (Cyprus, Israel and Malta) score very high on 
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Cragg-Donald F-value that exceeds 9.08 will be considered to be 
appropriately defined.92 
Table 5.1 Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable name  Source 
Obs. Mean 
St. 
dev. 
Min Max 
Real GDP per capita growth  World Dev. Ind. (WDI)  142  2.424 2.081 -3.607 10.577 
Initial GDP per capita (log)  WDI  154 8.603  1.064 7.028 9.776 
Trade openness (log)  WDI  153 -0.343 0.381 -0.958  0.700 
Inflation (log)  WDI  154 0.037  0.031  -0.004 0.261 
Lack of corruption (log)  PRS Group  154 1.116  0.343 0.405 1.609 
Bank efficiency (log)  Own calc. and Bankscope  154 0.519  0.091 0.321 0.692 
Private credit (log)  WDI  153 -0.389 0.829 -3.242  0.945 
Stock market turnover (log)  WDI  140 -1.215 1.165 -4.143  0.947 
Scope restrictions  Barth et al. surveys (BRSS)  137  7.526 1.595  5.000 10.000 
Government ownership  Barth et al. surveys (BRSS)  78 0.275  0.303 0.000 0.958 
Cap. req. stringency  Barth et al. surveys (BRSS)  137 4.869  2.141 1.000 9.000 
Supervisory independence  Barth et al. surveys (BRSS)  154 1.760  0.893 0.000 3.000 
Deposit insurance  Barth et al. surveys (BRSS)  137 0.766  0.425 0.000 1.000 
Private monitoring  Barth et al. surveys (BRSS)  137  8.212 0.958  6.000 10.000 
Credit information  Doing Business surveys  140  8.000 2.921  4.000 14.000 
Notes: Bankscope database is compiled and distributed by Bureau van Dijk; World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and Doing Business surveys are both distributed by the 
World Bank. 
 
The regulatory variables (R)  are only available for the years 2000, 
2003 and 2007. Nevertheless, changes in regulations are relatively slow 
over time, as the results in section 2 amply demonstrated. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the regulatory factors remain constant in the 
periods prior to the observed outcomes, i.e. in 1995-2000, 2001-03 and 2004-
07.  
The sources and descriptive statistics for the data used in this section 
are summarised in Table 5.1. A number of country-specific time variant 
variables are used to control for macroeconomic factors. Real initial GDP 
per capita is included to account for fast growth in poorer countries. The 
expected sign for the coefficient is negative, implying a significant catch-up 
                                                      
92 For our purposes, the Cragg-Donald threshold of 9.08 (with three instruments 
and a single endogenous variable) corresponds to a maximum bias of 10% at the 
5% significance level. For more information, see Stock & Yogo (2001, Table 1).  CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 119 
 
effect. Openness to trade, which is calculated as the imports and exports 
divided by GDP, accounts for the positive spillovers from an open current 
account. Inflation rate is included to account for the impact of economic 
instability or inflationary policies on growth. Lastly, lack of corruption 
assesses the level of corruption within the political system and the 
bureaucracy.  
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Table 5.2 Impact of regulations on growth controlling for efficiency 
    I  II  III IV V  VI VII  VIII 
Bank  efficiency  6.118*  0.700 0.038 3.623 6.584 2.824 2.749 1.880 
 (2.956)  (3.288)  (3.707)  (3.782)  (4.004) (3.316) (3.080) (3.150) 
Initial GDP per 
capita (real) 
-0.920*** -0.977***  -1.328***  -0.928***  -0.878*** -0.876*** -0.974*** -0.907*** 
 (0.269)  (0.271)  (0.313)  (0.319)  (0.275) (0.279) (0.285) (0.305) 
Openness  to  trade  0.659  0.089 -0.172  0.268 0.661 0.104 0.148 0.993 
 (0.490)  (0.472)  (0.828)  (0.500)  (0.461) (0.456) (0.472) (0.621) 
Inflation  3.883  6.885 6.599 5.979 4.119 5.696 7.364 2.991 
 (6.866)  (7.168)  (8.575)  (7.678)  (6.596) (7.668) (7.244) (6.313) 
Lack  of  corruption  1.130  1.626** 0.169  1.635** 0.961  1.490** 1.412** 1.118* 
 (0.722)  (0.637)  (0.946)  (0.702)  (0.853) (0.654) (0.673) (0.678) 
Scope  restrictions   -0.242*  .. .. .. .. .. .. 
    ( 0 . 1 3 4 )         
Government-
ownership 
..  .. -0.023*  .. .. .. .. .. 
     ( 0 . 0 1 3 )        
Cap. req. 
stringency 
..  .. .. -0.160  .. .. .. .. 
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Supervisory 
independence 
..  .. .. .. 0.068  .. .. .. 
       ( 0 . 2 2 3 )      
Deposit  insurance  ..  .. .. .. .. -0.358  .. .. 
        ( 0 . 4 2 7 )     
Private 
monitoring 
..  .. .. .. .. .. 0.301  .. 
         ( 0 . 1 8 9 )    
Credit  information  ..  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.037 
          ( 0 . 0 9 2 )  
Constant  5.922** 10.219***  13.522***  7.290*** 5.362*  6.911*** 5.096*  7.968*** 
 (2.688)  (2.384)  (3.306)  (2.531)  (2.872) (2.392) (2.750) (2.525) 
Observations  142  127 77  127 142 127 127 130 
F-test (second-
stage) 
4.068  4.907 4.555 2.303 3.599 2.712 2.928 4.253 
  …  p-value  0.002  0.000 0.001 0.039 0.002 0.017 0.011 0.001 
Hansen J-test for 
overidentification 
2.057  2.955 2.178 2.824 1.961 0.704 0.448 3.075 
  …  p-value  0.358  0.228 0.337 0.244 0.375 0.703 0.799 0.215 
Cragg-Donald test 
for weak id.(>9.08) 
10.01 13.62  13.71  13.56  9.92  15.70 19.91 16.34 
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Table 5.3 Impact of regulations on growth controlling for private credit 
    I II  III IV V  VI VII  VIII 
Private credit   -0.631  -0.839  -1.125 -0.953 -3.856 -0.433 -1.034 -0.196 
 (0.984)  (0.780)  (1.194)  (0.780)  (3.105) (0.761) (0.957) (0.475) 
Initial GDP per capita (real)  -0.769**  -0.753**  -1.299*** -0.656*  0.402  -0.780**  -0.796**  -0.923*** 
 (0.382)  (0.335)  (0.286)  (0.336)  (1.103) (0.307) (0.318) (0.300) 
Openness  to  trade  0.671  0.431 -0.083  0.475 1.518 0.139 0.448 0.966 
 (0.679)  (0.568)  (0.667)  (0.559)  (1.151) (0.517) (0.599) (0.664) 
Inflation  -0.181  5.856 13.660  4.545 -15.272  3.945 5.817 0.952 
 (7.568)  (7.393)  (9.036)  (7.867)  (19.562) (7.503)  (7.115)  (6.685) 
Lack  of  corruption  1.947**  2.100*** 0.977  2.292*** 1.922*  1.912**  2.180*** 1.295* 
 (0.867)  (0.754)  (1.175)  (0.849)  (1.027) (0.841) (0.828) (0.690) 
Scope  restrictions  ..  -0.200  .. .. .. .. .. .. 
    (0.136)        
Government-ownership  ..  .. -0.042*  .. .. .. .. .. 
     ( 0 . 0 2 4 )        
Cap.  req.  stringency  ..  .. .. -0.102  .. .. .. .. 
      (0.072)      
Supervisory  independence  ..  .. .. .. 1.498  .. .. .. 
       (1.254)     
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        ( 0 . 4 1 8 )     
Private  monitoring  ..  .. .. .. .. .. 0.514**  .. 
         ( 0 . 2 5 0 )    
Credit  information  ..  .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.074 
          ( 0 . 1 0 9 )  
Constant 6.897*  7.739**  12.530***  5.691*  -6.144  7.024***  2.297  8.609*** 
 (3.652)  (3.220)  (2.822)  (3.024)  (12.352) (2.639)  (4.276)  (2.030) 
Observations  142  127 77  127 142 127 127 130 
F-test  (second-stage)  3.986  5.087 5.713 2.318 2.470 2.747 3.055 4.284 
  …  p-value  0.002  0.000 0.000 0.038 0.027 0.016 0.008 0.001 
Hansen J-test for 
overidentification 
4.367  1.975 2.053 2.400 0.659 1.151 0.107 3.264 
  …  p-value  0.113  0.372 0.358 0.301 0.719 0.562 0.948 0.196 
Cragg-Donald test for weak 
id.(> 9.08) 
3.457  8.163 3.556 6.148 4.475 7.127 4.779 15.80 
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Table 5.4 Impact of regulations on growth controlling for stock market turnover 
    I  II  III IV V  VI VII  VIII 
Stock  turnover  0.784**  0.393 0.312 0.577 0.779**  0.393 0.394 0.657 
 (0.363)  (0.400)  (0.356)  (0.415)  (0.363) (0.398) (0.385) (0.463) 
Initial GDP per capita (real)  -1.306***  -1.179***  -1.712*** -1.225*** -1.297*** -1.103*** -1.155*** -0.971*** 
 (0.289)  (0.334)  (0.376)  (0.398)  (0.296) (0.346) (0.332) (0.300) 
Openness  to  trade  1.715**  0.854 0.360 1.194 1.868**  0.694 0.774 1.610* 
 (0.805)  (0.902)  (1.227)  (0.938)  (0.774) (0.862) (0.885) (0.840) 
Inflation  4.864  5.737 12.913  5.510 6.756 4.806 7.024 9.622 
 (6.482)  (6.762)  (9.510)  (7.437)  (5.957) (6.830) (6.928) (7.145) 
Lack of corruption  1.156*  1.320*  0.302  1.933***  1.303*  1.731***  1.554**  1.220* 
 (0.696)  (0.730)  (1.044)  (0.735)  (0.787) (0.638) (0.686) (0.672) 
Scope  restrictions  ..  -0.225  .. .. .. .. .. .. 
    (0.153)        
Government-ownership  ..  .. -0.043***  .. .. .. .. .. 
     ( 0 . 0 1 5 )        
Cap.  req.  stringency  ..  .. .. -0.149*  .. .. .. .. 
      (0.081)      
Supervisory  independence  ..  .. .. .. -0.186  .. .. .. 
       (0.218)     
Deposit  insurance  ..  .. .. .. .. -0.438  .. .. CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 125 
 
        ( 0 . 4 4 7 )     
Private  monitoring  ..  .. .. .. .. .. 0.274  .. 
         ( 0 . 2 0 5 )    
Credit  information  ..  .. .. .. .. .. .. -0.130 
          ( 0 . 1 2 6 )  
Constant 13.785***  13.357***  17.426***  12.341*** 13.844*** 10.841*** 8.839**  11.496*** 
 (2.685)  (2.971)  (4.388)  (4.128)  (2.771) (3.534) (4.050) (2.610) 
Observations  129  119 69  119 129 119 119 117 
F-test  (second-stage)  6.926  5.521 6.895 3.516 5.686 3.675 3.489 5.350 
  …  p-value  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 
Hansen J-test for 
overidentification 
0.287  2.377 3.290 2.647 0.536 0.730 0.352 2.011 
  …  p-value  0.866  0.305 0.193 0.266 0.765 0.694 0.839 0.366 
Cragg-Donald test for weak 
id.(> 9.08) 
11.07  9.827 15.01 8.701 11.97 9.172 11.76 15.28 
 
 
 126 | IMPACT OF BANK REGULATIONS ON GROWTH 
 
Three financial variables are used to assess the impact on growth. 
First,  bank efficiency, which is the country average for the meta-
technology ratio scores for the banks (developed in section 2). Second, 
private credit measures the share of private credits to the GDP. Lastly, the 
stock turnover measures the ratio of stocks traded divided by the average 
market capitalisation for the period.  
In addition to these variables, the regulatory variables already 
revised in section 4 are included, including scope restrictions, government-
owned banks, capital requirements stringency, supervisor independence, 
deposit insurance, private monitoring and credit information. Entry 
obstacles were not included in the tests as government-ownership due to a 
lack of observations for foreign denials. Instead, the market share of state-
owned banks is used as an indicator of the entry conditions, including 
foreign denials and the number of licensing requirements.93  
5.3  Results  
The results of the regressions are summarised in Table 5.2. The Hansen J-
tests fail to reject the null hypotheses for the 24 specifications, implying that 
the instruments are properly used and are not correlated with the residuals 
of the (second-stage) regressions. An additional statistic, the Cragg-Donald 
test for weak identification, is also included. These results point at potential 
problems due to weak instruments in Table 5.3, which endogenously 
account for private credit except for the last column (VIII), which controls 
for the level of credit information available. 
The results show that some of the country-specific variables do not 
matter while others have a significant impact on growth. In particular, our 
results reveal that inflation is not a significant determinant of growth in any 
of the specifications, despite a consistently positive coefficient estimate. 
Openness to trade has a weak positive impact on growth when stock 
market turnover is considered in Table 5.4, i.e. columns I and VIII. In turn, 
initial GDP per capita also has a persistently and significantly negative 
                                                      
93 For more details on entry obstacles, see secion 2.3. The pairwise correlation 
coefficients between the market share of state-owned banks on the one hand and 
the licensing requirement and foreign denial scores on the other are 0.270 and 
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impact on growth, which implies that poorer countries tend to grow more 
quickly than richer ones, as in Barro (1991).  
There is broad evidence that lack of corruption has a relatively 
consistent and positive impact on growth. This is in line with the findings 
in the growth literature.94 Corruption could lead to a number of 
inefficiencies, such as rent-seeking and avoidance behaviour, which may 
lead to substantial deadweight losses (Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993). Mauro (1995) shows that corruption affects growth by 
lowering returns from private investment. 
The results show that the three financial development variables have 
a relatively limited impact on growth. In particular, private credit (Table 
5.3) does not have a significant impact (although all of the coefficient 
estimates are negative) when it is allowed to be the endogenously 
determined financial development variable. In turn, both bank efficiency 
(Table 5.2) and stock market turnover (Table 5.4) have positive impacts on 
growth.  
Among the regulatory factors, government ownership has a weak but 
consistent impact, reducing growth in all three tables. More specifically, 
countries in which the state-owned banks are predominant grow less 
quickly. These findings are by and large supported in the literature. Barth 
et al. (1999) find evidence that government ownership of banks is 
associated with a low level of financial development, as measured by the 
available of credit to private enterprises. La Porta et al. (2002) find that 
government ownership of banks is associated with lower subsequent 
financial development and growth in per capita income. Beck et al. (2004) 
use firm-level data to show that public bank ownership tends to 
exacerbates market power of the incumbents and thus constrains credit to 
private enterprises.95 
                                                      
94 Several studies linking the impact of financial development to growth have used 
black market premia to account for corruption-related factors (Beck et al., 2000; 
Beck & Levine, 2004; Ben Naceur & Ghazouani, 2007).  
95 Part of the literature argues that excessive government ownership can be 
harmful because politicians use government-owned banks to further their own 
political goals (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; La Porta et al., 2002). Dinc (2005) provides 
support to this ‘political view’ that public bank policies are often politically-
oriented in finding that public banks increase their lending in election years. 
Caprio & Peria (2000) show that state ownership of banking is associated with a 
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Other regulatory factors have a less consistent impact. The strongest 
impact is with private monitoring, which is positively associated with 
capital income growth when private credit is considered but not in other 
cases. Scope restrictions tend to have a negative impact on growth when 
bank efficiency is considered but not when the two financial development 
factors are considered. Lastly, capital requirement stringency has a weak 
negative impact when the presence of stock market turnover is considered 
as an endogenous variable.  
These findings imply that the government’s role most likely serves as 
a proxy for other activities that are detrimental to growth—possibly 
unrelated to the financial markets. In turn, the impact of private 
monitoring, scope restrictions and capital requirements are mostly indirect, 
operating through the financial development variables, since their 
independent effects become insignificant when some of the financial 
development factors are controlled for.  
5.4  Conclusions 
According to our specifications, financial regulations have a relatively 
limited direct impact on growth. Among the seven regulatory areas 
considered throughout the paper, only government ownership—a proxy 
for entry obstacles and market conditions—appears to have a consistent 
and significant negative impact on growth. Moreover, there is limited 
evidence that financial development leads to economic development. 
Although efficiency and stock market turnover appear to increase income 
per capita growth, private credit appears to have little (and possibly 
negative) impact.  
These results show that regulatory factors operate mostly through the 
financial variables. Based on the results reviewed in this section, the 
regulatory factors considered in the paper have at best an indirect impact 
on growth, working their way through financial development. Moreover, 
lack of corruption has a clear impact on growth, which underlines its 
importance as a precondition for growth.  
                                                                                                                                       
greater likelihood of crises. The latter finding should also be considered in light of 
evidence that public banks in developing countries are often more stable than their 
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Several technical shortcomings have to be noted at this stage. First, 
due to the small sample size considered in the study, panel estimations 
were not feasible. Second, the similarities between the countries considered 
might have generated sampling biases, which imply that the results have to 
be interpreted with care and should be adequately re-assessed before 
applying to other regions. Third, the similarities between countries also 
make the task of finding strong indicators more difficult as the cross-
country variation is relatively limited. This is indeed one of the main causes 
for the apparent weaknesses of the instruments for the share of private 
credit in GDP. Lastly, the regulatory variables are assumed to remain fixed 
over long periods; although this assumption is unlikely to lead to 
substantial biases, it creates another source of homogeneity. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS  
his study sheds light on the changing regulatory environments of 
four south Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia. Over the past two decades, all four countries have engaged 
in financial sector reforms, with varying degrees of depth, engagement and 
success. Morocco has achieved the most advanced financial system as 
compared to the three others, eliminating interest rate subsidies and 
controls; reinforcing the responsibilities and roles of the supervisor; 
improving the risk-management practices along with the state-of-the-art; 
successfully implementing of a deposit insurance scheme; and introducing 
a credit information system that may well serve as a best-practice for other 
developing financial systems.  
The other South-MED countries examined in this study have been 
less successful in implementing key reforms. The banks in all of the three 
countries have relatively poor asset qualities, as evidenced by high rates of 
non-performing loans (NPLs). The policies put in place to respond to low 
asset quality have either led to limited improvement, a decline of credit 
availability or both. The privatisation efforts have been only partly 
successful and at times have not led to any change in the market conditions 
and financial development. In Algeria, the publicly-owned banks continue 
to dominate the banking sector, accounting for over 90% of total assets. In 
Egypt, although privatisation efforts have been partly successful, public 
loans and debt represent a substantial proportion of the portfolios of banks, 
which hampers financial development and growth opportunities. In 
Tunisia, a majority of the top three banks remain owned by the state.  
The comparisons among the EU-MED countries reveal particular 
shortcomings. Despite some recent improvements, entry obstacles continue 
to be widespread in all of the South-MED countries, arising from high rates 
of denied foreign applications and closely linked with a dominant state 
ownership. Capital requirements are less stringent in the Southern 
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Mediterranean under examination, increasingly so due to the disparities in 
the risk-sensitivity of the minimum capital requirements. The existing 
deposit insurance schemes in place, i.e. those in Algeria and Morocco, 
provide adverse incentives and may increase moral hazard risks. In Egypt 
and Tunisia, the implicit government guarantees may also aggravate the 
moral hazard problem. Although private monitoring and disclosure 
requirements appear in line with the EU-MED standards, accounting 
practices are increasingly poor in the South-MED. Lastly, despite recent 
improvements, especially in Morocco and Egypt, credit information 
availability is relatively low within the region.  
Turning to the cost efficiency analysis, results indicate an overall 
improvement in efficiency levels for the EU-MED and South-MED in the 
later stages of the analysis, from 2005 onwards (with the exception of 
Egypt). For the South-MED, this improvement is particularly remarkable 
for Moroccan and Algerian banks, but for different reasons. The overall 
mean efficiency in the region is improving, once more driven by 
improvements in the best practice. EU-MED banks, in particular the 
Spanish banks, dominate the region, with average efficiency scores of 80.4% 
against the region's average of 63.5%. Spanish banks also exhibit the 
highest meta-technology ratios and the ratios increase over time. This 
indicates that Spanish banks consistently improved their performance, and 
their banking technology became best practice. Nonetheless, during this 
period of analysis, the average meta-technology ratio is increasing, which 
indicates an ability of banks in all countries to appropriate the best 
available technology. These results are supported by the estimation of β-
convergence. The β coefficient is always negative and statistically 
significant, thus indicating that convergence in efficiency scores has 
occurred across countries in the MED-11 area. Furthermore, results for the 
σ-convergence suggest an increase in the speed of convergence as the σ 
coefficient is always negative and statistically significant. This indicates 
that, whereas the technological gap is still wide, the gap is narrowing at a 
faster speed. 
When examining the impact of the regulatory and supervisory 
practices on cost efficiency of banks, the results clearly show that a sound 
regulatory structure is a forceful contributor to an efficient system. The case 
of Morocco is revealing in this respect. In particular, deposit insurance 
schemes, adequate disclosure requirements and credit information 
availability seem to improve the efficiencies of banks. A broader definition 
of the banking market by imposing fewer scope restrictions and removing 132 | CONCLUSIONS 
 
entry obstacles also improves efficiency, albeit less significantly so than the 
previous factors. The rapid deployment of private credit bureaus, possibly 
modelled after the regional best-practice as evidenced by Morocco’s brand 
new system, is also important in enhancing efficiency. 
Lastly, the pro-growth impact of regulatory adequacy appears to 
operate mainly though its impact on financial development. The study 
shows that government ownership in banking is detrimental to growth, 
even outside the scope of financial development and other finance-related 
variables. Moreover, more restrictive disclosure and capital requirements 
as well as less limited scope restrictions have pro-growth impacts by 
enhancing financial development.  
It is important to note that the regulatory practices and adequacy 
factors should not be treated in a vacuum. Institutional quality, measured 
in the study by a variety of political and governance-related factors, is a 
substantially important factor in all of the regressions. The control of 
corruption and the presence of democratic institutions are also important 
factors, which need to be considered alongside the regulatory conditions.  
To sum up, the study highlights some of the key shortcomings of the 
banking regulations of the South-MED countries. It appears that some of 
the newer standards, such as the Basel II capital requirements, have been 
conceived with developed nations in mind and may not be appropriate, 
due to a variety of deficiencies in information-sharing and institutional and 
disclosure mechanisms. A key aim of the upcoming reforms should be to 
look for ways to reduce the role of government in the banking sector while 
ensuring that the regulatory framework and the relevant institutional 
development adequately respond to the market imperfections.  
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ANNEX 1.  CEPS SURVEY ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION FOR THE SOUTHERN 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
The survey comprised two distinct parts: data requests and face-to-face 
interviews. Data requests (Section I) were sent prior to the interviews to 
allow for researchers to develop more focus in the interviews. Face-to-face 
interviews (Section II) were held with experts in the supervisory and 
regulatory agencies, backed with data obtained in section I and other 
sources, including a variety of international databases and data sources 
from the World Bank, IMF and national sources. The text of the survey is 
reproduced below. 
SECTION 1. DATA REQUESTS 
The following survey is designed to allow the CEPS research team to better 
assess the practice of banking supervision in your country. The data 
requests cover a variety of regulatory issues, including general aspects of 
the supervisory agency (Part 1); licensing, disclosure, and prudential 
requirements (Parts 2 to 4); crisis management practices and schemes (Parts 
5 and 6); and, market infrastructure (Part 7). The last section (Part 8) 
concludes the interview with final remarks. 
For all questions, please respond with the most recent information. In 
some cases, space is provided for OPTIONAL data on prior years. Please 
enter the data in the corresponding columns to distinguish between 
different years.  
  1. SUPERVISORY  AGENCY 
 1.1.  General   
  1.1.a.  Name of agency:  
 1.1.b.  Operational  since: 
  1.1.c.  Legal basis (please provide formal legal reference): 
 1.2.  Resources   
 1.2.a.  Budget: 
  1.2.b.  Number of staff (Full-time equivalent (FTE), 2009): 
  1.2.c.  Number of supervisory staff (FTE, 2009):  
 1.3.  Management   
  1.3.a.  Name of the current head of agency: 
  1.3.b.  Current head appointed in: 146 | ANNEX 
 
  1.3.c  Current head’s term to last until:  
  2.  ENTRY AND LICENSING 
 2.1  General   
  2.1.a.  Name of licensing body: 
  2.1.b.  Operational since:  
 2.1.c.  Legal  basis: 
  2.1.d.  New licenses granted: 
  2.1.e.  Number of banks for the following categories: 
 2.1.e.i.  Commercial  banks: 
 2.1.e.ii.  Public  banks: 
 2.1.e.iii.  Development  banks: 
 2.1.e.iv.  Islamic  banks: 
  2.1.e.v.  Specialised credit institutions: 
 2.1.e.vi.  Foreign  subsidiaries: 
 2.1.e.vii.  Foreign  branches: 
  2.1.f.  Total assets of banks for the following categories: 
 2.1.f.i.  Commercial  banks: 
 2.1.f.ii. Public  banks: 
 2.1.f.iii.  Development  banks: 
 2.1.f.iv.  Islamic  banks: 
  2.1.f.v.  Specialised credit institutions: 
 2.1.f.vi.  Foreign  subsidiaries: 
 2.1.f.vii.  Foreign  branches: 
 2.1.f.viii.  Currency: 
  2.1.g.  Total customer loans of banks for the following categories: 
 2.1.g.i. Commercial  banks: 
 2.1.g.ii.  Public  banks: 
 2.1.g.iii.  Development  banks: 
 2.1.g.iv.  Islamic  banks: 
  2.1.g.v.  Specialised credit institutions: 
 2.1.g.vi.  Foreign  subsidiaries: 
 2.1.g.vii.  Foreign  branches: 
  2.1.h.  Total customer deposits for the following categories: 
 2.1.h.i. Commercial  banks: 
 2.1.h.ii.  Public  banks: 
 2.1.h.iii.  Development  banks: 
 2.1.h.iv.  Islamic  banks: 
  2.1.h.v.  Specialised credit institutions: 
 2.1.h.vi.  Foreign  subsidiaries: 
 2.1.h.vii.  Foreign  branches: 
2.1.i  Concentration of banking sector (assets of top-3 banks as percentage 
of total banking assets):  
 2.2.  Entry  requirements   CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 147 
 
2.2.a. Please identify the minimum capital requirements for the following 
institutions, whenever applicable: 
 2.2.a.i.   Commercial  banks: 
 2.2.a.ii.  Public  banks: 
 2.2.a.iii.  Development  banks: 
 2.2.a.iv.  Islamic  banks: 
  2.2.a.v.  Specialised credit institutions: 
 2.2.a.vi.  Foreign  subsidiaries: 
 2.2.a.vii.  Foreign  branches: 
  2.2.b.  What types of funds may be used as paid-up capital upon entry:  
 2.2.b.i. Cash? 
 2.2.b.ii.  Government  securities?   
 2.2.b.iii.  Borrowed  funds? 
  2.2.b.iv.  Other (please specify)? 
 2.3.  Acquisitions 
  2.3.a.  Name of approving body: 
  2.3.b.  Acquisitions granted (2005-2009): 
 2.4.  Rejections 
2.4.a.  Number of rejected licensing applications for the following 
institutions (2005-09): 
 2.4.a.i.   Commercial  banks: 
 2.4.a.ii.  Public  banks: 
 2.4.a.iii.  Development  banks: 
 2.4.a.iv.  Islamic  banks: 
  2.4.a.v.  Specialised credit institutions: 
 2.4.a.vi.  Foreign  subsidiaries: 
 2.4.a.vii.  Foreign  branches: 
2.4.b. Number of rejected acquisitions for the following institutions (2005-
09): 
 2.4.b.i. Commercial  banks: 
 2.4.b.ii.  Public  banks: 
 2.4.b.iii.  Development  banks: 
 2.4.b.iv.  Islamic  banks: 
  2.4.b.v  Specialised credit institutions: 
 2.5.  Foreign  entities 
  2.5.a.  Licences granted to foreign (majority-owned) branches (2005-09): 
  2.5.b.  Licences granted to foreign (majority-owned) subsidiaries (2005-09): 
  2.5.c.  Foreign acquisitions granted (2005-09): 
  3. INFORMATION  DISCLOSURE 
 3.1.  General 
3.1.a.  Number of legal actions taken against auditors for not fulfilling their 
responsibilities (2005-09): 148 | ANNEX 
 
3.1.b. Number of legal actions taken against bank directors on failing to 
disclose information accurately or truthfully to the public (2005-09):  
 4.  PRUDENTIAL  REQUIREMENTS 
  4.1.  Capital requirements and conditions 
  4.1.a.  What are the minimum capital requirements? 
 4.1.a.i.   Tier  1  ratio  (%): 
  4.1.a.ii.  Total (tier 1 + tier 2) capital ratio (%):  
  4.1.a.iii.  Leverage ratio (please specify): 
  4.1.a.iv.  Other (please specify):  
  4.1.b.  What are the actual capital conditions? 
  4.1.b.i.  Tier 1 ratio (%): 
  4.1.b.ii.  Total capital ratio (%):  
  4.1.b.iii.  Simple leverage ratio (%): 
   Please  specify  calculation  method: 
 4.1.b.iv.  Other:   
  4.2.  Liquidity and diversification requirements 
  4.2.a.  Percentage bank assets held in government bonds (%): 
 4.2.b.  Percentage  foreign-currency denominated bank assets (%): 
  4.2.c.  Percentage foreign-currency denominated bank liabilities (%): 
 4.3.  Provisioning  rules 
  4.3.a.  Ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans (%): 
  4.3.b.  How many days is a loan in arrears classified as? 
 4.3.b.i. Substandard: 
 4.3.b.ii.  Doubtful: 
 4.3.b.iii.  Loss: 
4.3.c.  What are the minimum provisioning requirements for loans that are 
classified as? 
 4.3.c.i.   Substandard: 
 4.3.c.ii. Doubtful: 
 4.3.c.iii.  Lost: 
 5.  CRISIS  MANAGEMENT 
 5.1.  General 
  5.1.a.  Number of times the “cease and desist” actions invoked (2005-09): 
  5.1.b.  Number of banks restructured (2005-09): 
  5.1.c.  Number of banks liquidated (2005-09):  
  6.  DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME 
 6.1.  General 
6.1.a.  Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system? If not, please 
skip this section. 
 6.1.b.  Name  of  scheme: 
 6.1.c.  Legal  basis: 
 6.1.d.  Operational  since: 
  6.1.e.  Number of times depository insurance was activated (2005-09): CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 149 
 
  6.1.f.  How are depositors informed about the scheme? 
 6.1.f.i.   Verbally  when  opening  accounts:   
  6.1.f.ii.  Notices or brochures available at branches: 
 6.1.f.iii.  Media  announcements: 
 6.1.f.iv.  Direct  mailings: 
  6.1.f.v.  Publication in official journal/newspaper: 
  6.1.f.vi.  Other (please specify):  
 6.2.  Protection 
  6.2.a.  What is the insurance limit per account for: 
 6.2.a.i.   Local  currency  accounts? 
  6.2.a.ii.  Foreign currency accounts, if covered? 
  6.2.b.  What is the insurance limit per person for: 
  6.2.b.i.  Local currency deposits? 
  6.2.b.ii.  Foreign currency accounts, if covered? 
6.2.c.  Is there a ‘co-insurance mechanism’? In other words, are depositors 
insured for some part of their deposits, notwithstanding the insurance 
limits above? If so, please specify the applicable ratio. Otherwise, 
leave blank. 
6.2.d. Is there a legal period for which all the covered depositors must be 
paid in full? If so, specify the maximum allowed delay: 
 6.3.  Funding 
  6.3.a.  Please check how often are premiums collected: 
  6.3.a.i.  Other (please specify):  
6.3.b. If there is an ex-ante fund, please specify the amount of funds 
accumulated as percent of total customer deposits (2005-09): 
 7.  MARKET  INFRASTRUCTURE 
 7.1.  Liquidity  management 
  7.1.a.  Agency responsible for implementing monetary policy: 
 7.1.b.  Legal  basis: 
  7.1.c.  Operational since:  
  7.1.d.  Amount of transactions in the inter-bank market: 
  7.1.e.  Please detail which monetary policy tools are available for use: 
7.1.e.i.  Interest rate ceilings or credit ceilings? If so, please specify 
requirements: 
7.1.e.ii.  Reserve requirements i.e. deposit reserve requirement ratio? If 
so, please specify requirements: 
7.1.e.iii.  Liquid asset restrictions/ratios? If so, please specify 
requirements: 
  7.1.e.iv.  Standing facilities? If so, amount of lending (2009): 
7.1.e.v.  Open market operations, i.e. buying/selling assets on 
secondary market, repo, or foreign exchange markets? If so, 
amount of lending (2009): 150 | ANNEX 
 
7.1.e.vi.  Government or central bank security auctions? If so, please 
specify methods (volume tenders; interest rate bids; multiple-
rate auctions; etc.). If so, amount of lending (2009): 
  7.1.e.vii.  Others? (please specify as above) 
7.1.f.  Which of the above tools has been the most predominant one over the 
past five years? Please support the argument with evidence, i.e. 
amount/volume of transactions, etc. 
 7.2.  Payment  system 
  7.2.a.  Number and value of card payments: 
  7.2.b.  Number and value of cheques drawn: 
  7.2.c.  Number and value of ATM withdrawals: 
 7.3.  Public  debt  management 
  7.3.a.  What percent of domestic credit is available to the 
 7.3.a.i.   general  government  (2009)? 
  7.3.a.ii.  state-owned (public) enterprises (2009) 
 
SECTION II. FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEW 
The following interview is designed to allow the CEPS research team to 
better assess the practice of banking supervision in your country. The 
questions address a variety of regulatory issues, including general aspects 
of the supervisory agency (Part 1); licensing, disclosure, and prudential 
requirements (Parts 2 to 4); crisis management practices and schemes (Parts 
5 and 6); and, market infrastructure (Part 7). The last section (Part 8) 
concludes the interview with final remarks.  
Please answer the questions fully, providing details and references, 
whenever applicable. You will have an opportunity to make additional 
comments at the end of the questionnaire.  
 
1. SUPERVISORY  AGENCY 
1.1. General 
 1.1.a.  What are the official roles and aims of the supervisory agency? 
 1.1.b.  How is the agency financed? By public funds, premiums on financial 
institutions, or else? 
1.2. Resources 
 1.2.a.  What are the educational requirements for supervisors, including 
required diplomas, specialisations, etc.? 
 1.2.b.  Approximately what percent of the agency’s budget is devoted to 
training programmes for supervisors? 
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the EU to improve the resource utilisation of the agency, including 
technical aid, training, and twinning programmes.  
 1.2.d.  Has the supervisory agency signed any mutual recognition agreements 
or memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the EU member states? 
If so, what are the details of these agreements? 
 1.2.e.  Do the supervisors meet regularly with EU’s supervisory authorities? 
Please provide details on frequency and types of meetings.  
 1.2.f.  Does the supervisor agency have a seat as 
observer in Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS)? 
YES/NO 
1.3. Management 
 1.3.a.  Who appoints the head of agency?  
 1.3.b.i.  If there is a fixed term of service for the head of agency, what is the 
term?  
 1.3.b.ii.  Can the fixed-term be renewed?  YES/NO 
 1.3.c.  Have there been instances of dismissal of the supervisory agency’s 
management over the past few years? If so, please provide details.  
1.4. Liability 
 1.4.a.  Can the agency or management be held legally 
liable for its actions? 
YES/NO 
 1.4.b.  Have the agency or management been held liable for its actions over the 
past few years? If so, please provide details on the case and final ruling.  
2.  ENTRY AND LICENSING 
2.1. Entry  requirements 
 2.1.a.  What is the maximum delay for fulfilling minimum capital 
requirements? Are delays tolerated in fulfilling these requirements? 
2.2. Rejections 
 2.2.a.  Are the grounds for rejecting a licensing application specified by law? If 
so, what are these criteria? 
 2.2.b.  If applicable, what are the most typical reasons for rejecting licensing 
applications? 
 2.2.c.  If applicable, what are the most typical reasons for rejecting 
acquisitions? 
2.3 Foreign  entities 
 2.3.a.  Is there a political commitment to manage foreign entry into banking 
sector? Please comment on the arguments, potential benefits and harms 
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 2.3.b.  How are the home-host supervisory conflicts resolved for foreign 
financial institutions established in your country? Is there an active 
cooperation with EU’s supervisors? 
3. INFORMATION  DISCLOSURE 
3.1 External  audit 
 3.1.a.  Please name the top-three certified auditors in terms of number of banks 
audited: 
 3.1.b.  Please comment on the adequacy and quality of external audits. In 
particular, do the auditors face difficulties (lack of training, resources, 
experience, etc.) in making an independent and fair judgement? If so, 
please identify how these issues can be overcome in the future? 
3.2 Financial  statements 
 3.2.a.  Are there delays (i.e. more than 1-2 days) in sending audited financial 
statements to authorities? If so, what are the typical reasons for filing 
late? 
 3.2.b.  Are banks’ directors legally liable for the 
accuracy and truthfulness of information 
disclosed to the public or to the authorities? 
YES/NO 
4. PRUDENTIAL  REQUIREMENTS 
4.1. Capital  requirements 
 4.1.a.  Are the minimum requirements anticipated to remain 
the same over the next few years? 
YES/NO 
 4.1.b.  Does credit to SME’s receive any preferential treatment?  YES/NO 
4.2.  Liquidity and diversification requirements 
 4.2.a.  What are the rules and guidelines on asset diversification (maximum 
exposure to a single borrower, minimum diversification of loans among 
sectors, concentration limits, etc.)? 
 4.2.b.  What is the reserve requirement, i.e. the minimum deposit reserve 
requirement ratio? 
4.3 Basel  implementation 
 4.3.a.  Is the Basel II framework currently applicable? If so, since when? If not, 
when is it anticipated to be applicable?  
 4.3.b  Are there any differences in the implementation of Basel II for public 
banks and private banks? If so, what are the official reasons for making 
such a distinction? 
 4.3.c.  What is the definition of tier I and tier II capital? 
 4.3.c.  Are there plans to implement Basel III rules? If so, by when? CONVERGENCE OF BANK REGULATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN | 153 
 
 4.3.d.  Is the internal ratings based (IRB) approach applicable? If so, since 
when? If not, when is it anticipated to be applicable? 
 4.3.e.  Please comment on the main difficulties in applying Basel II and the 
upcoming Basel III.  
 4.3.f.  Please comment on whether Basel II puts domestic banks at a 
disadvantage in comparison to foreign-owned banks.  
 4.3.g.  Please comment on existing or potential cooperation opportunities with 
the EU to improve Basel II implementation, including technical aid, 
training, and twinning programmes. 
4.4. Provisioning  rules 
 4.4.a.  When is a loan classified as a “non-performing loan” (NPL)? 
 4.4.b.  Is a high NPL ratio a challenge for the banking sector? If so, what are the 
relevant policy responses to combat with this challenge? 
5. CRISIS  MANAGEMENT 
5.1. General 
 5.1.a.  Is there a regime exclusively applicable for bank insolvencies? If so, 
please detail the legal basis for the regime. 
 5.1.b.  Please comment to what extent the current laws and structures ensure a 
speedy resolution/restoration of troubled banks? 
 5.1.c.  What is the level of cooperation between the supervisory authority and 
government in resolution/restoration of troubled banks? 
 5.1.d.  Has the financial crisis had any impact on banks in your country? If so, 
what was the impact? Increased NPL, liquidity support, insolvencies, 
etc.? Please provide details. 
5.2.  Prompt corrective action 
 5.2.a.  Which body or bodies have the power to 
 5.2.a.i.  Order a bank to “cease and desist” all activities? (please specify below) 
 5.2.a.ii.  Impose penalties due to infraction of “cease and desist” orders? 
 5.2.a.iii.  Override management’s or director’s decisions? 
5.3. Restructuring 
 5.3.a.  Which of the following actions are available during restructuring: 
 5.3.a.i.  Mergers  YES/NO 
 5.3.a.ii.  Recapitalisation  YES/NO 
 5.3.a.iii.  Outright sale of the bank  YES/NO 
 5.3.a.iv.  Acquisition of assets by another bank  YES/NO 
 5.3.a.v.  Transfer of assets to an asset management company  YES/NO 
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 5.3.b.  Which body or bodies have the power to: 
 5.3.b.i.  Supersede shareholders’ rights? 
 5.3.b.ii.  Replace management and directors? 
 5.3.b.iii.  Forebear (i.e. withhold the application of) certain regulations? 
 5.3.c.  To what extent are shareholders’ rights upheld during restructuring, 
especially for those that contribute to the recapitalisation of the bank? 
 5.3.d.  Is there a difference in the treatment of public banks 
and commercial banks during restructuring? 
YES/NO 
5.4. Liquidation 
 5.4.a.  Which body or bodies have the power to: 
 5.4.a.i.  Declare a bank insolvent? (please identify below) 
 5.4.a.ii.  Appoint a receiver or liquidator? 
 5.4.a.iii.  Terminate shareholders’ rights? 
6.  DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME 
6.1. General 
 6.1.a.  Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection 
system? If not, please skip to section 7.  
YES/NO 
 6.1.b.  Does the system provide coverage for foreign-
owned banks? 
YES/NO 
6.2. Protection 
 6.2.a.  Is there a legally determined maximum delay to pay covered depositors 
in full in the event of the failure of a bank? If so, what is the period? 
 6.2.b.  Please comment on the anticipated delay to pay the covered depositors 
in full in the event of the failure of an average-sized bank. Is this in line 
with the legal period mentioned above? 
 6.2.c.  Historically, have depositors been compensated fully up to the legal 
protection? If not, please comment on the reasons, i.e. shortage of ex-
ante funds, foreign exchange volatility, etc., for why the actual 
protection fell short of the intended protection. 
 6.2.d.  Please comment on the powers of the insurer in intervening in a bank, 
revoking deposit insurance, taking legal action against management, etc. 
6.3. Funding 
 6.3.a.  Are premiums risk-adjusted? If so, please comment on how the risk 
ratings or valuations are determined. 
 6.3.b.  Is there an ex-ante fund or an ex-post system? If the latter, please detail 
how the system is to operate in the event of a trouble? Is the system 
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7. MARKET  INFRASTRUCTURE 
7.1. Liquidity  management 
 7.1.a.  How does the monetary policy impact banking in your country 
currently? What are the relevant anticipated changes in monetary policy 
in upcoming years? How will these developments impact banking?  
 7.1.b.  Please comment on existing or potential cooperation arrangements with 
the EU to improve the use of monetary policy tools, including technical 
aid, training, and twinning programmes. 
7.2.  Foreign exchange policy 
 7.2.a.  How relevant are foreign currency risks in banking? How are these risks 
likely to evolve with the introduction of new exchange policies in 
upcoming years, if applicable? 
7.3. Payment  system 
 7.3.a.  What is the predominance of cash-based transactions as opposed to card 
payments or paperless transactions? 
 7.3.b.  Is there a real-time gross settlement system? If so, since when has it been 
operational? 
7.4 Institutional  environment 
 7.4.a.  Please comment on the effectiveness of the judicial system on loan 
recovery. What needs to be done to overcome challenges, if any? 
 7.4.b.  How effective are laws in protecting private property rights? What 
needs to be done to overcome challenges, if any? 
 7.4.c.  Please comment on the degree of government involvement in banking. 
Is there an active government policy to direct credit? rovide details.  
8. FINAL  REMARKS 
8.1.  Please comment on the key challenges for banking supervision in your 
country, distinguishing between challenges faced by policy-makers, 
banking sector, auditors, investors and depositors.  
8.2.  What are the most important regulatory and supervisory developments 
that have taken place in the past few years? What are the anticipated 
changes in the upcoming years? 
8.3.  Please comment on the general cooperation opportunities with the EU to 
improve banking supervision. 
 